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Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server

ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kgfamilyofficeknowledgegraph.aistreamable-httpv0.21.0Scanned

Family Office Knowledge Graph: read-only MCP door over the public record. Agentic KG Holdings.

7 tools: 1 change things and 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server can do

The Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server is published by familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: claim_seat), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (get_record, list_events_since, claim_seat and 1 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.21.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • claim_seatA family office's own agent claims the seat of its own record.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A family office's own agent claims the seat of its own record. Give card_url (the https URL of the office agent's card) and record_id (the record id as the graph serves it). The record must resolve to the name the card gives; the door then issues a domain challenge (DNS TXT _fo-kg-seat.<domain> or https://<domain>/.well-known/fo-kg-seat.txt). Call again with challenge_id: proven → the record moves listed → claimed and the seat key is answered once. With seat_key and rows, the seat sets its own fields on its own record only (website, aliases, sectors, structure, description, contact_url); the sourced fields are never touched and verified is set by a person, never by a tool. The seat settles on /seat (x402).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Claim a seat
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • get_recordThe Family Office Record for one identifier: every field with value, source_url, read_by and state; optionally a named version.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_record" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The Family Office Record for one identifier: every field with value, source_url, read_by and state; optionally a named version.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Get a Family Office Record
  • list_aliasesEvery name the record carries for one identifier — legal name, register names, other names — each with its source.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_aliases" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every name the record carries for one identifier — legal name, register names, other names — each with its source.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: List aliases
  • list_events_sinceDated, URL'd events on one record (registrations, renewals, orders, acquisitions), oldest first, optionally since a date, paged by cursor.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_events_since" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Dated, URL'd events on one record (registrations, renewals, orders, acquisitions), oldest first, optionally since a date, paged by cursor.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: List events on a record
  • list_my_receiptsFor a seat holder only: the RCO-10060 receipts whose subject is its own record — who read it (as the door saw the reader: user agent, network, country), when, and under which rule …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_my_receipts" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For a seat holder only: the RCO-10060 receipts whose subject is its own record — who read it (as the door saw the reader: user agent, network, country), when, and under which rule (the tool) — newest first, each with its verify URL. Needs record_id and the seat key of that record; nobody else can list them.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: List the receipts of my record
  • list_nodesThe graph's nodes — one per jurisdiction — with record counts read from each node's index, the node door and its as-of.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_nodes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The graph's nodes — one per jurisdiction — with record counts read from each node's index, the node door and its as-of.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: List nodes
  • resolve_family_officeResolve an identifier (LEI, legal name, alias or register id) to the family-office records that carry it, with the node that serves each.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_family_office" says "resolve": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an identifier (LEI, legal name, alias or register id) to the family-office records that carry it, with the node that serves each.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Resolve a family office

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://agent-kg.ai
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including claim_seat (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 1.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
  2. Tools2 added.+2 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.21.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http fo-kg https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http fo-kg https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__fo-kg__resolve_family_office",
      "mcp__fo-kg__get_record",
      "mcp__fo-kg__list_events_since",
      "mcp__fo-kg__list_aliases",
      "mcp__fo-kg__list_nodes",
      "mcp__fo-kg__list_my_receipts"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__fo-kg__claim_seat"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as fo-kg. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__fo-kg__get_record untrusted-input
  • mcp__fo-kg__list_events_since untrusted-input
  • mcp__fo-kg__claim_seat untrusted-input
  • mcp__fo-kg__list_my_receipts untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg/verify?hash=6070531d0d4a365ff9b6b08de7821bdb446a039be90913394e57da8a0668a04f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 6070531d0d4a, from Nov 18, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server have?

7 tools: 1 write, 6 read. claim_seat, resolve_family_office, get_record, list_events_since, list_aliases, list_nodes and list_my_receipts.

Does the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 5, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.