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AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server

ai.agenticcart/agenticcartagenticcart.aistreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Check any Shopify, WooCommerce or other online store, product page or feed for AI readiness.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 5
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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  • Your agent never holds the key.
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What the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server can do

The AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server is published by agenticcart.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_store_readiness, check_product and check_acp_feed), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (check_llms_txt); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (check_store_readiness, check_product, check_acp_feed and 2 more); 5 tools can send data out of your system (check_store_readiness, check_product, check_acp_feed and 2 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_acp_feedGrade a product feed against the Agentic Commerce Protocol (ACP) / OpenAI product feed specification, which governs whether a catalog can be sold inside ChatGPT.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Grade a product feed against the Agentic Commerce Protocol (ACP) / OpenAI product feed specification, which governs whether a catalog can be sold inside ChatGPT. Takes the feed URL (XML or JSON) and returns a 0-100 score plus per-attribute findings on required and recommended fields. Use this when asked whether a catalog or feed is ready for agentic commerce, for ChatGPT Instant Checkout, or for ACP compliance in general.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Grade a feed against the Agentic Commerce Protocol
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_productAudit a single product page for how well AI shopping assistants can read and recommend it.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit a single product page for how well AI shopping assistants can read and recommend it. Takes the product page URL and returns a 0-100 score with findings on structured data (Product/Offer schema), price and availability markup, images, description quality and identifiers such as GTIN and brand. Use this for questions like "why does ChatGPT not recommend this product", or when reviewing one specific product listing rather than a whole store. Works on any public product page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a product page for AI readability
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_store_readinessAudit any public online store for AI and agent readiness.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_store_readiness" says "store": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_store_readiness" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store_readiness" says "store": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit any public online store for AI and agent readiness. Takes the store homepage URL and returns a 0-100 score with concrete findings: whether AI crawlers are allowed in robots.txt, whether the pages send their content in the HTML or only build it in the browser with JavaScript (React, Vue or Angular apps that most AI crawlers see as empty), whether product structured data is present, sitemap, llms.txt and HTTPS. Use this when asked whether a shop can be discovered, read or cited by AI shopping assistants such as ChatGPT, Perplexity or Google AI Overviews, or when reviewing a store's AI visibility. Works on any store on the public web - no account, no ownership and no login required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check store AI readiness
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_llms_txtFetch a website's /llms.txt and check it against the llmstxt.org format: the H1 title, the summary block, the link sections, whether the listed links answer, and whether the server…Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a website's /llms.txt and check it against the llmstxt.org format: the H1 title, the summary block, the link sections, whether the listed links answer, and whether the server really sends the file rather than an HTML page. Returns a 0-100 score with findings; when the file is missing it says so. Use this when asked whether a site has an llms.txt, whether it is valid, or how to improve it. For a whole-store review use check_store_readiness, which only notes whether the file exists.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a site's llms.txt
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_merchant_feedValidate a product feed against the Google Merchant Center product specification.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "validate": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validate a product feed against the Google Merchant Center product specification. Takes the feed URL (XML or JSON) and returns a 0-100 score with findings on required attributes, price formatting, availability values and GTIN checksums. Use this when asked to check, debug or validate a Google Merchant / Google Shopping feed, or to explain why products might be disapproved.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Validate a Google Merchant Center feed
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

25 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out5
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agenticcart__check_llms_txt"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agenticcart.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_store_readiness (write), check_product (write), check_acp_feed (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "check_store_readiness" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store_readiness" says "store": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agenticcart https://agenticcart.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agenticcart https://agenticcart.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agenticcart__check_store_readiness",
      "mcp__agenticcart__check_product",
      "mcp__agenticcart__check_acp_feed",
      "mcp__agenticcart__check_merchant_feed",
      "mcp__agenticcart__check_llms_txt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenticcart. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__agenticcart__check_store_readiness untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agenticcart__check_product untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agenticcart__check_acp_feed untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agenticcart__check_merchant_feed untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agenticcart__check_llms_txt private-data, untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.agenticcart/agenticcart/verify?hash=93de7d3c5dd1a054ad9979b77e795456f13e71caf1b4b3e269809f461f45abf9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 93de7d3c5dd1, from Nov 19, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.agenticcart/agenticcart/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.agenticcart/agenticcart
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.agenticcart/agenticcart.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.agenticcart/agenticcart)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. check_store_readiness, check_product, check_acp_feed, check_merchant_feed and check_llms_txt.

Does the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server send data to outside services?

5 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_store_readiness, check_product, check_acp_feed, check_merchant_feed and check_llms_txt.

Has the AgenticCart: AI readiness checks for online stores MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.