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dataecho.ai MCP server

ai.dataecho/mcpdataecho.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Deploy files, sites, and Dockerfile apps to live URLs + private drives for agent memory.

26 tools: 4 can delete or cancel things, 2 do something that can't be undone, 11 change things and 9 only read.

Tools: 4 delete, 2 irreversible, 11 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 5
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 1 finding, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here can delete or cancel things and 2 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the dataecho.ai MCP server can do

The dataecho.ai MCP server is published by dataecho.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 26 tools. It can delete or cancel things (4 tools: delete_site, drive_delete_file, drive_revoke_token and delete_variable), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (publish_site and drive_move_file) and create or change data (11 tools: platform_info, request_login_code, verify_login_code, claim_site and 7 more). 9 tools only read.

5 tools read private data (get_site, list_drives, drive_list_files and 2 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (publish_site and drive_move_file).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

26 tools

Deletes or cancels 4Claude Code: deny
  • delete_sitePermanently delete an owned site.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_site" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The description says "Permanently delete".
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Permanently delete an owned site. Irreversible — confirm with the user first.
  • delete_variableDelete an account variable.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_variable" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete an account variable.
  • drive_delete_fileDelete one file from a drive.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drive_delete_file" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete one file from a drive.
  • drive_revoke_tokenRevoke a drive share token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drive_revoke_token" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Revoke a drive share token.
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • drive_move_fileMove/rename a file inside a drive.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drive_move_file" says "move": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Move/rename a file inside a drive.
  • publish_siteDeploy files to a live URL.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "publish_site" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "publish_site" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deploy files to a live URL. No slug → create a NEW site (works without auth; anonymous sites expire in 24h — always show the user the claimUrl). With slug → UPDATE that site (complete snapshot: send ALL files). A Dockerfile in the files makes it a server-side app (auth required; listen on process.env.PORT; persist under /data; poll app_status). Total payload ≤ 8 MB — for bigger sites use the dataecho skill scripts.
Changes things 11Claude Code: ask
  • claim_siteMake a previously-anonymous site permanent under the authenticated account (requires auth + the claimToken from publish_site).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Make a previously-anonymous site permanent under the authenticated account (requires auth + the claimToken from publish_site).
  • create_driveCreate a new private drive.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_drive" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a new private drive.
  • drive_historyVersion timeline of a drive (every write is a restorable version).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Version timeline of a drive (every write is a restorable version).
  • drive_restoreRestore a drive to a prior version (commits a new version; nothing is lost).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Restore a drive to a prior version (commits a new version; nothing is lost).
  • drive_shareMint a scoped drive access token for another agent (perms read|write, optional path prefix + TTL like `7d`).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint a scoped drive access token for another agent (perms read|write, optional path prefix + TTL like `7d`). The secret is returned ONCE.
  • drive_write_fileWrite/overwrite one file in a drive (ETag-safe: pass ifMatch to assert the version you read, otherwise the current version is used automatically).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drive_write_file" says "write": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Write/overwrite one file in a drive (ETag-safe: pass ifMatch to assert the version you read, otherwise the current version is used automatically).
  • platform_infoDataEcho platform overview: what it can host, auth state of this connection, docs links.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    DataEcho platform overview: what it can host, auth state of this connection, docs links. Call this first if unsure.
  • request_login_codeStart sign-in: email a one-time code to the user.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_login_code" says "request": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start sign-in: email a one-time code to the user. Follow with verify_login_code.
  • set_variableCreate/update a write-only account secret (uppercase name).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "set_variable" says "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create/update a write-only account secret (uppercase name). Injected as env vars into container apps and as ${VAR} into proxy calls. Optionally pin which upstream hosts may receive it.
  • update_site_metadataPatch site settings without redeploying: viewer title/description, SPA mode, TTL, password (string sets, null removes).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_site_metadata" says "update": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Patch site settings without redeploying: viewer title/description, SPA mode, TTL, password (string sets, null removes).
  • verify_login_codeComplete sign-in with the emailed code.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to "~/.artifact/credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...of this MCP connection (and/or save to ~/.artifact/credentials for the CLI scripts). Never echo it int..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Complete sign-in with the emailed code. Returns the apiKey ONCE — configure it as the `Authorization: Bearer <key>` header of this MCP connection (and/or save to ~/.artifact/credentials for the CLI scripts). Never echo it into chat.
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • app_statusBuild/run status of a container app deployed via publish_site with a Dockerfile.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "app_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build/run status of a container app deployed via publish_site with a Dockerfile. Poll until status is `live` or `failed`.
  • drive_list_filesList files in a drive (by drive name or drv_… id), optionally under a path prefix.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drive_list_files" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "drive_list_files" says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List files in a drive (by drive name or drv_… id), optionally under a path prefix.
  • drive_read_fileRead a file from a drive.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drive_read_file" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "drive_read_file" says "read" and "drive": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a file from a drive. Text comes back as utf-8 `content`; binary as `contentBase64`. Files over 1 MB are refused (use the skill scripts).
  • drive_tokensList active share tokens of a drive (secrets are never shown again).Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "drive_tokens" says "drive": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List active share tokens of a drive (secrets are never shown again).
  • get_siteFull details + current file manifest of an owned site.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_site" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full details + current file manifest of an owned site.
  • list_drivesList the authenticated account's private cloud drives.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_drives" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_drives" says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the authenticated account's private cloud drives.
  • list_sitesList all sites owned by the authenticated account.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_sites" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all sites owned by the authenticated account.
  • list_variablesList account variable NAMES (values are write-only — they are injected into proxy calls and container apps, never read back).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_variables" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List account variable NAMES (values are write-only — they are injected into proxy calls and container apps, never read back).
  • search_sitesFull-text search across the authenticated account's sites (names, metadata, and text content).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_sites" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full-text search across the authenticated account's sites (names, metadata, and text content).

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input.

Reads private data5
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
17
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 17 tools that change things (4 destructive, 2 irreversible, 11 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://dataecho.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 26 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_site (destructive), drive_delete_file (destructive), drive_revoke_token (destructive), delete_variable (destructive), publish_site (irreversible) and 12 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high
  • The description refers to "~/.artifact/credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...of this MCP connection (and/or save to ~/.artifact/credentials for the CLI scripts). Never echo it int..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http dataecho https://dataecho.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http dataecho https://dataecho.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__dataecho__list_sites",
      "mcp__dataecho__search_sites",
      "mcp__dataecho__get_site",
      "mcp__dataecho__app_status",
      "mcp__dataecho__list_drives",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_list_files",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_read_file",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_tokens",
      "mcp__dataecho__list_variables"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__dataecho__platform_info",
      "mcp__dataecho__request_login_code",
      "mcp__dataecho__verify_login_code",
      "mcp__dataecho__publish_site",
      "mcp__dataecho__claim_site",
      "mcp__dataecho__update_site_metadata",
      "mcp__dataecho__create_drive",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_write_file",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_move_file",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_share",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_history",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_restore",
      "mcp__dataecho__set_variable"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__dataecho__delete_site",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_delete_file",
      "mcp__dataecho__drive_revoke_token",
      "mcp__dataecho__delete_variable"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dataecho. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__dataecho__publish_site outbound
  • mcp__dataecho__get_site private-data
  • mcp__dataecho__list_drives private-data
  • mcp__dataecho__drive_list_files private-data
  • mcp__dataecho__drive_read_file private-data
  • mcp__dataecho__drive_move_file outbound
  • mcp__dataecho__drive_tokens private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.dataecho/mcp/verify?hash=4807c875821c0aeb4794dc26e3fcf3785d78a77ae4b9dbca1aa6d85b32fd164b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4807c875821c, from Nov 10, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.dataecho/mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.dataecho/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.dataecho/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.dataecho/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

dataecho.ai MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the dataecho.ai MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 26 tools, 17 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the dataecho.ai MCP server delete data?

Yes. 4 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_site, drive_delete_file, drive_revoke_token and delete_variable.

Can the dataecho.ai MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: publish_site and drive_move_file.

What tools does the dataecho.ai MCP server have?

26 tools: 4 destructive, 2 irreversible, 11 write, 9 read. delete_site, drive_delete_file, drive_revoke_token, delete_variable, publish_site, drive_move_file, platform_info, request_login_code and 18 more.

Does the dataecho.ai MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the dataecho.ai MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): publish_site and drive_move_file.

Has the dataecho.ai MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.