Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server
ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kgfamilyofficeknowledgegraph.aistreamable-httpv0.21.0Scanned
Family Office Knowledge Graph: read-only MCP door over the public record. Agentic KG Holdings.
7 tools: 1 change things and 6 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server can do
The Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server is published by familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: claim_seat), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (get_record, list_events_since, claim_seat and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.21.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
claim_seatA family office's own agent claims the seat of its own record.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it A family office's own agent claims the seat of its own record. Give card_url (the https URL of the office agent's card) and record_id (the record id as the graph serves it). The record must resolve to the name the card gives; the door then issues a domain challenge (DNS TXT _fo-kg-seat.<domain> or https://<domain>/.well-known/fo-kg-seat.txt). Call again with challenge_id: proven → the record moves listed → claimed and the seat key is answered once. With seat_key and rows, the seat sets its own fields on its own record only (website, aliases, sectors, structure, description, contact_url); the sourced fields are never touched and verified is set by a person, never by a tool. The seat settles on /seat (x402).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Claim a seat
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
get_recordThe Family Office Record for one identifier: every field with value, source_url, read_by and state; optionally a named version.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_record" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it The Family Office Record for one identifier: every field with value, source_url, read_by and state; optionally a named version.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Get a Family Office Record
list_aliasesEvery name the record carries for one identifier — legal name, register names, other names — each with its source.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_aliases" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Every name the record carries for one identifier — legal name, register names, other names — each with its source.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: List aliases
list_events_sinceDated, URL'd events on one record (registrations, renewals, orders, acquisitions), oldest first, optionally since a date, paged by cursor.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_events_since" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Dated, URL'd events on one record (registrations, renewals, orders, acquisitions), oldest first, optionally since a date, paged by cursor.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: List events on a record
list_my_receiptsFor a seat holder only: the RCO-10060 receipts whose subject is its own record — who read it (as the door saw the reader: user agent, network, country), when, and under which rule …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_my_receipts" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it For a seat holder only: the RCO-10060 receipts whose subject is its own record — who read it (as the door saw the reader: user agent, network, country), when, and under which rule (the tool) — newest first, each with its verify URL. Needs record_id and the seat key of that record; nobody else can list them.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: List the receipts of my record
list_nodesThe graph's nodes — one per jurisdiction — with record counts read from each node's index, the node door and its as-of.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_nodes" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The graph's nodes — one per jurisdiction — with record counts read from each node's index, the node door and its as-of.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: List nodes
resolve_family_officeResolve an identifier (LEI, legal name, alias or register id) to the family-office records that carry it, with the node that serves each.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "resolve_family_office" says "resolve": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve an identifier (LEI, legal name, alias or register id) to the family-office records that carry it, with the node that serves each.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Resolve a family office
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://agent-kg.ai
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including claim_seat (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 1.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1
Tools2 added.+2 addedView diff
- Added:claim_seatChanges things
- Added:list_my_receiptsOnly reads
Install
Pinned to version 0.21.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http fo-kg https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http fo-kg https://mcp.familyofficeknowledgegraph.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__fo-kg__resolve_family_office",
"mcp__fo-kg__get_record",
"mcp__fo-kg__list_events_since",
"mcp__fo-kg__list_aliases",
"mcp__fo-kg__list_nodes",
"mcp__fo-kg__list_my_receipts"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__fo-kg__claim_seat"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as fo-kg. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__fo-kg__get_record untrusted-input
- mcp__fo-kg__list_events_since untrusted-input
- mcp__fo-kg__claim_seat untrusted-input
- mcp__fo-kg__list_my_receipts untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg/verify?hash=6070531d0d4a365ff9b6b08de7821bdb446a039be90913394e57da8a0668a04f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6070531d0d4a, from Nov 18, 2026, 20:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.familyofficeknowledgegraph/fo-kg)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 write, 6 read. claim_seat, resolve_family_office, get_record, list_events_since, list_aliases, list_nodes and list_my_receipts.
Does the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Family Office Knowledge Graph MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 5, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.