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agent-cronjob MCP server

ai.agentasy/cronjobagentasy.aistreamable-httpv0.0.1Scanned

Scheduled, HMAC-signed, retried webhook triggers for AI agents. No account: self-register via tools.

15 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 8 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 3 delete, 0 irreversible, 8 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 6 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the agent-cronjob MCP server can do

The agent-cronjob MCP server is published by agentasy.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 15 tools. It can delete or cancel things (3 tools: delete_job, rotate_secret and rotate_token) and create or change data (8 tools: create_job, verify_challenge, claim_credentials, retry_challenge and 4 more). 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_job); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (create_job and retry_challenge); 1 tool can send data out of your system (create_job). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 6 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

15 tools

Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
  • delete_jobStop the job forever and revoke all its credentials.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_job" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The description says "Cannot be undone".
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "Stop the job forever and revoke all its credentials. Cannot be undone. (REST: DELETE /v1/jo..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Stop the job forever and revoke all its credentials. Cannot be undone. (REST: DELETE /v1/jobs/{id})

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Delete a job
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • rotate_secretNew hmac_secret (SHOWN ONCE, store it now).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    New hmac_secret (SHOWN ONCE, store it now). Until previous.expires_at (grace_sec, default 24 h) triggers carry two v1= signatures, new first. (REST: POST /v1/jobs/{id}/rotate-secret)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Rotate the HMAC signing secret
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • rotate_tokenNew management_token (SHOWN ONCE, store it now).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    New management_token (SHOWN ONCE, store it now). The old one stops working after grace_sec (default 0 = immediately). (REST: POST /v1/jobs/{id}/rotate-token)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Rotate the management token
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • claim_credentialsStep 3.3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The title mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      title: "Poll verification / collect credentials"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The annotations title mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      annotations.title: "Poll verification / collect credentials"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...N ONCE, store them now; later calls say credentials: "already_issued". (REST: GET /v1/jobs/..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 3. Poll verification state with the setup_token. The first call after the webhook is verified returns hmac_secret (signs triggers) and management_token (manages the job) — SHOWN ONCE, store them now; later calls say credentials: "already_issued". (REST: GET /v1/jobs/{id}/verification)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Poll verification / collect credentials
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • create_jobStep 1.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_job" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1. Register your webhook and schedule (no account, no API key). Returns job_id and a one-time setup_token, and POSTs a url_verification challenge to webhook_url. Your webhook must answer it (echo: reply 2xx {"challenge":"<same>"}) — then call claim_credentials. Or reply 2xx and call verify_challenge with the value (callback). Nothing triggers before verification. (REST: POST /v1/jobs)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create a job (start registration)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_deliveriesTrigger log, newest first: scheduled_at, first attempt time, delay, attempts, status and last response code of each run.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_deliveries" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "trigger": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_deliveries" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_deliveries" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Trigger log, newest first: scheduled_at, first attempt time, delay, attempts, status and last response code of each run. since/until (ISO 8601) filter scheduled_at; page with next_cursor. (REST: GET /v1/jobs/{id}/runs)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Run history
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • pause_jobStop triggering (idempotent).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "stop": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Stop triggering (idempotent). Schedule points while paused are not made up later. (REST: POST /v1/jobs/{id}/pause)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Pause a job
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • resume_jobResume a paused or disabled job from its next schedule point; resets consecutive_failures.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resume a paused or disabled job from its next schedule point; resets consecutive_failures. (REST: POST /v1/jobs/{id}/resume)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Resume a job
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • retry_challengeRe-send a fresh url_verification challenge to your webhook (at most 5 re-sends (6 challenges in total), at least 60 s apart).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-send a fresh url_verification challenge to your webhook (at most 5 re-sends (6 challenges in total), at least 60 s apart). The previous challenge stops working. (REST: POST /v1/jobs/{id}/verification/retry)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Re-send the challenge
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • update_jobChange a job in place: signature_in_body (true = triggers also carry cronjob_signature in the JSON body, for platforms that drop the X-Cronjob-* headers; applies from the next atte…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_job" says "update": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Change a job in place: signature_in_body (true = triggers also carry cronjob_signature in the JSON body, for platforms that drop the X-Cronjob-* headers; applies from the next attempt sent) and/or max_runs. Raising max_runs on a job completed with max_runs_reached reactivates it (next run = next occurrence after now, no catch-up); there is no separate resume for completed jobs. Returns the updated job. (REST: PATCH /v1/jobs/{id})

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Change job settings
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_challengeStep 2 (callback mode).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 2 (callback mode). Send back the challenge value your webhook received. On success the result holds hmac_secret and management_token — SHOWN ONCE, store them now. (REST: POST /v1/jobs/{id}/verify)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify the challenge (callback mode)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_jobSettings, status, next_run_at, run_count and credential prefixes of one job (webhook path masked).Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "credential": it reads secrets.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ngs, status, next_run_at, run_count and credential prefixes of one job (webhook path maske..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Settings, status, next_run_at, run_count and credential prefixes of one job (webhook path masked). (REST: GET /v1/jobs/{id})

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get a job
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_runOne run and each delivery attempt: sent_at, response status, duration, error and next retry.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_run" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One run and each delivery attempt: sent_at, response status, duration, error and next retry. (REST: GET /v1/jobs/{id}/runs/{run_id})

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One run with every delivery attempt
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_statsOn-time rate, p50/p95 first-attempt delay and success rate over a window (default 24h).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_stats" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    On-time rate, p50/p95 first-attempt delay and success rate over a window (default 24h). (REST: GET /v1/jobs/{id}/stats)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Punctuality stats
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_jobsStatus of every job you hold a management token for.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_jobs" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Status of every job you hold a management token for. There are no accounts, so pass each {job_id, management_token} pair (up to 20); a pair without management_token uses the Authorization header. (REST: GET /v1/jobs/{id} (once per job))

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List your jobs
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__cronjob__create_job"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 4, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
11
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (3 destructive, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://cronjob.agentasy.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_job (destructive), rotate_secret (destructive), rotate_token (destructive), create_job (write), verify_challenge (write) and 6 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn5 info
  • The server marks "get_deliveries" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_deliveries" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The title mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    title: "Poll verification / collect credentials"

    What this check looks for
  • The annotations title mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    annotations.title: "Poll verification / collect credentials"

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...N ONCE, store them now; later calls say credentials: "already_issued". (REST: GET /v1/jobs/..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ngs, status, next_run_at, run_count and credential prefixes of one job (webhook path maske..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "Stop the job forever and revoke all its credentials. Cannot be undone. (REST: DELETE /v1/jo..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:update_jobChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema

Install

Pinned to version 0.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http cronjob https://cronjob.agentasy.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http cronjob https://cronjob.agentasy.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__cronjob__list_jobs",
      "mcp__cronjob__get_job",
      "mcp__cronjob__get_run",
      "mcp__cronjob__get_stats"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__cronjob__create_job",
      "mcp__cronjob__verify_challenge",
      "mcp__cronjob__claim_credentials",
      "mcp__cronjob__retry_challenge",
      "mcp__cronjob__update_job",
      "mcp__cronjob__pause_job",
      "mcp__cronjob__resume_job",
      "mcp__cronjob__get_deliveries"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__cronjob__delete_job",
      "mcp__cronjob__rotate_secret",
      "mcp__cronjob__rotate_token"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as cronjob. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__cronjob__create_job untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__cronjob__retry_challenge untrusted-input
  • mcp__cronjob__get_job private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.agentasy/cronjob/verify?hash=46cc4626899975b362a762cf5337adf019723d744a4b697fa26fc79ed4a1e3ad" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 46cc46268999, from Nov 17, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.agentasy/cronjob/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.agentasy/cronjob
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.agentasy/cronjob.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.agentasy/cronjob)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

agent-cronjob MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the agent-cronjob MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 15 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the agent-cronjob MCP server delete data?

Yes. 3 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_job, rotate_secret and rotate_token.

Can the agent-cronjob MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the agent-cronjob MCP server have?

15 tools: 3 destructive, 8 write, 4 read. delete_job, rotate_secret, rotate_token, create_job, verify_challenge, claim_credentials, retry_challenge, update_job and 7 more.

Does the agent-cronjob MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the agent-cronjob MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): create_job.

Has the agent-cronjob MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.