check MCP server
ai.hanria/checkhanria.aistreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Check a proposed agent action against operator's rules: permit, deny or escalate, with the clause.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 10 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the check MCP server can do
The check MCP server is published by hanria.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_action and validate_mandate), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 10 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_actionCall this before your agent does something consequential (sends, pays, deletes, publishes, installs or changes access).6 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."
- Info
The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.action.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.action.description: "...local HANRIA runtime. MUST NOT contain credentials, secrets, private keys, or tokens."
- Info
The input schema at properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description: "...st whose parameters appear to contain a credential."
- Info
The input schema at properties.action.$comment mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.action.$comment: "Forbidden anywhere in an instance: credential, secret, private_key, token, password,..."
- Warn
The server marks "check_action" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Call this before your agent does something consequential (sends, pays, deletes, publishes, installs or changes access). Pass mandate (the operator's rules; the first matching clause decides) and action (kind, verb, target, optional counterparty and amount). Returns permit, deny or escalate with the governing clause, a reason, an action digest and a signed receipt; treat error as deny. Advisory: it cannot stop an action, and it keeps no request content. To check a new mandate first, call validate_mandate. Examples: inputSchema. Docs: https://hanria.ai/llms.txt
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
validate_mandateCall this after writing or editing a mandate, before relying on it.4 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_mandate" says "validate": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ready decides them, unbounded prefixes, credential material, and expiry. An invalid mandat..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."
- Info
The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."
- Warn
The server marks "validate_mandate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_mandate" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Call this after writing or editing a mandate, before relying on it. Returns valid true or false with the reason: schema errors, clauses that can never run because an earlier clause already decides them, unbounded prefixes, credential material, and expiry. An invalid mandate makes every check_action call answer error. Once per mandate version is enough; there is no need to call it before every check_action. Free, and it keeps no request content. Docs: https://hanria.ai/llms.txt
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://check.hanria.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_action (write), validate_mandate (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncheck_action
The server marks "check_action" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- Warnvalidate_mandate
The server marks "validate_mandate" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_mandate" says "validate": a word for reading.
- Infocheck_action
The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."
- Infocheck_action
The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."
- Infocheck_action
The input schema at properties.action.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.action.description: "...local HANRIA runtime. MUST NOT contain credentials, secrets, private keys, or tokens."
- Infocheck_action
The input schema at properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.action.properties.operation.properties.parameters.description: "...st whose parameters appear to contain a credential."
Show 4 more findingsShow fewer
- Infocheck_action
The input schema at properties.action.$comment mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.action.$comment: "Forbidden anywhere in an instance: credential, secret, private_key, token, password,..."
- Infovalidate_mandate
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ready decides them, unbounded prefixes, credential material, and expiry. An invalid mandat..."
- Infovalidate_mandate
The input schema at properties.mandate.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.description: "...a component that exclusively holds the credentials and can refuse."
- Infovalidate_mandate
The input schema at properties.mandate.$comment mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mandate.$comment: "...s of doing it, and must never contain a credential, secret, key or token. The checker refu..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http check https://check.hanria.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http check https://check.hanria.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__check__check_action",
"mcp__check__validate_mandate"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as check. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.hanria/check/verify?hash=86e6a74cadff161dca68ac26ef7abfb4fcf797916431ac783dff9147e8301124" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 86e6a74cadff, from Nov 11, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.hanria/check/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.hanria/check)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.
check MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the check MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 10 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the check MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the check MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. check_action and validate_mandate.
Does the check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the check MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the check MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.