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check MCP server

ai.hanria/checkhanria.aistreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Check a proposed agent action against operator's rules: permit, deny or escalate, with the clause.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 10 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the check MCP server can do

The check MCP server is published by hanria.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_action and validate_mandate), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 10 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_actionCall this before your agent does something consequential (sends, pays, deletes, publishes, installs or changes access).6 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.action.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.action.description: "...local HANRIA runtime. MUST NOT contain credentials, secrets, private keys, or tokens."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description: "...st whose parameters appear to contain a credential."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.action.$comment mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.action.$comment: "Forbidden anywhere in an instance: credential, secret, private_key, token, password,..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "check_action" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call this before your agent does something consequential (sends, pays, deletes, publishes, installs or changes access). Pass mandate (the operator's rules; the first matching clause decides) and action (kind, verb, target, optional counterparty and amount). Returns permit, deny or escalate with the governing clause, a reason, an action digest and a signed receipt; treat error as deny. Advisory: it cannot stop an action, and it keeps no request content. To check a new mandate first, call validate_mandate. Examples: inputSchema. Docs: https://hanria.ai/llms.txt

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • validate_mandateCall this after writing or editing a mandate, before relying on it.4 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_mandate" says "validate": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ready decides them, unbounded prefixes, credential material, and expiry. An invalid mandat..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "validate_mandate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_mandate" says "validate": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call this after writing or editing a mandate, before relying on it. Returns valid true or false with the reason: schema errors, clauses that can never run because an earlier clause already decides them, unbounded prefixes, credential material, and expiry. An invalid mandate makes every check_action call answer error. Once per mandate version is enough; there is no need to call it before every check_action. Free, and it keeps no request content. Docs: https://hanria.ai/llms.txt

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://check.hanria.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_action (write), validate_mandate (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn8 info
  • The server marks "check_action" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "validate_mandate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_mandate" says "validate": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.action.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.action.description: "...local HANRIA runtime. MUST NOT contain credentials, secrets, private keys, or tokens."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description: "...st whose parameters appear to contain a credential."

    What this check looks for
Show 4 more findings
  • The input schema at properties.action.$comment mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.action.$comment: "Forbidden anywhere in an instance: credential, secret, private_key, token, password,..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ready decides them, unbounded prefixes, credential material, and expiry. An invalid mandat..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http check https://check.hanria.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http check https://check.hanria.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__check__check_action",
      "mcp__check__validate_mandate"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as check. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.hanria/check/verify?hash=86e6a74cadff161dca68ac26ef7abfb4fcf797916431ac783dff9147e8301124" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 86e6a74cadff, from Nov 11, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.hanria/check/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.hanria/check
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.hanria/check.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.hanria/check)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

check MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the check MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 10 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the check MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the check MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. check_action and validate_mandate.

Does the check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the check MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the check MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.