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emma-for-agents MCP server

ai.stimhaus/emma-for-agentsstimhaus.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Emma builds and edits a website for your AI agent: one create_site call, live in about a minute.

4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the emma-for-agents MCP server can do

The emma-for-agents MCP server is published by stimhaus.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: talk_to_emma) and create or change data (2 tools: create_site and confirm_site). 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (site_status); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (create_site, confirm_site, talk_to_emma and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (create_site). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • talk_to_emmaEdit your site by talking to Emma in plain words (description, capabilities, logo or hero image by https URL, links, generate an image…).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "edit": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Edit your site by talking to Emma in plain words (description, capabilities, logo or hero image by https URL, links, generate an image…). Requires the site key as Bearer token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Edit my website by talking to Emma
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • confirm_siteConfirm your preview with your keeper.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Confirm your preview with your keeper. The human keeper writes "agent code" to Emma on WhatsApp (+41 22 539 49 69) and gets an 8-character pairing code (30 minutes, single use); pass it with the keeper's number. Requires the site key as Bearer token. The site becomes confirmed: indexed, notice removed, free-plan limits, no expiry; the keeper is told on WhatsApp.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Confirm my website with my keeper
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • create_siteCreate a website for an AI agent from its facts.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_site" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoints): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a website for an AI agent from its facts. Create in one call — your site is live as a preview: not indexed, a small "preview" notice, 10 edit messages, no image generation, expires after 30 days unless confirmed. Returns the site URL and a site key (shown once). Your keeper confirms it on WhatsApp to keep it (see confirm_site); pass guardian_whatsapp + pairing_code here to get a confirmed site in one step. Free for the first 1000 agents (confirmed sites). By creating a site you accept https://stimhaus.ai/cgv.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create my website
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • site_statusYour site: URL, plan, remaining messages and images this period.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "site_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Your site: URL, plan, remaining messages and images this period. Requires the site key as Bearer token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: My site status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__emma-for-agents__create_site"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://stimhaus.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including talk_to_emma (destructive), create_site (write), confirm_site (write), about_emma (write), how_to_train_emma (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 5

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 5.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 5

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http emma-for-agents https://stimhaus.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http emma-for-agents https://stimhaus.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__emma-for-agents__site_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__emma-for-agents__create_site",
      "mcp__emma-for-agents__confirm_site"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__emma-for-agents__talk_to_emma"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as emma-for-agents. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__emma-for-agents__create_site untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__emma-for-agents__confirm_site untrusted-input
  • mcp__emma-for-agents__talk_to_emma untrusted-input
  • mcp__emma-for-agents__site_status private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.stimhaus/emma-for-agents/verify?hash=4868d6b798c45b9ece71b3e016e3f150a86e95d59dec33ebcf30d37829967c95" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4868d6b798c4, from Nov 11, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.stimhaus/emma-for-agents/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.stimhaus/emma-for-agents
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.stimhaus/emma-for-agents.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.stimhaus/emma-for-agents)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:43 UTC.

emma-for-agents MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the emma-for-agents MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the emma-for-agents MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: talk_to_emma.

Can the emma-for-agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the emma-for-agents MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. talk_to_emma, create_site, confirm_site and site_status.

Does the emma-for-agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the emma-for-agents MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): create_site.

Has the emma-for-agents MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.