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jeda-ai MCP server

ai.jeda/jeda-aijeda.aistreamable-httpv1.23.40Scanned

Visual AI for strategic thinking — SWOT, flowcharts, mindmaps, Gantt diagrams as polished SVG.

5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the jeda-ai MCP server can do

The jeda-ai MCP server is published by jeda.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: generate_visual, recommend_framework, generate_framework_analysis and generate_diagram), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (generate_visual, recommend_framework and generate_framework_analysis).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.23.40.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • generate_diagramDEPRECATED alias for `generate_visual` (removed no earlier than v1.24.x).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_diagram" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_diagram" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_diagram" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    DEPRECATED alias for `generate_visual` (removed no earlier than v1.24.x). Use `generate_visual` going forward — identical behaviour.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Generate Diagram (deprecated)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • generate_framework_analysisRuns a specific framework against a user's inputs and produces a full analysis: prose explanation + structured fields + a self-contained SVG visualisation.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_framework_analysis" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_framework_analysis" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_framework_analysis" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Runs a specific framework against a user's inputs and produces a full analysis: prose explanation + structured fields + a self-contained SVG visualisation. Powered by the Jeda.ai · Visual AI framework knowledge graph. ALWAYS call `recommend_framework` FIRST to obtain a valid framework_id -- it returns the exact namespaced slug to pass here. Framework ids are namespaced by category (e.g. SWOT = "cms_swot-analysis", Porter's 5 Forces = "cms_porters-five-forces"); a bare slug like "swot-analysis" will 404. REQUIRED post-processing on success: the response's first text block contains a `curl -fsSL` save-directive for the SVG. Save the file locally and surface it as a file chip — do NOT summarise the visual in prose. Input: framework_id (namespaced slug from `recommend_framework`) + user_inputs object (per-framework field set), OR a free-text `raw_prompt` fallback. Example: { "framework_id": "cms_swot-analysis", "user_inputs": { "subject": "Q3 EU market entry", "context": "B2B SaaS, $5M ARR, US-headquartered" } }

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Generate Framework Analysis
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • generate_visualGenerates a visual (flowchart, mindmap, matrix, timeline, Gantt, ER, sequence, swimlane, block diagram) as a self-contained SVG.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_visual" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_visual" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_visual" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generates a visual (flowchart, mindmap, matrix, timeline, Gantt, ER, sequence, swimlane, block diagram) as a self-contained SVG. Powered by Jeda.ai · Visual AI. REQUIRED post-processing on every success: the response's FIRST text block is a "SAVE THIS NOW" directive with a `curl -fsSL` one-liner (Step 1) and an inline-SVG fallback (Step 2). Always attempt Step 1 first; only fall back to Step 2 if curl exits non-zero. The user expects an "Image · SVG" file chip — not a markdown link or prose summary. The signed URL is safe to fetch (auth is in the query string). Two modes: (1) natural-language `prompt` → Data Agent + Design Agent build the visual; (2) structured `nodes` + `edges` for precise control. Visual types: matrix | mindmap | flowchart | block-diagram | timeline | gantt | er-diagram | sequence | process-flow. Default: auto-detected from prompt. Slash commands work too: `/matrix SWOT`, `/timeline roadmap`, `/process-flow procurement approval with finance and legal lanes`. For style options (themes, fonts, arrow styles, animations, per-edge overrides, matrix/process-flow specifics) call `get_style_options` first. Default theme is `pastel` — only override when the user explicitly names another. Example: { "prompt": "user signup with email verification", "theme": { "preset": "pastel" } }

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Generate Visual
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • recommend_frameworkRecommends business / strategy / risk frameworks for a stated problem.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recommends business / strategy / risk frameworks for a stated problem. Powered by the Jeda.ai · Visual AI framework knowledge graph (~2,100 frameworks across 19 categories, edge-curated). Use when the user describes a business problem ("customer churn rising", "evaluating market entry", "need to assess vendor risk") rather than naming a specific framework. Returns top-N frameworks ranked by fit, each with a concrete reason citing the specific problem signals matched. Input: just the problem statement is enough. Optional faceted filters (`persona`, `regulation`, `decision_stage`) narrow the candidate set. Set `limit` between 3 and 10 for picker UIs. Pair with `generate_framework_analysis` to actually run a recommended framework against the user's inputs. Example: { "problem_statement": "We need to decide whether to enter the EU SMB market in Q3", "decision_stage": "decide", "limit": 5 }

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Recommend Framework
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_style_optionsReturns the full style-options catalog for `generate_visual` — theme presets, fonts, arrow styles, line styles, arrowheads, scene/connector animations, layout directions, per-edge …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_style_options" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the full style-options catalog for `generate_visual` — theme presets, fonts, arrow styles, line styles, arrowheads, scene/connector animations, layout directions, per-edge overrides, and matrix/process-flow specifics. Call this once when you need to expose specific style choices to the user (e.g. "what themes are available?") or before composing a `generate_visual` call that needs non-default styling. Output is plain text, ~4 KB.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Style Options for generate_visual
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.jeda.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_visual (write), recommend_framework (write), generate_framework_analysis (write), generate_diagram (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 warn
  • The server marks "generate_visual" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_visual" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_framework_analysis" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_framework_analysis" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "generate_diagram" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_diagram" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.23.40. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http jeda-ai https://mcp.jeda.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http jeda-ai https://mcp.jeda.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__jeda-ai__get_style_options"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__jeda-ai__generate_visual",
      "mcp__jeda-ai__recommend_framework",
      "mcp__jeda-ai__generate_framework_analysis",
      "mcp__jeda-ai__generate_diagram"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as jeda-ai. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__jeda-ai__generate_visual untrusted-input
  • mcp__jeda-ai__recommend_framework untrusted-input
  • mcp__jeda-ai__generate_framework_analysis untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.jeda/jeda-ai/verify?hash=b37414682d312d2855f422109dca731c6dbe8d023dd391793d16c51f4ce2ae17" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b37414682d31, from Nov 11, 2026, 19:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.jeda/jeda-ai/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.jeda/jeda-ai
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.jeda/jeda-ai.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.jeda/jeda-ai)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:41 UTC.

jeda-ai MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the jeda-ai MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the jeda-ai MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the jeda-ai MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the jeda-ai MCP server have?

5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. generate_visual, recommend_framework, generate_framework_analysis, generate_diagram and get_style_options.

Does the jeda-ai MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the jeda-ai MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the jeda-ai MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.