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APIR Agent Verification MCP server

ai.apir/verifyapir.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Check an AI agent you did not build: is it who it claims, inside its mandate, and what's its record

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 5 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the APIR Agent Verification MCP server can do

The APIR Agent Verification MCP server is published by apir.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: verify_agent), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 5 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_agentCheck whether an AI agent carries a real, cryptographically signed credential.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...arries a real, cryptographically signed credential. Accepts an agent name, a credential id..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.query.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.query.description: "Agent name, credential id (TP-... or APIR-TP-...), agent UUID,..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether an AI agent carries a real, cryptographically signed credential. Accepts an agent name, a credential id (TP-...), an agent UUID, a domain or a DID. Returns one of seven verdicts: VERIFIED, EXPIRED, REVOKED, SUPERSEDED, UNSIGNED, UNCHECKED or NO_RECORD. IMPORTANT for interpreting the answer: VERIFIED means the Ed25519 signature recomputes against the key published at apir.ai and the credential is unexpired and unrevoked. It confirms WHO issued the credential and that its contents are unaltered. It is NOT a guarantee that the agent behaves well. NO_RECORD is an honest, first-class answer: it means nothing is on file, which is not evidence of wrongdoing and not a warning. It means any claim the agent makes about itself is unverified. Free, unauthenticated, and no account is required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify an AI agent
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_authorityResolve the human mandate behind an AI agent: which actions a named person actually permitted, any value cap, the expiry, and whether the grant itself is signed.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...else's behalf. An agent holding a valid credential may still be acting outside its mandate..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.query.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.query.description: "Agent name, credential id, or agent UUID."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve the human mandate behind an AI agent: which actions a named person actually permitted, any value cap, the expiry, and whether the grant itself is signed. Where authority was delegated agent to agent, the full chain is walked back to the human at the root, and one law is enforced at every hop: authority may only ever narrow. No hop can hold an action, a target or a spending cap wider than the hop above it, and the root must be a human. Use this before letting an agent transact, sign, spend or commit on someone else's behalf. An agent holding a valid credential may still be acting outside its mandate, and those are different questions. The answer is the mandate on file as of checked_at. It is not proof the permission still holds at the moment the action runs: check again at the point of action, and treat a record as proof of what was recorded and when.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check what an agent is allowed to do
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_verification_keysReturn the Ed25519 public keys APIR publishes, so a signature can be recomputed offline without trusting any APIR response, including this one.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_verification_keys" says "get": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...i. Retired keys stay published so older credentials still verify."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the Ed25519 public keys APIR publishes, so a signature can be recomputed offline without trusting any APIR response, including this one. Keys are published as a JWKS at apir.ai/.well-known/jwks.json and as did:web:apir.ai. Retired keys stay published so older credentials still verify.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get APIR public signing keys
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://apir.ai/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_agent (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

5 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http verify https://apir.ai/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http verify https://apir.ai/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__verify__check_authority",
      "mcp__verify__get_verification_keys"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__verify__verify_agent"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as verify. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.apir/verify/verify?hash=7340e3b3b3bfdfb330a0c1e607f4361b411c9690a986039acc485cbf924c697e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7340e3b3b3bf, from Nov 11, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.apir/verify/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.apir/verify
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.apir/verify.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.apir/verify)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

APIR Agent Verification MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the APIR Agent Verification MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the APIR Agent Verification MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the APIR Agent Verification MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the APIR Agent Verification MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. verify_agent, check_authority and get_verification_keys.

Does the APIR Agent Verification MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the APIR Agent Verification MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the APIR Agent Verification MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.