Life Scenario MCP server
ai.lifescenario/infolifescenario.aistreamable-httpv1.3.2Scanned
For parents and teachers: SEL trait guides, practice scenarios, what-to-say guides (ages 6-14).
4 tools: 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Life Scenario MCP server can do
The Life Scenario MCP server is published by lifescenario.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
1 tool reads private data (find_practice_situation); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (find_practice_situation and get_what_to_say).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.3.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
find_practice_situationFinds up to 3 public Life Scenario practice scenarios for a real-life situation a child is facing (for example: left out at recess, peer pressure, cheating in a group chat, parents…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_practice_situation" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "chat": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Finds up to 3 public Life Scenario practice scenarios for a real-life situation a child is facing (for example: left out at recess, peer pressure, cheating in a group chat, parents arguing, a new school). Returns each scenario's title, a short excerpt, the ages it is written for, the traits it practises, a link the adult can open to try it together with the child without an account and, when one is published, the parent page or what-to-say guide about the same situation. match_quality is "close" (the scenarios are about this situation) or "loose" (they only touch it and may not fit). An empty or loose result means only that no public scenario fits. Returns authored practice scenarios only, never other children's answers. Topics involving risk of harm, or medical or legal questions, return status "not_covered" with no guide or practice link.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find a practice situation
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_site_overviewFactual overview of Life Scenario: what the SEL practice game for children aged 6–14 does, what it is not, how child safety is handled, what this server can and cannot see, and key…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_site_overview" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Factual overview of Life Scenario: what the SEL practice game for children aged 6–14 does, what it is not, how child safety is handled, what this server can and cannot see, and key links.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Life Scenario overview
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_what_to_sayFinds the published Life Scenario page for parents that best matches a topic (for example: "nobody will play with me", "being teased", "a friend wants to copy my child's homework")…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_what_to_say" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "reply": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Finds the published Life Scenario page for parents that best matches a topic (for example: "nobody will play with me", "being teased", "a friend wants to copy my child's homework"): a "What to say" guide or a scenario page (one situation, with example replies by age), whichever is closer. Returns its short answer, the key lines a child can say, its URL and, when it has one, a practice_url: a practice scenario on a similar situation that the adult can open with the child without signing up. If no guide or scenario page on that topic is published, returns status "no_article_yet" and, when a public practice scenario is about the same situation, that scenario. Topics involving risk of harm, or medical or legal questions, return status "not_covered" with no guide or practice link.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a what-to-say guide
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_traitsLists the 15 social and emotional learning (SEL) traits Life Scenario practises, each with a plain-language description and the everyday skills it covers.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_traits" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Lists the 15 social and emotional learning (SEL) traits Life Scenario practises, each with a plain-language description and the everyday skills it covers. For questions about what a trait means for a child aged 6–14.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List SEL traits
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://lifescenario.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://lifescenario.ai
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://lifescenario.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers: none to https://lifescenario.ai
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://lifescenario.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; Authorization servers: none -> https://lifescenario.ai; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (an…View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://lifescenario.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers: none to https://lifescenario.ai
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http info https://lifescenario.ai/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http info https://lifescenario.ai/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__info__list_traits",
"mcp__info__find_practice_situation",
"mcp__info__get_what_to_say",
"mcp__info__get_site_overview"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as info. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__info__find_practice_situation private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__info__get_what_to_say untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.lifescenario/info/verify?hash=620099fad32c9d799b05d65e3c15e70806c8afb2b1dbcd0bb29effb09cd5dd93" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 620099fad32c, from Nov 16, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.lifescenario/info/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.lifescenario/info)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Life Scenario MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Life Scenario MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Life Scenario MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Life Scenario MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Life Scenario MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 read. list_traits, find_practice_situation, get_what_to_say and get_site_overview.
Does the Life Scenario MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Life Scenario MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Life Scenario MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.