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bidclub MCP server

ai.bidclub/bidclubbidclub.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Search 45+ investor podcasts and read transcripts, TL;DRs, digests — bilingual EN/中文, keyless.

6 tools: 2 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the bidclub MCP server can do

The bidclub MCP server is published by bidclub.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: bidclub_feed_index and bidclub_download_links), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • bidclub_feed_indexThe slim catalogue of every episode — one row each, metadata only.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The slim catalogue of every episode — one row each, metadata only. Narrow it with show or person; passing both is an error. Large responses are truncated to the newest rows with a note, so filter rather than paging.
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • bidclub_get_episodeRead one section of an episode.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "bidclub_get_episode" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one section of an episode. Long sections page deterministically: when the result says truncated: true, call again with offset set to next_offset and concatenate content_md until next_offset is null. Prefer tldr or digest — a transcript can exceed 100,000 characters and is rarely worth paging in full. lang selects the OUTPUT edition, not a catalogue filter; transcripts exist only in the episode's source language, so requesting a different lang for section=transcript always returns the source with lang_fallback: true.
  • bidclub_list_episodesList episodes newest first, optionally narrowed to one show.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "bidclub_list_episodes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List episodes newest first, optionally narrowed to one show. Returns metadata only — titles, deks, dates, durations, participant chips and source links — never the digest or transcript. Use bidclub_get_episode for content.
  • bidclub_list_showsList every show in the BidClub library with its id, display name, source language, hosts, and source links.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "bidclub_list_shows" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every show in the BidClub library with its id, display name, source language, hosts, and source links. Start here when you need a show id for the show parameter of the other tools.
  • bidclub_search_episodesFull-text search across titles, deks, TL;DRs, digests and transcripts, with a substring sweep that handles Chinese queries the tokenizer cannot segment.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "bidclub_search_episodes" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full-text search across titles, deks, TL;DRs, digests and transcripts, with a substring sweep that handles Chinese queries the tokenizer cannot segment. Returns up to 20 metadata rows, never content. When the response carries partial: true the query only covered the newest searched_recent episodes, so say so rather than reporting an absence.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://bidclub.ai/api/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including bidclub_feed_index (write), bidclub_download_links (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http bidclub https://bidclub.ai/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http bidclub https://bidclub.ai/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__bidclub__bidclub_list_shows",
      "mcp__bidclub__bidclub_list_episodes",
      "mcp__bidclub__bidclub_search_episodes",
      "mcp__bidclub__bidclub_get_episode"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__bidclub__bidclub_feed_index",
      "mcp__bidclub__bidclub_download_links"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as bidclub. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.bidclub/bidclub/verify?hash=9d5946707d9797b660c421b830f23a3ee27a9e6f317922feff6e09d4ffce4a5c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9d5946707d97, from Nov 11, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.bidclub/bidclub/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.bidclub/bidclub
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.bidclub/bidclub.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.bidclub/bidclub)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

bidclub MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the bidclub MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the bidclub MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the bidclub MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the bidclub MCP server have?

6 tools: 2 write, 4 read. bidclub_feed_index, bidclub_download_links, bidclub_list_shows, bidclub_list_episodes, bidclub_search_episodes and bidclub_get_episode.

Does the bidclub MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the bidclub MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the bidclub MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.