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Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server

ai.legitreviews/legitreviewslegitreviews.aistreamable-httpv2.0.0Scanned

Scores whether a business's Google Maps reviews are genuine. Your agent collects them, we judge.

7 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 1 finding

Sign-in required, OAuth metadata published. Remote posture

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What the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server can do

The Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server is published by legitreviews.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (finalize_submission) and create or change data (3 tools: check_place, begin_submission and submit_reviews), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_scored_places); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (describe_review_source, get_place_trust and list_scored_places); 3 tools can send data out of your system (check_place, begin_submission and get_place_trust). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in and publishes OAuth metadata.

Last scanned Nov 3, 2026, version 2.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • finalize_submissionFor a submission fed by inline chunks: validates, scores, stores and returns the report.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "finalize_submission" says "finalize": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For a submission fed by inline chunks: validates, scores, stores and returns the report. For one already uploaded to its upload_url: returns the stored report. Pending with nothing uploaded yet: says so.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • begin_submissionReserves a submission and returns an upload_url.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reserves a submission and returns an upload_url. POST the complete JSON payload (format from describe_review_source) to it from your own environment or the user's browser; the HTTP response is the trust report. The URL is a secret that completes the submission under YOUR identity whoever posts to it, so the POST needs no key. Alternatively feed the same submission_id to submit_reviews in inline chunks. Pending submissions expire after 2 hours (or are closed as superseded when you one-shot the same place instead).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_placeCall first.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_place" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call first. Resolves a Google Maps link or place_id and reports whether a trust result is cached, how fresh it is, and a recommendation: use the cached result, or collect and submit the reviews (also when a cached single-source result would benefit from your corroboration). Never contacts Google.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • submit_reviewsSubmit the review feed inside the tool call.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_reviews" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit the review feed inside the tool call. Without submission_id this is a one-shot submission of the whole payload (fine up to about 150 reviews). For more, call begin_submission, then send chunks of up to 150 reviews each with the same submission_id and final=false; send final=true with the last chunk (the identity fields may arrive with any chunk). Use this only when you cannot POST to the upload_url yourself (no page fetch, no curl): retyping reviews you already hold in a page or script is slow and error-prone. Returns the trust report when finalized.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • describe_review_sourceRead this BEFORE scraping.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_review_source" says "describe": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "describe_review_source" says "describe" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read this BEFORE scraping. Returns, per platform, the exact submission format: identity fields for the listing, the per-review fields (required vs optional; everything required is visible on the review card), where each lives on the platform's pages, the sort-by-newest and 500-most-recent rules, an example payload, and how to deliver it. Without a platform it lists the supported platforms. Only Google Maps exists today.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_place_trustThe cached fraud analysis for a place: verdict (looks_legit / not_sure / past_manipulation / inflated / manipulated) with its label and a one-sentence summary, letter grade, 0-100 …Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_place_trust" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    The cached fraud analysis for a place: verdict (looks_legit / not_sure / past_manipulation / inflated / manipulated) with its label and a one-sentence summary, letter grade, 0-100 trust score, the adjusted rating credible reviewers actually give (vs the headline average), reviewer-mix tiers, review-injection statistics, cross-business duplicate-review evidence, red flags, and provenance. Cache only: on a miss, collect and submit the reviews (see check_place).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_scored_placesThe ranked directory of places already analyzed for review fraud, best adjusted rating first (what the site's home and city pages show).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_scored_places" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The ranked directory of places already analyzed for review fraud, best adjusted rating first (what the site's home and city pages show). 25 per page. Optional city or curated-list filter; the response lists the available cities/lists and their counts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

9 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__legitreviews__list_scored_places"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, OAuth metadata published

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
401
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
yes
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
https://isitlegitreviews.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://isitlegitreviews.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://isitlegitreviews.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no

Posture changes

  1. Nov 18, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 401
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
    • resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none to https://isitlegitreviews.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://isitlegitreviews.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://isitlegitreviews.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. Nov 11, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "check_place" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 401; WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed -> yes (and 5 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 401
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
    • resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none to https://isitlegitreviews.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://isitlegitreviews.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://isitlegitreviews.com
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 2.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http legitreviews https://legitreviews.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http legitreviews https://legitreviews.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__legitreviews__describe_review_source",
      "mcp__legitreviews__list_scored_places"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__legitreviews__check_place",
      "mcp__legitreviews__begin_submission",
      "mcp__legitreviews__submit_reviews",
      "mcp__legitreviews__finalize_submission",
      "mcp__legitreviews__get_place_trust"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as legitreviews. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__legitreviews__describe_review_source untrusted-input
  • mcp__legitreviews__check_place outbound
  • mcp__legitreviews__begin_submission outbound
  • mcp__legitreviews__get_place_trust untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__legitreviews__list_scored_places private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.legitreviews/legitreviews/verify?hash=85eb752f73a8e041c6b19b1625f01c796b204011393ba04637e45570c8794d35" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 85eb752f73a8, from Nov 3, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.legitreviews/legitreviews/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.legitreviews/legitreviews
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.legitreviews/legitreviews.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.legitreviews/legitreviews)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: finalize_submission.

What tools does the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server have?

7 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read. finalize_submission, check_place, begin_submission, submit_reviews, describe_review_source, get_place_trust and list_scored_places.

Does the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and it publishes OAuth protected resource metadata (RFC 9728); its authorization server supports dynamic client registration.

Does the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_place, begin_submission and get_place_trust.

Has the Is it legit? Reviews trust checker MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 3, 2026.