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EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server

ai.eosl/eosleosl.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Hardware end-of-life dates by part number, each linked to the vendor's own bulletin.

5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server can do

The EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server is published by eosl.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: bulk_check), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (lookup_part); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_family).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • bulk_checkCheck up to 200 part numbers in one call (read-only, no auth; for a single part use lookup_part).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check up to 200 part numbers in one call (read-only, no auth; for a single part use lookup_part). Returns a per-part row (status, EOSL date, source URL, page URL) plus summary counts: past, endingSoon, supported, active, notFound. Never partial and never destructive: unknown or malformed entries do not fail the call, each simply returns found:false in its row.
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_familyFetch the full source-backed record for one product family by slug (from search_models or lookup_part pageUrl): lifecycle dates per SKU group, every part number, support runway sco…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_family" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the full source-backed record for one product family by slug (from search_models or lookup_part pageUrl): lifecycle dates per SKU group, every part number, support runway score factors, and the vendor bulletin URLs. Read-only; an unknown slug returns found:false with a hint, never an error.
  • list_vendorsList all vendors tracked by EOSL.ai with family counts and vendor page URLs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_vendors" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all vendors tracked by EOSL.ai with family counts and vendor page URLs. Read-only, no parameters. Use this first to check whether a vendor is covered at all; for specific models use search_models, for a part number use lookup_part.
  • lookup_partLook up one hardware part number or model name in the EOSL.ai database (read-only, no auth; for many parts use bulk_check).Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_part" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "database": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up one hardware part number or model name in the EOSL.ai database (read-only, no auth; for many parts use bulk_check). Returns support status, End-of-Sale and End-of-Service-Life dates, support runway score, and the primary vendor bulletin URL backing the dates. Matching is exact, then punctuation-insensitive, then Fortinet short-SKU aliases (FG-60E -> FortiGate-60E); a model/family name (e.g. "7010TX-48") that matches no SKU returns the family-level record, flagged matchedVia:family-name. Anything else returns found:false rather than a guessed date.
  • search_modelsSearch tracked product families by vendor, product line, or series name (case-insensitive substring, e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_models" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search tracked product families by vendor, product line, or series name (case-insensitive substring, e.g. "nexus 9300"). Read-only. Returns up to 10 families with status, EOSL window, and page URL. Use this for discovery when you have a name; for an exact part number use lookup_part, and use get_family with a returned slug for the full record.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://eosl.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including bulk_check (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http eosl https://eosl.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http eosl https://eosl.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__eosl__lookup_part",
      "mcp__eosl__search_models",
      "mcp__eosl__get_family",
      "mcp__eosl__list_vendors"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__eosl__bulk_check"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as eosl. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__eosl__lookup_part private-data
  • mcp__eosl__get_family untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.eosl/eosl/verify?hash=46bb3fd530edc88543464841454d6744533609a916718b9b3762fece0ac9b5d8" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 46bb3fd530ed, from Nov 11, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.eosl/eosl/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.eosl/eosl
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.eosl/eosl.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.eosl/eosl)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. bulk_check, lookup_part, search_models, get_family and list_vendors.

Does the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the EOSL.ai — Hardware End-of-Life Database MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.