Python Code Validator MCP server
ai.statemind/python-code-validatorstatemind.aistreamable-httpv1.22.0Scanned
Proves AI-generated Python does what you asked: lint, types, security, sandbox run, exact fixes.
3 tools: 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Python Code Validator MCP server can do
The Python Code Validator MCP server is published by statemind.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: validate_python, repair_python and execute_python), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention, annotation-conflict and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.22.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
execute_pythonEverything repair does, and then RUNS the code in a throwaway container — no network, read-only filesystem, killed at options.timeout_s — reporting exit code, stdout and stderr.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "execute_python" says "execute": a word for a change.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,986 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...; see outputSchema. The code and its verdict are retained to improve the service."
Description, as the server wrote it Everything repair does, and then RUNS the code in a throwaway container — no network, read-only filesystem, killed at options.timeout_s — reporting exit code, stdout and stderr. Any '>>>' examples in the code are run too, and one that does not print what it says is an error the other tools cannot see. This is a side effect: do not submit code you do not want executed. Use it when you need proof that the code runs, or that it does what it says. Alternatives: validate_python for the diagnosis and repair_python for the fix, neither of which runs anything. Auth: a key is required. This call needs a paid key and answers HTTP 402 without one. Credits are bought without an account, 10 per call: GET /v1/pricing says where to send the xDAI. Or pay for this one call with no key at all: call it without one and the result carries x402 payment requirements ($0.1 in USD Coin on eip155:8453); sign them and repeat the call with the payment in _meta['x402/payment']. Arguments: code: the whole file, 1..200000 bytes of UTF-8 measured after encoding (empty is refused with 400, larger with 413); a fragment is fine, but line and column numbers in the answer count from 1 in what you sent. language: must be 'python'; anything else is 400, and the field may be omitted. options.max_iterations (1..10, default 3) caps the fix/verify rounds: raise it for a file with several independent faults, leave it for a snippet. options.optimize (default false) additionally folds constants and drops dead code, and is only worth setting when you asked for a rewrite anyway. options.transpile_to (e.g. 'javascript') returns a translation of the *repaired* source in transpiled, not of what you sent. fixed_code is null when nothing could be proven safe to change, so treat null as 'no fix', not as an error. options.timeout_s (seconds, default 5) is the wall clock for the run; the schema allows up to 60 but this deployment caps it at 30 and refuses a larger value with 400. options.expected_output compares stdout byte for byte and adds an 'expected-output' diagnostic (valid=false) when it differs, which is how you ask for 'it did the right thing' rather than 'it ran'. options.examples is the same question for code with no output: pass what you asked for as doctest lines ('>>> total([1, 2])' then '3') or assertions ('assert total([1, 2]) == 3'), and each is run against the code -- one that does not hold is a 'python:example-mismatch' error, and repair looks for a single-token change that makes them all pass. Send it whenever you know what you asked for: without it, code that runs but returns the wrong answer looks perfect from here. The program that runs is the repaired one, so read fixed_code before you trust runtime.stdout, and it runs exactly once however many rounds the repair took. Returns valid, score 0..1, diagnostics (rule, message, line, column), security findings, fixes, fixed_code and runtime; see outputSchema. The code and its verdict are retained to improve the service.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Execute Python
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
repair_pythonEverything validation does, plus deterministic fixes: the corrected source comes back in fixed_code, and the original is kept whenever the fix cannot be proven safe.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "repair_python" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Everything validation does, plus deterministic fixes: the corrected source comes back in fixed_code, and the original is kept whenever the fix cannot be proven safe. The code is still never run. Use it when validation failed and you want the fix rather than the diagnosis. Alternatives: validate_python when the diagnosis is enough; execute_python when the fix has to be proven to run. Auth: a key is required. This call needs a paid key and answers HTTP 402 without one. Credits are bought without an account, 3 per call: GET /v1/pricing says where to send the xDAI. Or pay for this one call with no key at all: call it without one and the result carries x402 payment requirements ($0.03 in USD Coin on eip155:8453); sign them and repeat the call with the payment in _meta['x402/payment']. Arguments: code: the whole file, 1..200000 bytes of UTF-8 measured after encoding (empty is refused with 400, larger with 413); a fragment is fine, but line and column numbers in the answer count from 1 in what you sent. language: must be 'python'; anything else is 400, and the field may be omitted. options.max_iterations (1..10, default 3) caps the fix/verify rounds: raise it for a file with several independent faults, leave it for a snippet. options.optimize (default false) additionally folds constants and drops dead code, and is only worth setting when you asked for a rewrite anyway. options.transpile_to (e.g. 'javascript') returns a translation of the *repaired* source in transpiled, not of what you sent. fixed_code is null when nothing could be proven safe to change, so treat null as 'no fix', not as an error. options.timeout_s, options.examples and options.expected_output do nothing here: nothing is run, so there is no clock, no stdout, and no way to check an example. Returns valid, score 0..1, diagnostics (rule, message, line, column), security findings, fixes, fixed_code and runtime; see outputSchema. The code and its verdict are retained to improve the service.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Repair Python
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
validate_pythonCheck Python source without running it: parse, lint (ruff), type-check (mypy), AST security policy, credential scan.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_python" says "validate": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...type-check (mypy), AST security policy, credential scan. Safe on code you do not trust. Us..."
- Warn
The server marks "validate_python" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_python" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check Python source without running it: parse, lint (ruff), type-check (mypy), AST security policy, credential scan. Safe on code you do not trust. Use it on every Python file you generated or edited, before writing it to disk. Alternatives: repair_python to get the corrected source instead of the diagnosis; execute_python to prove the code runs. Auth: a key is required. A free key covers this call, 25 per day, then HTTP 429; get one with POST /v1/keys. Credits are bought without an account, 1 per call: GET /v1/pricing says where to send the xDAI. Or pay for this one call with no key at all: call it without one and the result carries x402 payment requirements ($0.01 in USD Coin on eip155:8453); sign them and repeat the call with the payment in _meta['x402/payment']. Arguments: code: the whole file, 1..200000 bytes of UTF-8 measured after encoding (empty is refused with 400, larger with 413); a fragment is fine, but line and column numbers in the answer count from 1 in what you sent. language: must be 'python'; anything else is 400, and the field may be omitted. Of options only transpile_to (e.g. 'javascript', which returns a translated copy in transpiled) acts here; timeout_s, max_iterations, optimize, examples and expected_output need a pass that rewrites or runs the code, so send code alone. Ignored options are not refused, so a call that sets them looks like it worked; and code that does not parse is answered rather than refused: valid=false with the syntax error located, which is the point. Returns valid, score 0..1, diagnostics (rule, message, line, column), security findings, fixes, fixed_code and runtime; see outputSchema. The code and its verdict are retained to improve the service.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Validate Python
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://api.statemind.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://api.statemind.ai
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.statemind.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including validate_python (write), repair_python (write), execute_python (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnvalidate_python
The server marks "validate_python" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "validate_python" says "validate": a word for reading.
- Warnrepair_python
The server marks "repair_python" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- Infovalidate_python
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...type-check (mypy), AST security policy, credential scan. Safe on code you do not trust. Us..."
- Infoexecute_python
The description is 2,986 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...; see outputSchema. The code and its verdict are retained to improve the service."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.22.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http python-code-validator https://api.statemind.ai/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http python-code-validator https://api.statemind.ai/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__python-code-validator__validate_python",
"mcp__python-code-validator__repair_python",
"mcp__python-code-validator__execute_python"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as python-code-validator. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.statemind/python-code-validator/verify?hash=3136130f5653dee0ee643b1cd24e8ac27edfaaf4d53ba2a72bf90cd204c3a6fe" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3136130f5653, from Nov 10, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.statemind/python-code-validator/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.statemind/python-code-validator)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:43 UTC.
Python Code Validator MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Python Code Validator MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Python Code Validator MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Python Code Validator MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Python Code Validator MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 write. validate_python, repair_python and execute_python.
Does the Python Code Validator MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Python Code Validator MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Python Code Validator MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.