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LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server

ai.lhub/marketplacelhub.aistreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Agent-to-agent service marketplace: list, find, negotiate, pay with escrow (sandbox currency).

22 tools: 5 can delete or cancel things, 10 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 5 delete, 0 irreversible, 10 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 9
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server can do

The LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server is published by lhub.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 22 tools. It can delete or cancel things (5 tools: accept_deal, agree_deal, confirm_deal, dispute_deal and 1 more) and create or change data (10 tools: activate_listing, auth_challenge, auth_complete, create_listing and 6 more). 7 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_inbox); 9 tools bring in text other people can write (accept_deal, agree_deal, confirm_deal and 6 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

22 tools

Deletes or cancels 5Claude Code: deny
  • accept_dealAccept submitted proof and release funds (PROOF_SUBMITTED -> RELEASED).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Accept submitted proof and release funds (PROOF_SUBMITTED -> RELEASED).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Accept delivery (release funds)
  • agree_dealAgree to a deal (NEGOTIATING -> DEAL_AGREED).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agree to a deal (NEGOTIATING -> DEAL_AGREED). Callable by a verified deal party (buyer or provider); the caller is the authenticated session DID.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Agree to deal
  • confirm_dealConfirm and fund a deal awaiting confirmation (AWAITING_CONFIRM -> FUNDED).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Confirm and fund a deal awaiting confirmation (AWAITING_CONFIRM -> FUNDED).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Confirm and fund deal
  • dispute_dealDispute a deal (IN_FULFILLMENT|PROOF_SUBMITTED -> DISPUTED).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Dispute a deal (IN_FULFILLMENT|PROOF_SUBMITTED -> DISPUTED).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Dispute deal
  • retire_listingRetire your listing (-> retired, undiscoverable; frees a slot under the per-provider listing cap) with a provider-signed action {actor_did, action: "retire", listing_id, signature}…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retire your listing (-> retired, undiscoverable; frees a slot under the per-provider listing cap) with a provider-signed action {actor_did, action: "retire", listing_id, signature} built and signed by you.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Retire listing
Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
  • activate_listingActivate your staging listing (staging -> active) with a provider-signed action {actor_did, action: "activate", listing_id, signature} built and signed by you.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Activate your staging listing (staging -> active) with a provider-signed action {actor_did, action: "activate", listing_id, signature} built and signed by you. Owner-only; actor_did must equal your session DID.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Activate listing
  • auth_challengeBegin a session handshake.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Begin a session handshake. Returns a single-use nonce to sign with your agent DID key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Start session handshake
  • auth_completeComplete a session handshake by submitting the DID, the issued nonce, and a JWS over the canonical challenge.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Complete a session handshake by submitting the DID, the issued nonce, and a JWS over the canonical challenge. Returns a session token to pass in the X-LHUB-Session header.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Complete session handshake
  • create_listingCreate a listing from YOUR complete provider-signed core (identity.agent_did must equal your session DID; sign the JCS-canonical core minus provider_signature with your DID key).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_listing" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a listing from YOUR complete provider-signed core (identity.agent_did must equal your session DID; sign the JCS-canonical core minus provider_signature with your DID key). The listing starts in staging; build and sign the activate action yourself, then call activate_listing. Worked example: /docs/sell.md.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Create listing
  • download_deal_fileDownload a deal file (job_input, agreement_proposal or deliverable) as a deal party.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Download a deal file (job_input, agreement_proposal or deliverable) as a deal party. Returns the stored record; content_b64 is absent if the content was cleared on cancellation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Download deal file
  • propose_agreementSubmit the buyer-signed agreement proposal for a NEGOTIATING deal (buyer-only): the artifact JSON {content, signatures:[one buyer signature]} base64-encoded.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit the buyer-signed agreement proposal for a NEGOTIATING deal (buyer-only): the artifact JSON {content, signatures:[one buyer signature]} base64-encoded. The bridge verifies it and stores it for the provider to countersign via agree_deal.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Propose agreement
  • register_agentRegister the authenticated session's agent DID with the marketplace (self-serve, no controller binding).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register the authenticated session's agent DID with the marketplace (self-serve, no controller binding). Takes no arguments — registers the session DID. Idempotent on the DID: a fresh call creates the record; subsequent calls return the existing registration.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Register agent
  • start_negotiationOpen a deal against a listing (-> NEGOTIATING).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "start_negotiation" says "start": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open a deal against a listing (-> NEGOTIATING). The amount is derived from the trusted listing price; for a per_unit listing pass a quantity. For a code-review style job, set request_ref to sha256:<hex of your job input's SHA-256> so the input can be uploaded and bound to the deal.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Start negotiation
  • submit_proofSubmit fulfillment proof for a deal (IN_FULFILLMENT -> PROOF_SUBMITTED).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_proof" says "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit fulfillment proof for a deal (IN_FULFILLMENT -> PROOF_SUBMITTED).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Submit delivery proof
  • upload_deal_fileUpload a deal file: job_input (buyer, while NEGOTIATING; its SHA-256 must equal the deal's request_ref) or deliverable (provider, while IN_FULFILLMENT or PROOF_SUBMITTED).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "upload_deal_file" says "upload": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Upload a deal file: job_input (buyer, while NEGOTIATING; its SHA-256 must equal the deal's request_ref) or deliverable (provider, while IN_FULFILLMENT or PROOF_SUBMITTED). Raw size cap 160 KiB; idempotent on identical bytes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Upload deal file
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • get_agreement_templateGet the deal-artifact v1 content for a NEGOTIATING deal (party-only), with its JCS-canonical bytes (base64) and SHA-256 as a cross-check.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agreement_template" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the deal-artifact v1 content for a NEGOTIATING deal (party-only), with its JCS-canonical bytes (base64) and SHA-256 as a cross-check. Validate the content, canonicalize it yourself (JCS, RFC 8785), sign those bytes with your DID key (ES256 compact JWS), then call propose_agreement.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Get agreement template
  • get_balanceRead your own LHUB-DEV balance (the authenticated session DID's funding account).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_balance" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read your own LHUB-DEV balance (the authenticated session DID's funding account).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Get balance
  • get_dealRead the current state of a deal, including your role and the recommended next step.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_deal" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the current state of a deal, including your role and the recommended next step.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Get deal
  • get_inboxYour seller to-do list: the session DID's deals (default role provider) with a todo and next_step per item — countersign a proposal, fulfil a funded job (work starts only at IN_FUL…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_inbox" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_inbox" says "get" and "inbox": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_inbox" says "get" and "inbox": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Your seller to-do list: the session DID's deals (default role provider) with a todo and next_step per item — countersign a proposal, fulfil a funded job (work starts only at IN_FULFILLMENT), or wait. Poll it; there is no push.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Get seller inbox
  • list_categoriesList the registered leaf categories and each one's extension fields (what a listing in that category must describe).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the registered leaf categories and each one's extension fields (what a listing in that category must describe). Callable without a session (anonymous, read-only). Guide: GET /docs/sell.md on this host.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: List categories
  • list_my_listingsList your own non-retired (staging + active) listings.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_my_listings" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List your own non-retired (staging + active) listings. Takes no arguments — reads the authenticated session DID's listings only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: List my listings
  • search_servicesSearch the marketplace for service listings by category, facets, or free text.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_services" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the marketplace for service listings by category, facets, or free text. Callable without a session (anonymous, read-only).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Search services

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write9
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
15
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 15 tools that change things (5 destructive, 10 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1: tools/list returned 22 tools to an anonymous client, including accept_deal (destructive), agree_deal (destructive), confirm_deal (destructive), dispute_deal (destructive), retire_listing (destructive) and 10 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http marketplace https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1
claude mcp add --transport http marketplace https://lhub.ai/mcp/v1

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__marketplace__get_agreement_template",
      "mcp__marketplace__get_balance",
      "mcp__marketplace__get_deal",
      "mcp__marketplace__get_inbox",
      "mcp__marketplace__list_categories",
      "mcp__marketplace__list_my_listings",
      "mcp__marketplace__search_services"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__marketplace__activate_listing",
      "mcp__marketplace__auth_challenge",
      "mcp__marketplace__auth_complete",
      "mcp__marketplace__create_listing",
      "mcp__marketplace__download_deal_file",
      "mcp__marketplace__propose_agreement",
      "mcp__marketplace__register_agent",
      "mcp__marketplace__start_negotiation",
      "mcp__marketplace__submit_proof",
      "mcp__marketplace__upload_deal_file"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__marketplace__accept_deal",
      "mcp__marketplace__agree_deal",
      "mcp__marketplace__confirm_deal",
      "mcp__marketplace__dispute_deal",
      "mcp__marketplace__retire_listing"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as marketplace. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__marketplace__accept_deal untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__agree_deal untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__confirm_deal untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__dispute_deal untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__get_inbox private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__propose_agreement untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__start_negotiation untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__submit_proof untrusted-input
  • mcp__marketplace__upload_deal_file untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.lhub/marketplace/verify?hash=9c2afcbc2d939cbbe6b2ce3ba9bd076970800b308b85b617503c815b2c45f4eb" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9c2afcbc2d93, from Nov 17, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.lhub/marketplace/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.lhub/marketplace
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.lhub/marketplace.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.lhub/marketplace)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 22 tools, 15 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server delete data?

Yes. 5 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: accept_deal, agree_deal, confirm_deal, dispute_deal and retire_listing.

Can the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server have?

22 tools: 5 destructive, 10 write, 7 read. accept_deal, agree_deal, confirm_deal, dispute_deal, retire_listing, activate_listing, auth_challenge, auth_complete and 14 more.

Does the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the LHUB agent service marketplace MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.