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integration-agent MCP server

ai.getvda/integration-agentgetvda.aistreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

MCP Drift Observatory: has a public MCP server's declared tools changed? Free check, archive, feeds.

6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 3
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the integration-agent MCP server can do

The integration-agent MCP server is published by getvda.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: drift_hash, drift_check and selftest), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (drift_diff and drift_probe); 3 tools can send data out of your system (drift_check, drift_diff and drift_probe).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • drift_checkHas this MCP server's declared tool surface changed since we first saw it?Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Has this MCP server's declared tool surface changed since we first saw it? Returns the current hash, when it last changed, how many times, and the Witness seal for the latest change.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Check a server for tool changes
  • drift_hashCanonically hash a tool list you supply, so you can confirm your implementation reproduces our bytes before trusting any hash we publish.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Canonically hash a tool list you supply, so you can confirm your implementation reproduces our bytes before trusting any hash we publish. ensure_ascii=False is the flag people miss.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Hash a tool list
  • selftestFree, no payment required.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, no payment required. Runs this agent's real capability on a fixed canned input and returns the genuine result, an honest assertion grade, and the full trust manifest (signed Agent Card, JWKS, governance/licence chain, safety posture) with a proof link for every claim. Intended for registries, graders and auditors: this is behavioural evidence, not a self-description.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Self-test
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • drift_diffWhat actually changed: field-level detail for this server's observed changes, including which tool moved and whether the change touched a description, a schema or an annotation.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drift_diff" says "diff": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    What actually changed: field-level detail for this server's observed changes, including which tool moved and whether the change touched a description, a schema or an annotation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Show what changed
  • drift_probeFetch this server right now and compare it to our stored baseline.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch this server right now and compare it to our stored baseline. Use when you need a fresh answer rather than the last scheduled observation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Probe a server now
  • drift_statusCoverage of the MCP Drift Observatory: how many public MCP servers we have discovered, how many we can actually observe, and how many are auth-walled.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "drift_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Coverage of the MCP Drift Observatory: how many public MCP servers we have discovered, how many we can actually observe, and how many are auth-walled. Reports the denominator, not just the flattering numerator.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Observatory coverage

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:30 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://drift.getvda.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including drift_hash (write), drift_check (write), selftest (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Protocol version: 2026-07-28 to 2025-06-18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Protocol version: 2026-07-28 -> 2025-06-18.View diff
    • Protocol version: 2026-07-28 to 2025-06-18
  2. Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
    • Changed:drift_checkChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
    • Changed:drift_diffOnly readstitleannotations
    • Changed:drift_hashChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
    • Changed:drift_probeOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
    • Changed:drift_statusOnly readstitledescriptionannotations
    • Changed:selftestChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http integration-agent https://drift.getvda.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http integration-agent https://drift.getvda.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__integration-agent__drift_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__integration-agent__drift_hash",
      "mcp__integration-agent__drift_check",
      "mcp__integration-agent__drift_diff",
      "mcp__integration-agent__drift_probe",
      "mcp__integration-agent__selftest"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as integration-agent. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__integration-agent__drift_check outbound
  • mcp__integration-agent__drift_diff untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__integration-agent__drift_probe untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.getvda/integration-agent/verify?hash=d87d025f0bf573969844fb48b298b5c625fd92fabf0fe22adf042970f46485ea" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d87d025f0bf5, from Nov 19, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.getvda/integration-agent/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.getvda/integration-agent
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.getvda/integration-agent.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.getvda/integration-agent)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

integration-agent MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the integration-agent MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the integration-agent MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the integration-agent MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the integration-agent MCP server have?

6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. drift_hash, drift_check, selftest, drift_status, drift_diff and drift_probe.

Does the integration-agent MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the integration-agent MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): drift_check, drift_diff and drift_probe.

Has the integration-agent MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.