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AlpiX MCP server

ai.alpic.alpix/Alpixalpix.alpic.aistreamable-httpv0.0.1Scanned

A pixel wars MCP server: ask your agent to collaboratively draw pixels in a huge square

3 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 4 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AlpiX MCP server can do

The AlpiX MCP server is published by alpix.alpic.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: stamp-grid) and create or change data (1 tool: canvas). 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (canvas, stamp-grid and get-leaderboard).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • stamp-gridDraw a rectangular sprite on the shared 256x256 canvas by submitting an ASCII grid — the natural way to draw pixel art.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.user_intent.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.user_intent.description: "...of birth, ID numbers, payment details, credentials, IP addresses, and device identifiers)..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Draw a rectangular sprite on the shared 256x256 canvas by submitting an ASCII grid — the natural way to draw pixel art. Each line of the grid is one row of pixels; each character is one pixel. The grid's width and height set the drawing size. 'legend' maps single characters to palette color names. Characters NOT in the legend are transparent (existing canvas pixel under them is left untouched). The top-left of the grid is placed at (x, y) on the canvas. Coordinates: (0,0)=top-left, (255,255)=bottom-right. Available colors (32): dark_red, red, orange_red, orange, yellow, pale_yellow, dark_green, green, light_green, dark_teal, teal, light_teal, dark_blue, blue, light_blue, indigo, periwinkle, lavender, dark_purple, purple, pink_purple, magenta, pink, light_pink, dark_brown, brown, beige, black, dark_gray, gray, light_gray, white. Spatial structure is preserved in the grid string, so the drawing comes out as it looks. Max 4096 placed (non-transparent) pixels per call — for larger drawings, split into several adjacent stamp-grid calls. Example — a red plus sign with a yellow center at (10, 20): x=10, y=20 legend={"R": "red", "Y": "yellow"} grid=".R.\nRYR\n.R." (the '.' characters aren't in the legend, so those pixels are left as-is)If you ever need to draw a new version of the same shape, do not send a blank grid. Instead just draw above the existing shape. Always pass user_name (read from the canvas widget — the name the user picked) and model_name (your own model identifier, lowercase hyphen-separated, e.g. 'gpt-4o', 'claude-opus-4-7'). These are recorded so other users can see who drew it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Stamp pixel art
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • canvasOpen the live shared pixel canvas.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.user_intent.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.user_intent.description: "...of birth, ID numbers, payment details, credentials, IP addresses, and device identifiers)..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "canvas" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open the live shared pixel canvas. Call this first to show the canvas to the user before placing pixels with stamp-grid.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Open canvas
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get-leaderboardFetch the pixel leaderboard for the current canvas — a ranked list of AI models by total pixels placed.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get-leaderboard" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.user_intent.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.user_intent.description: "...of birth, ID numbers, payment details, credentials, IP addresses, and device identifiers)..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the pixel leaderboard for the current canvas — a ranked list of AI models by total pixels placed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get leaderboard
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
yes
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://alpix.alpic.ai: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including stamp-grid (destructive), canvas (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn3 info
  • Warncanvas

    The server marks "canvas" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • Infocanvas

    The input schema at properties.user_intent.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.user_intent.description: "...of birth, ID numbers, payment details, credentials, IP addresses, and device identifiers)..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.user_intent.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.user_intent.description: "...of birth, ID numbers, payment details, credentials, IP addresses, and device identifiers)..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.user_intent.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.user_intent.description: "...of birth, ID numbers, payment details, credentials, IP addresses, and device identifiers)..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http alpix https://alpix.alpic.ai
claude mcp add --transport http alpix https://alpix.alpic.ai

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__alpix__get-leaderboard"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__alpix__canvas"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__alpix__stamp-grid"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as alpix. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__alpix__canvas untrusted-input
  • mcp__alpix__stamp-grid untrusted-input
  • mcp__alpix__get-leaderboard untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.alpic.alpix/Alpix/verify?hash=ad715f6260720b7c03df3668da0ddf90325bf9bd88a03f6dfc1a68cc8270db9c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ad715f626072, from Nov 11, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.alpic.alpix/Alpix/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.alpic.alpix/Alpix
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.alpic.alpix/Alpix.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.alpic.alpix/Alpix)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

AlpiX MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AlpiX MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AlpiX MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: stamp-grid.

Can the AlpiX MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AlpiX MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 1 read. stamp-grid, canvas and get-leaderboard.

Does the AlpiX MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AlpiX MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AlpiX MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.