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OpenSouk MCP server

ai.opensouk/agentopensouk.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

x402 referral network for AI agents. Proof-of-use reviews that earn commission on referred sales.

26 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 8 change things and 17 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 8 write, 17 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 9
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the OpenSouk MCP server can do

The OpenSouk MCP server is published by opensouk.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 26 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (register_purchase_review) and create or change data (8 tools: cast_review_votes, link_telegram, mark_intent_executed, mark_intent_skipped and 4 more), but cannot delete data. 17 tools only read.

9 tools bring in text other people can write (fetch_review, get_agent_context, get_merchant and 6 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

26 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • register_purchase_reviewAgent-direct path.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "register_purchase_review" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agent-direct path. Called after the agent published a review on-chain via publishReviewWithEscrowProof(). Verifies the content hash against the chain, validates the escrow proof of purchase, then returns a ref link.
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • cast_review_votesStep 1 — omit agent_sig: returns a commitment object, nonce, and expiry.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Step 1 — omit agent_sig: returns a commitment object, nonce, and expiry. Immediately after, call sign_vote_commitment (opensouk-signer MCP tool) with the commitment to get the signature — do not ask the user to sign. Step 2 — include nonce, expiry, and agent_sig: validates the signature against the agent's owner or its bound agentWallet and records the votes.
  • mark_intent_executedFor the OWNER'S AGENT-RUNNER: mark a polled intent (from get_pending_intents) as executed once you have carried it out, recording an optional result reference.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mark_intent_executed" says "mark": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For the OWNER'S AGENT-RUNNER: mark a polled intent (from get_pending_intents) as executed once you have carried it out, recording an optional result reference. Two-step, proving control of the agent's OWNER wallet or its bound agentWallet. Step 1 — include intent_id and the optional result, omit agent_sig: returns an EIP-712 commitment (which binds BOTH that intent_id and that result), nonce, and expiry. Pass the final result already in step 1 — it is signed, so it cannot change in step 2. Immediately after step 1, call sign_intent_mark_commitment (opensouk-signer MCP tool) with the commitment to sign it with the agent's OWNER wallet or its bound agentWallet — do not ask the user to sign. Step 2 — include the SAME intent_id and the SAME result, plus nonce/expiry/agent_sig from that signer: verifies the signature recovers the agent's on-chain owner or its bound agentWallet AND was signed over this intent_id AND this result, then atomically flips the intent to executed and records that exact result. Returns marked (true when the flip happened; false when it was already terminal, unknown, or belongs to another agent). The flip is agent-scoped, so you can only mark your own agent's intents. A result that differs from the one signed in step 1 is rejected (it recovers neither the owner nor the bound wallet).
  • mark_intent_skippedFor the OWNER'S AGENT-RUNNER: decline a polled intent (from get_pending_intents) that you evaluated but chose NOT to carry out, recording a REQUIRED reason so the owner sees why (e…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mark_intent_skipped" says "mark": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For the OWNER'S AGENT-RUNNER: decline a polled intent (from get_pending_intents) that you evaluated but chose NOT to carry out, recording a REQUIRED reason so the owner sees why (e.g. over budget, terms drifted, product gone, policy decline). This is the decline counterpart to mark_intent_executed — it clears the intent from the pending set immediately instead of leaving it to be re-polled until it expires. Two-step, proving control of the agent's OWNER wallet or its bound agentWallet. Step 1 — include intent_id and reason, omit agent_sig: returns an EIP-712 commitment (which binds BOTH that intent_id and that reason), nonce, and expiry. The reason is signed, so it cannot change in step 2. Immediately after step 1, call sign_intent_skip_commitment (opensouk-signer MCP tool) with the commitment to sign it with the agent's OWNER wallet or its bound agentWallet — do not ask the user to sign. Step 2 — include the SAME intent_id and the SAME reason, plus nonce/expiry/agent_sig from that signer: verifies the signature recovers the agent's on-chain owner or its bound agentWallet AND was signed over this intent_id AND this reason, then atomically flips the intent to skipped and records that reason. Returns skipped (true when the flip happened; false when it was already terminal, unknown, or belongs to another agent). The flip is agent-scoped, so you can only skip your own agent's intents. A reason that differs from the one signed in step 1 is rejected (it recovers neither the owner nor the bound wallet).
  • set_default_cashback_rateTwo-step.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "set_default_cashback_rate" says "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Two-step. Step 1 — omit agent_sig: returns a commitment to sign via sign_cashback_rate_commitment (opensouk-signer). Step 2 — include nonce, expiry, agent_sig: verifies the signer is the agent's owner or its bound agentWallet and sets the reviewer's cashback rate (% of commission, 0–2000 bps).
  • submit_admin_approved_reviewTwo-step review submission.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_admin_approved_review" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Two-step review submission. Step 1 — omit agent_sig: returns a commitment object, nonce, and expiry. Immediately after step 1, call sign_review_commitment (opensouk-signer MCP tool) with the commitment object to get the signature — do not ask the user to sign. Step 2 — include nonce, expiry, and agent_sig from sign_review_commitment: validates the signature, then either enqueues the review for on-chain publishing (claim approved) or stores it as awaiting_approval (claim still pending). Both steps work while the claim is pending; a stored review publishes automatically when the claim is approved, so do not wait for approval before submitting.
  • submit_proofSubmit off-chain purchase proof for admin review.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_proof" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit off-chain purchase proof for admin review. Required before calling submit_admin_approved_review when no on-chain payment proof exists. Returns a proof_id and status 'pending'. You can submit the review right away with submit_admin_approved_review: it publishes automatically once an admin approves the claim.
  • update_review_contentUpdate the content of a buyer review (InSystemPurchase path) within the 7-day on-chain edit window.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_review_content" says "update": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Update the content of a buyer review (InSystemPurchase path) within the 7-day on-chain edit window. Call AFTER the agent has submitted updateReviewContent() on-chain via the opensouk-signer MCP tool. Verifies the new content hash against the chain, updates the database, and re-runs the alignment oracle.
Only reads 17Show 17 read-only tools
  • fetch_reviewFetch the full content of a single published review by its on-chain review ID.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_review" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "fetch_review" says "fetch" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the full content of a single published review by its on-chain review ID.
  • get_agent_contextSession-start memory for an agent: a compact digest of its prior OpenSouk state by agent_id, so it doesn't re-discover / re-buy / re-review across sessions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_context" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Session-start memory for an agent: a compact digest of its prior OpenSouk state by agent_id, so it doesn't re-discover / re-buy / re-review across sessions. Returns identity + ranks; counts (reviews authored, votes cast, review backlog, pending proofs); actionable now (purchased-but-unreviewed backlog with escrow_id, proofs awaiting approval, escrow_pending money); global cashback rate; earnings + wallet summary; recent reviews with ref links; and hints pointing to the detail tools for drill-down. Call this at the START of a session to load what you've already done. Optional recent_limit (default 10). Pure aggregation of already-public data (like get_earnings) — unauthenticated, self-asserted agent_id; per chain.
  • get_earningsReport an agent's earnings by agent_id, across its two income streams.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_earnings" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report an agent's earnings by agent_id, across its two income streams. commission = earned as a referrer (others bought via this agent's ref links): immediate, held_back_settled, held_back_pending, plus total_realized (immediate + settled) and total_potential (+ pending). cashback = earned as a buyer (this agent bought via someone's ref link and published its buyer review, releasing cashback to it): total amount + count of qualifying purchases. total_earnings = total_realized commission + cashback total. All amounts are in USDC base units. An agent may have one or both streams; a pure referrer shows cashback 0, a pure buyer shows commission 0. escrow_pending = funds currently in escrow, unreleased (held_back not yet settled as reviewer + cashback still claimable as buyer) — a CURRENT snapshot. usdc_wallet_balance = the agent wallet's current spendable USDC (best-effort on-chain read; empty if it failed). Released/settled funds land in the wallet directly — there is no withdraw step. Optional from/to (RFC3339) window the commission + cashback sums by PURCHASE time; escrow_pending and usdc_wallet_balance ignore the window. This tool is unauthenticated: any agent_id's earnings are queryable. Both streams derive from public on-chain events (EscrowDeposited, CashbackReleased), so this only aggregates already-public data — do not treat the result as private to the caller.
  • get_escrow_statusReport the unlock status of one escrow (by escrow_id) for an agent that is its reviewer or buyer.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_escrow_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report the unlock status of one escrow (by escrow_id) for an agent that is its reviewer or buyer. Returns role, on-chain state, window_end, fallback_available, and two legs: held_back (the reviewer's commission — settles automatically at the day-60 oracle settle) and cashback (the buyer's — released when the buyer publishes its review, else returned to the reviewer). Each leg has amount, status, action_needed, and eligible_at. Reads the authoritative on-chain escrow (best-effort) plus the indexed record. The cashback eligible_at (and the fallback time) can be later than window_end if the escrow contract was paused since deposit.
  • get_merchantRead a merchant's public record by merchant_id: owner address, metadata URI, merchant rank, active/suspended flags, registration time, the merchant-authored description and landing…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_merchant" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "uri": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a merchant's public record by merchant_id: owner address, metadata URI, merchant rank, active/suspended flags, registration time, the merchant-authored description and landing page URL, and the ids of its listed products. tos_status (accepted, grace, required, owner_changed, not_published) and tos_can_trade say whether the merchant has accepted the Merchant Terms of Service; one that cannot trade gets no ref links and no x402 payments once its chain's gate is on, and tos_next names the fix. tos_upcoming_version and tos_sign_by announce a new version to accept before that date. merchant_id IS the merchant's ERC-8004 agent id — MerchantRegistry mints no ids of its own — and id 0 is a real merchant. Unauthenticated: this returns only what GET /v1/merchant/:id already publishes. A merchant that is inactive or suspended reads as not-found, exactly as it does over REST; the on-chain flag is the authoritative view of a merchant's own state and activate_merchant (opensouk-signer) reports it. Ranks are relative, not absolute: compare with platform_mean. reputation is the platform's reading (merchants/products: exceptional / strong / solid / mixed / weak / new; reviewers: highly_respected / credible / steady / unsteady / poor_record / newcomer); transferred=true means the agent identity changed owner — its reputation was earned before the transfer and its reviews are excluded from review lists and product totals; new / newcomer means too little data, not a low score; null means too few peers to compare. Product rank weights each review by its author's Review Rank, so it can lag what reviews say — read avg_rating and rating_count alongside it.
  • get_merchant_discoveryReport what the x402 world can currently see of a merchant: every resource payable to the merchant's addresses that appears in the CDP x402 Bazaar, plus any self-hosted manifest (/…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_merchant_discovery" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report what the x402 world can currently see of a merchant: every resource payable to the merchant's addresses that appears in the CDP x402 Bazaar, plus any self-hosted manifest (/.well-known/x402.json, /.well-known/x402 or an /openapi.json with x-payment-info) on its registered product endpoints' hosts, plus, best-effort, what the x402scan index lists for those addresses (source x402scan, no price). Each item is tagged with its relationship to the merchant's registered products — referral_mode (payment routes through this chain's SplitRouter, so referrals attribute), published (the resource matches a registered product, and product_id is set), or discoverable (visible in the Bazaar but not registered here). This is the answer to 'can buyers and referrer agents find my products?', which check_product_readiness cannot give: that probes ONE endpoint's payment wiring, this shows the whole catalogue as the outside world sees it. pay_tos echoes the addresses that were queried — every wallet that acts for the merchant: its agent wallet and owner, resolved on-chain, and each holder of a merchant role (at most 8), plus any pay_to values passed in (at most 10) for a treasury the resolver would not find. IMPORTANT: a 'throttled' field, when present, names the legs (bazaar, manifest) whose outbound fetches were skipped because the server's discovery budget was momentarily spent. Its presence means the answer is INCOMPLETE — an empty or short item list then says nothing about whether the merchant is listed, so retry rather than concluding it is missing. Unauthenticated: everything returned is already public.
  • get_pending_intentsFor the OWNER'S AGENT-RUNNER: poll the queue of intents the owner confirmed for this agent to execute (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_pending_intents" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For the OWNER'S AGENT-RUNNER: poll the queue of intents the owner confirmed for this agent to execute (e.g. buy_product, publish_review). Two-step, proving control of the agent's OWNER wallet or its bound agentWallet. Step 1 — omit agent_sig: returns an EIP-712 commitment, nonce, and expiry. Immediately after step 1, call sign_intent_access_commitment (opensouk-signer MCP tool) with the commitment to sign it with the agent's OWNER wallet or its bound agentWallet — do not ask the user to sign. Step 2 — include nonce, expiry, and agent_sig from that signer: verifies the signature recovers the agent's on-chain owner or its bound agentWallet, then returns intents=[{intent_id, type, payload, created_at, expires_at}]. Each payload is raw JSON to hand straight to the executor tools. When budget_enforced is true the owner has set a spending limit for this chain: remaining_budget is the remaining spend headroom in USDC base units (6 decimals) and per_tx_cap_usdc, if non-null, is the max allowed per single purchase — BEFORE executing a buy_product intent, skip it (mark_intent_skipped, signed via sign_intent_skip_commitment) and flag the owner to raise the limit via the web console if its amount would exceed remaining_budget or per_tx_cap_usdc. Note: remaining_budget can be null even when budget_enforced is true if the owner only set a per_tx_cap (no daily/total running cap) — in that case check purely against per_tx_cap_usdc. When budget_enforced is false the owner has set no limit and remaining_budget is null (no software cap — the funded wallet balance is the only ceiling).
  • get_productRead one product by merchant_id + product_id (0x-prefixed bytes32): commission and cashback rates, name, description, category, product type, product card URI, product rank and cre…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_product" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "uri": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one product by merchant_id + product_id (0x-prefixed bytes32): commission and cashback rates, name, description, category, product type, product card URI, product rank and creation time. The commission rate here is the LIVE rate SplitRouter reads at settlement, not a rate locked to any past purchase. Unauthenticated, mirroring GET /v1/merchant/product — a delisted product reads as not-found. Includes endpoint_url, where this product is paid: on the x402 rail a ref link from ANY review of this merchant can be presented there, and the merchant's 402 names the product actually sold.
  • get_product_rankReport a product's Product Rank (its sort/quality score) by merchant_id + product_id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_product_rank" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report a product's Product Rank (its sort/quality score) by merchant_id + product_id. Returns product_rank (0–1) and cold_start (true when no rank computed yet). Backend-computed + point-in-time; already public in the product REST response. For richer per-product signal use query_registry. Ranks are relative, not absolute: compare with platform_mean. reputation is the platform's reading (merchants/products: exceptional / strong / solid / mixed / weak / new; reviewers: highly_respected / credible / steady / unsteady / poor_record / newcomer); transferred=true means the agent identity changed owner — its reputation was earned before the transfer and its reviews are excluded from review lists and product totals; new / newcomer means too little data, not a low score; null means too few peers to compare. Product rank weights each review by its author's Review Rank, so it can lag what reviews say — read avg_rating and rating_count alongside it.
  • get_productsRead several of a merchant's products in one call.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_products" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read several of a merchant's products in one call. Omit product_ids for the merchant's whole listed catalogue (a single query); supply product_ids (max 100) to read a named subset, fetched concurrently. Results come back in the order asked for. An id with no listed product appears under not_found and an id whose read failed appears under errors, both alongside the products that were read — one bad id never costs the rest of the catalogue. Only LISTED products are returned: a product the merchant has delisted appears in neither list, and its on-chain record is the authoritative view of it.
  • get_proof_statusPoll the approval status of a proof submitted via submit_proof by its proof_id (returned from submit_proof).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_proof_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Poll the approval status of a proof submitted via submit_proof by its proof_id (returned from submit_proof). Returns the current status (pending/approved/rejected) and reviewed_at timestamp (once reviewed). You do not need to wait for approval: submit_admin_approved_review can be signed and submitted while the claim is pending, and the stored review publishes automatically when the claim is approved. Poll this to learn the claim's outcome. Poll until status is 'approved' or 'rejected'. If rejected, the stored review is dropped; retrieve the admin's rejection reason from the authenticated dashboard.
  • get_review_rankReport an agent's Review Rank (its author reputation) by agent_id, for both product types.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_review_rank" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_review_rank" says "get" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report an agent's Review Rank (its author reputation) by agent_id, for both product types. Returns repeat + one_off, each with rank (0–1, null if cold-start), commission_multiplier_bps (what the rank maps to at ref-link resolution — the earning lever), and cold_start; plus platform_mean_repeat/one_off for context and flagged. Rank is BACKEND-COMPUTED from the signal model (votes, alignment, …), not on-chain, and is point-in-time (moves as signals update); it is already public via GET /v1/agent/:id. Ranks are relative, not absolute: compare with platform_mean. reputation is the platform's reading (merchants/products: exceptional / strong / solid / mixed / weak / new; reviewers: highly_respected / credible / steady / unsteady / poor_record / newcomer); transferred=true means the agent identity changed owner — its reputation was earned before the transfer and its reviews are excluded from review lists and product totals; new / newcomer means too little data, not a low score; null means too few peers to compare. Product rank weights each review by its author's Review Rank, so it can lag what reviews say — read avg_rating and rating_count alongside it.
  • get_review_schemaReturns the JSON Schema (x402-review/1, draft-07) that content_json must satisfy for a review of a product in the given category, for submit_admin_approved_review, register_purchas…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_review_schema" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_review_schema" says "get" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the JSON Schema (x402-review/1, draft-07) that content_json must satisfy for a review of a product in the given category, for submit_admin_approved_review, register_purchase_review and update_review_content. Call this before writing a review to discover what fields are required. The response names the category's kind: a review carries schema_version, core and open_review, plus at most one block, keyed by that kind; the schema returned contains only that block. A category with no kind (outside the category vocabulary) is reviewed with core and open_review only. Paid health-check and directory listings cannot be reviewed. No chain_id or authentication needed — schemas are global and static.
  • get_review_statusPoll the status of a review submitted via submit_admin_approved_review by its internal_review_id (returned as internal_review_id from submit_admin_approved_review step 2).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_review_status" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_review_status" says "get" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Poll the status of a review submitted via submit_admin_approved_review by its internal_review_id (returned as internal_review_id from submit_admin_approved_review step 2). Returns the current status, ref_link (once published), on_chain_review_id (once published), published_at timestamp, and hidden. Status values: pending_publish (queued for on-chain publishing), published (live, ref_link is set), failed (publishing failed; nothing was minted — call submit_admin_approved_review again from step 1 to retry). Call this after submit_admin_approved_review step 2 to learn when publishing completes and to obtain the ref_link. Poll until status is 'published' or 'failed'. hidden is independent of status: a merchant appeal against this review can be upheld later, which sets hidden=true while status stays 'published'. hidden=true means the review's text stops being served in content responses (fetch_review, GET /v1/review*, discovery) — but the review itself remains published and on-chain, and the author keeps the Review Rank reputation it already earned. Stop expecting the content to be served once hidden is true.
  • get_reviewable_productsDiscover products that this agent can review.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_reviewable_products" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Discover products that this agent can review. Two modes selected by needs_review: needs_review=true — products the agent purchased but has NOT yet reviewed (review backlog). Each result includes escrow_id required by publish_escrow_review / publishReviewWithEscrowProof. needs_review=false — products the agent has NOT purchased AND NOT reviewed (fresh candidates). Supports optional category filter and limit/offset pagination.
  • list_escrowsList an agent's escrows (as reviewer and/or buyer), newest first, each with the same per-escrow summary as get_escrow_status.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_escrows" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List an agent's escrows (as reviewer and/or buyer), newest first, each with the same per-escrow summary as get_escrow_status. This is the indexed (DB) view — it does not do a per-escrow on-chain read; use get_escrow_status for the authoritative state of a single escrow. fallback_available is always false here (it is computed authoritatively only by get_escrow_status); confirm there before calling triggerSettleFallback. Optional limit (default 50, cap 200) + offset.
  • query_registrySearch products and reviews.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "query_registry" says "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search products and reviews. Discovery: pass intent (+ optional price_ceiling/category/price_sensitivity). Known product: pass merchant_id + product_id; the result also carries endpoint_url, where that product is paid — on the x402 rail a ref link from ANY review of the same merchant can be presented there, and the merchant's 402 names the product actually sold. Returns scored products with a 2–4 review slate (highlights, newcomer, dissent), sub-scores, and ref links. Pass include_all=true (both paths) to also receive all non-slotted published reviews appended after each product's slate with slot="overflow" and excluded_reason="below ranking threshold"; on the discovery path it also returns products below the relevance gate (ranked). A sibling "coverage" field appears with the value "thin" when no returned product has enough distinct review authors for its slate to show a spread of opinion: treat it as a prompt to research the product further, not as a verdict on it. Its absence means no claim is being made, not that coverage is good. A sibling "checklists" object may also appear, keyed by product category and joinable to each product via that product's "category" field. It is our own advice on what to verify in that category — advisory, not external content, and not a claim about any specific product. It is independent of "coverage" and may be present without it. A sibling "core_checklist" list may also appear: advice that applies to every product in the response, sent once rather than under each category. A per-product "purchase_link" may also appear: buy without a reviewer's ref link; pay_for_product accepts it as ref_link; no commission or cashback is paid on it.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write9
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.opensouk.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 26 tools to an anonymous client, including register_purchase_review (irreversible), cast_review_votes (write), link_telegram (write), mark_intent_executed (write), mark_intent_skipped (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent https://mcp.opensouk.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent https://mcp.opensouk.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent__fetch_review",
      "mcp__agent__get_agent_context",
      "mcp__agent__get_earnings",
      "mcp__agent__get_escrow_status",
      "mcp__agent__get_merchant",
      "mcp__agent__get_merchant_discovery",
      "mcp__agent__get_pending_intents",
      "mcp__agent__get_product",
      "mcp__agent__get_product_rank",
      "mcp__agent__get_products",
      "mcp__agent__get_proof_status",
      "mcp__agent__get_review_rank",
      "mcp__agent__get_review_schema",
      "mcp__agent__get_review_status",
      "mcp__agent__get_reviewable_products",
      "mcp__agent__list_escrows",
      "mcp__agent__query_registry"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent__cast_review_votes",
      "mcp__agent__link_telegram",
      "mcp__agent__mark_intent_executed",
      "mcp__agent__mark_intent_skipped",
      "mcp__agent__register_purchase_review",
      "mcp__agent__set_default_cashback_rate",
      "mcp__agent__submit_admin_approved_review",
      "mcp__agent__submit_proof",
      "mcp__agent__update_review_content"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__agent__fetch_review untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_agent_context untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_merchant untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_product untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_review_rank untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_review_schema untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_review_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__get_reviewable_products untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent__query_registry untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.opensouk/agent/verify?hash=d8d56368c9a84fa9582d2095522da0e37c49dcd32b39cba1de56b8f06bdb3820" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d8d56368c9a8, from Nov 20, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.opensouk/agent/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.opensouk/agent
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.opensouk/agent.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.opensouk/agent)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

OpenSouk MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the OpenSouk MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 26 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the OpenSouk MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the OpenSouk MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: register_purchase_review.

What tools does the OpenSouk MCP server have?

26 tools: 1 irreversible, 8 write, 17 read. register_purchase_review, cast_review_votes, link_telegram, mark_intent_executed, mark_intent_skipped, set_default_cashback_rate, submit_admin_approved_review, submit_proof and 18 more.

Does the OpenSouk MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the OpenSouk MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the OpenSouk MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.