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Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server

ai.limitguard.api/limitguardapi.limitguard.aistreamable-httpv2.11.9Scanned

Lead validation over MCP: KVK/KBO register, EU VAT, sanctions and email checks with sources.

10 tools: 6 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 9
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server can do

The Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server is published by api.limitguard.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: check_entity, verify_wallet, get_compliance_report, sanctions_screen and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

9 tools bring in text other people can write (check_entity, verify_wallet, get_risk_score and 6 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (verify_lead).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 2.11.9.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • check_agent_walletCheck a counterparty agent's EVM wallet in one call: OFAC SDN digital-currency address list match, Base USDC and ETH balance, ERC-8004 identity registration (and, given an agent id…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a counterparty agent's EVM wallet in one call: OFAC SDN digital-currency address list match, Base USDC and ETH balance, ERC-8004 identity registration (and, given an agent id, that agent's owner and payment wallet) and open ERC-8004 feedback, which is not scored. $0.005 by x402, $0.75 with an API key. Returns verdict (block, review or no_findings) with verdict_reasons, the components that ran and those that did not (with a reason), and sanctions, balance, identity, reputation, wallet_risk and domain (when a domain is given, else not_requested), each with its own status (ok, unavailable or error). Reputation and domain are descriptive only and never change the verdict. Base only; EVM addresses only. Args: wallet: EVM wallet address (0x + 40 hex characters) agent_id: Optional ERC-8004 agentId (decimal) the wallet claims domain: Optional website domain the agent gives for itself (e.g. example.com)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check agent wallet
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_entityCompany check via the Limitguard API.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Company check via the Limitguard API. Company check on a business: sanctions screening and country risk, the Dutch KVK register for an NL company, and the website domain when you send it. Returns trust_score (0-100, 100 = best), trust_level (high means low risk), cluster, recommendation, confidence, top_factors and sources_checked. Args: entity_name: Full legal name of the entity country: ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code (e.g., NL, BE, DE) kvk_number: Optional Dutch KVK registration number (8 digits) domain: Optional company website domain

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check entity trust
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_compliance_reportPer-entity report built from one real check.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_compliance_report" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_compliance_report" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_compliance_report" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Per-entity report built from one real check. Registry identity, sanctions and PEP screens, domain signals, risk score with the rules that fired, correlations, every finding as a ranked action, a per-source status table (ok / unavailable / error) and a report hash. Args: entity_name: Full legal name (with country; omit when sending check_id) country: ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code kvk_number: Optional Dutch KVK number (8 digits) cbe_number: Optional Belgian CBE number (0XXX.XXX.XXX or 10 digits) vat_number: Optional EU VAT number domain: Optional company website domain iban: Optional IBAN (never stored raw) wallet_address: Optional crypto wallet address (format check only) wallet_chain: Optional chain for wallet_address (eth, base, btc, sol, ...) check_id: Id of a check from an earlier report, instead of identifiers

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get compliance report
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sanctions_screenSanctions screen against the local OFAC SDN, EU and UN lists: matched entries.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sanctions screen against the local OFAC SDN, EU and UN lists: matched entries. Each match carries its list, entry id, entry type, programmes, countries, listing date and match score (exact normalised or word-order-insensitive name match only). A name match is not a determination. Rejected calls are not charged. Args: name: Company or person name to screen country: Optional ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code (orders matches, never excludes one)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sanctions screen
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_leadVerify a NL/BE sales lead against the registers in one call: real and active, VAT, mail server, IBAN, sanctions; a 0-100 lead score.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a NL/BE sales lead against the registers in one call: real and active, VAT, mail server, IBAN, sanctions; a 0-100 lead score. $0.10 by x402, $0.27 with an API key. Returns verdict (real_active, real_inactive, not_found, ambiguous, unverifiable or sanctioned), lead_score, the company as registered, and the vat, iban, sanctions and email checks, with flags and one finding per flag or mismatch, a dormant-shell score and, when a target is given, the ICP fit (information only). An input not given is not checked and never counts against the lead. The IBAN account holder is not checked. BE needs company_number. Rejected calls are not charged. Args: country: NL (KVK) or BE (KBO) company_number: 8-digit KVK number or 10-digit KBO/CBE number name: Company name as the lead gave it (NL without a number) vat_number: EU VAT number, checked with VIES email: Contact email; only its domain is checked domain: Company website domain address: {street, house_number, postcode, city} the lead gave iban: IBAN the lead gave; only country, bank, BIC and last 4 are returned phone: Phone number the lead gave; compared with the numbers the company publishes, never echoed. Rejected until website phone lookup is switched on target_industries: Ideal-customer industries: SBI/NACE code prefixes ("62") or whole words; information only target_size: Ideal-customer employee range {min, max}, both inclusive; information only

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify a sales lead
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_walletScreen a wallet: OFAC SDN address match, on-chain signals (contract check, native and USDC balance, transaction count, first seen on Base) and named risk rules with up to 3 advice …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a wallet: OFAC SDN address match, on-chain signals (contract check, native and USDC balance, transaction count, first seen on Base) and named risk rules with up to 3 advice items. On Base, also reports any ERC-8004 agent the wallet owns and its open on-chain reputation as descriptive signals, never scored. $0.005 by x402, $0.11 with an API key. Returns risk_score, risk_level, sanctions (hit, lists, as_of), signals with their source, the names of signals that could not be read (unavailable), rules_fired, advice and linked_entities (entities you checked that were linked to this wallet). On Base, also erc8004_agent_ids and erc8004_reputation (open ERC-8004 feedback, descriptive only -- never folded into risk_score or advice). Accepts EVM (0x...) and Solana (base58) addresses. The sanctions match alone is free: the wallet_sanctions_preview tool. Rejected calls are not charged. Args: wallet_address: Blockchain wallet address chain_id: CAIP-2 chain ID (default: eip155:8453 for Base); base, eth, solana, btc also accepted

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen wallet
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_risk_scoreQuick risk score from sanctions screening and country risk only.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_risk_score" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Quick risk score from sanctions screening and country risk only. Faster than check_entity: no register or domain lookup. Use when you only need basic risk evaluation. Returns risk_score (0-100, 100 = riskiest), risk_level (high means high risk, the reverse of check_entity's trust_level), sanctions_match and fatf_status; no recommendation or factors. Args: entity_name: Full legal name of the entity country: ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get risk score
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_trust_scoreLook up your own most recent trust score for an entity you checked before, from your stored checks: score, level, when, which product, trend and how many checks are on record.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_trust_score" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up your own most recent trust score for an entity you checked before, from your stored checks: score, level, when, which product, trend and how many checks are on record. Runs no new check and calls no data source. Free ($0). Returns status "found" with trust_score, trust_level, checked_at, source_product, trend and checks_on_record, or status "not_found" with a next_step. Only checks made with your key (via check_entity, or REST entity/KYB checks) are read; another key's or workspace's never are (#946). Signed in with OAuth, your workspace's checks are read instead (#1062). Args: entity_id: The entity name, as you sent it to check_entity

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get stored trust score
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sanctions_previewFree yes/no sanctions preview against the local OFAC SDN, EU and UN lists.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sanctions_preview" says "preview": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free yes/no sanctions preview against the local OFAC SDN, EU and UN lists. Returns possible_match, lists_checked, list_dates and list_note only, never an entry. 10 per caller per UTC day, shared with POST /v1/sanctions/preview, and key holders share a ceiling of 50 per IP; the matched entries are the sanctions_screen tool. Free ($0). Args: name: Company or person name to screen country: Optional ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code (orders matches, never excludes one)

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sanctions preview
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wallet_sanctions_previewFree yes/no check of a wallet address against the OFAC SDN list.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wallet_sanctions_preview" says "preview": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free yes/no check of a wallet address against the OFAC SDN list. Returns wallet_address (canonical), chain_id, sanctioned, lists, as_of (the list's publication date), status (ok or stale), source and upgrade, which names the full wallet screen (the verify_wallet tool, $0.005 by x402, $0.11 with an API key: balances, wallet age and activity, contract and delegation checks, a risk score with rules and advice, linked entities, ERC-8004 identity and reputation). 10 per caller per UTC day, shared with POST /v1/sanctions/wallet and separate from the name preview; key holders share a ceiling of 50 per IP. Free ($0). Args: wallet_address: Blockchain wallet address chain_id: CAIP-2 chain ID (default: eip155:8453 for Base); base, eth, solana, btc also accepted

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Wallet sanctions check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write9
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.limitguard.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including check_entity (write), verify_wallet (write), get_compliance_report (write), sanctions_screen (write), check_agent_wallet (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "get_compliance_report" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_compliance_report" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 2.11.9. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http limitguard https://api.limitguard.ai/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http limitguard https://api.limitguard.ai/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__limitguard__get_trust_score",
      "mcp__limitguard__get_risk_score",
      "mcp__limitguard__sanctions_preview",
      "mcp__limitguard__wallet_sanctions_preview"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__limitguard__check_entity",
      "mcp__limitguard__verify_wallet",
      "mcp__limitguard__get_compliance_report",
      "mcp__limitguard__sanctions_screen",
      "mcp__limitguard__check_agent_wallet",
      "mcp__limitguard__verify_lead"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as limitguard. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__limitguard__check_entity untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__verify_wallet untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__get_risk_score untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__get_compliance_report untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__sanctions_preview untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__wallet_sanctions_preview untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__sanctions_screen untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__check_agent_wallet untrusted-input
  • mcp__limitguard__verify_lead untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.limitguard.api/limitguard/verify?hash=8a9244fba2180fad194686744bad9ddb3ae5a03349dadb5120c8c5c28e7355f0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8a9244fba218, from Nov 10, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.limitguard.api/limitguard/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.limitguard.api/limitguard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.limitguard.api/limitguard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.limitguard.api/limitguard)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:42 UTC.

Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server have?

10 tools: 6 write, 4 read. check_entity, verify_wallet, get_compliance_report, sanctions_screen, check_agent_wallet, verify_lead, get_trust_score, get_risk_score and 2 more.

Does the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): verify_lead.

Has the Limitguard Lead Verification MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.