Skip to content

FORUM MCP server

ai.forumtrust/forumforumtrust.aistreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Signed, Merkle-proofed, on-chain-anchored trust records for MCP servers. Verify, do not trust.

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the FORUM MCP server can do

The FORUM MCP server is published by forumtrust.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool reads private data (get_method); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_method).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 22, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_methodReturn the metadata of the scoring method behind the current FORUM release: method_version, as_of_input_date, record_count, merkle_root, the record hash_recipe and freshness thresh…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_method" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "document": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the metadata of the scoring method behind the current FORUM release: method_version, as_of_input_date, record_count, merkle_root, the record hash_recipe and freshness thresholds (the same object as GET /v1/method on the FORUM HTTP API), plus pointers with SHA-256 to the full method document (/v1/method/doc; section 10 holds the verification recipes), the weights file and the release manifest, and the path of the signing keys. The method is public and versioned; weights live in a published config file. What a score is NOT: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. It is a longitudinal behavioral-reputation summary with full evidence disclosure: scanners answer "is this safe to install today"; FORUM answers "what has this thing done since everyone installed it". Scores are flags, not verdicts: the band is derived only from the documented sub-scores, and a sub-score FORUM could not observe is reported as null with a reason, not estimated. Takes no arguments. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: FORUM scoring method metadata
  • get_proofReturn the Merkle audit path that ties one FORUM trust record to the daily release root: leaf, index (0-based leaf position), path (sibling hashes, leaf level first) and root.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_proof" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the Merkle audit path that ties one FORUM trust record to the daily release root: leaf, index (0-based leaf position), path (sibling hashes, leaf level first) and root. Same object as GET /v1/trust/{registry_name}/proof on the FORUM HTTP API. Verification recipe: (1) h = the 32 bytes of `leaf` (hex-decoded; `leaf` is the record's content_sha256), i = `index`. (2) For each hex sibling s in `path`, in order: if i is even, h = sha256(h + s_bytes); if i is odd, h = sha256(s_bytes + h); then i = i // 2. (3) hex(h) must equal `root`. Then compare root with merkle_root from get_method and with the on-chain anchor (method doc section 10.2); a root taken only from this response shows internal consistency, not publication. A valid proof shows that the record is part of the published release; it says nothing about whether the scored server is safe. A score is: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. An unknown name returns isError with error=not_in_registry. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: FORUM Merkle proof
  • trust_lookupLook up the FORUM trust record for one MCP server listed in the official MCP Registry.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "trust_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up the FORUM trust record for one MCP server listed in the official MCP Registry. Returns, in one response: the ed25519-signed record (sub-scores for provenance, static scan, drift and incidents; a derived band; evidence pointers; a null score with a stated reason wherever coverage is missing), the record's Merkle proof, and a paragraph of verify instructions. record_json is byte-identical to the body of GET /v1/trust/{registry_name} on the FORUM HTTP API; record_content_sha256 is the record hash and Merkle leaf. Records are rebuilt daily; as_of_input_date is the input date of this one. An unknown name returns isError with error=not_in_registry: the name is not in the current registry snapshot, which is absence of a record, not a negative finding. What a score is NOT: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. It is a longitudinal behavioral-reputation summary with full evidence disclosure: scanners answer "is this safe to install today"; FORUM answers "what has this thing done since everyone installed it". Verify, do not trust: recompute the hash, check the signature, and check the proof against a root obtained independently. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: FORUM trust record lookup

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http forum https://api.forumtrust.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http forum https://api.forumtrust.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__forum__trust_lookup",
      "mcp__forum__get_proof",
      "mcp__forum__get_method"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as forum. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__forum__get_method private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.forumtrust/forum/verify?hash=50dae2c8ea60e0261efe53a66333ddc264e8a1aafa5e614f9c8812d99e42aa33" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 50dae2c8ea60, from Nov 22, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.forumtrust/forum/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.forumtrust/forum
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.forumtrust/forum.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.forumtrust/forum)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 22, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

FORUM MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the FORUM MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the FORUM MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the FORUM MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the FORUM MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. trust_lookup, get_proof and get_method.

Does the FORUM MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the FORUM MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the FORUM MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 22, 2026.