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Plith Rigor MCP server

ai.plith/rigorplith.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Structured multi-step workflows that produce production-quality deliverables. Plan any task free.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Plith Rigor MCP server can do

The Plith Rigor MCP server is published by plith.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: rigor_plan and rigor_execute), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (rigor_workflows); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (rigor_plan and rigor_execute); 1 tool can send data out of your system (rigor_execute). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • rigor_executeExecute a structured workflow end-to-end.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "rigor_execute" says "execute": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.delivery.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Execute a structured workflow end-to-end. Call rigor_plan first (free) to preview the step sequence and cost estimate before committing credits. Classifies the task, selects the optimal tool sequence, and executes each step with the right LLM model. Returns a complete deliverable — solution designs, competitive analyses, governance documents, and more. Supports SSE streaming for real-time progress, webhook callback, or polling. For atomic work — classification, scoring, ranking, entity extraction, query parsing — set preferences.execution to 'direct' and declare preferences.output_contract to get validated JSON records from a single call, routed to the cheapest model that holds the schema.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Execute a Rigor workflow
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • rigor_planBefore executing a complex task, get a structured workflow plan with per-step cost estimates.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before executing a complex task, get a structured workflow plan with per-step cost estimates. Classifies your task, selects the optimal framework sequence, and returns the full plan without executing anything. The response's allowed_modes tells you whether this plan is eligible for direct execution. Free — no credits charged.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Plan a Rigor workflow
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • rigor_statusCheck the status of a running or completed Rigor workflow.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "rigor_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check the status of a running or completed Rigor workflow. Returns progress, step results, and the full deliverable when complete. Use after rigor_execute with polling delivery to retrieve results.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check workflow status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • rigor_workflowsList and search Rigor workflows for your organization, with filtering and pagination.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a folder (input.folder_id), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List and search Rigor workflows for your organization, with filtering and pagination. Returns status, progress, capacity usage, and available actions per workflow. Use to monitor workflow state, understand concurrent limit usage, identify stuck or completed workflows, and — via q — find prior work on a subject before commissioning it again. Pair a q hit with rigor_status to read that workflow's deliverable.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Rigor workflows
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__rigor__rigor_execute"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://plith.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://plith.ai
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://plith.ai/api/mcp/rigor: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including rigor_plan (write), rigor_execute (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 16, 2026
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://plith.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://plith.ai
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
  2. Nov 9, 2026
    • Protocol version: 2024-11-05 to 2025-06-18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://plith.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; Authorization servers: none -> https://plith.ai; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 more).View diff
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://plith.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://plith.ai
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to yes
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Protocol version: 2024-11-05 -> 2025-06-18.View diff
    • Protocol version: 2024-11-05 to 2025-06-18

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http rigor https://plith.ai/api/mcp/rigor
claude mcp add --transport http rigor https://plith.ai/api/mcp/rigor

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__rigor__rigor_status",
      "mcp__rigor__rigor_workflows"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__rigor__rigor_plan",
      "mcp__rigor__rigor_execute"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rigor. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__rigor__rigor_plan untrusted-input
  • mcp__rigor__rigor_execute untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__rigor__rigor_workflows private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.plith/rigor/verify?hash=8971acf331132c3d5543d1325de0d43a41bee972fab42f6e4e8c5d91c4107bc4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8971acf33113, from Nov 9, 2026, 03:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.plith/rigor/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.plith/rigor
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.plith/rigor.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.plith/rigor)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 24, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Plith Rigor MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Plith Rigor MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Plith Rigor MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Plith Rigor MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Plith Rigor MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. rigor_plan, rigor_execute, rigor_status and rigor_workflows.

Does the Plith Rigor MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Plith Rigor MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): rigor_execute.

Has the Plith Rigor MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.