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Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server

ai.subpay/invoice-readersubpay.aistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Reads invoices and receipts from PDF to JSON and checks the math. $0.04/page via x402.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server can do

The Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server is published by subpay.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: about), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (extract_invoice).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • aboutFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. What extract_invoice reads, the arithmetic checks, price, payment networks and terms.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • extract_invoiceReads invoices, bills and receipts from PDF into structured JSON — vendor, customer, dates, PO, line items, discount, tax, shipping, total, balance due — and checks the arithmetic:…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.fileName), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads invoices, bills and receipts from PDF into structured JSON — vendor, customer, dates, PO, line items, discount, tax, shipping, total, balance due — and checks the arithmetic: quantity × unit price, lines to subtotal, tax rate, total and balance due. The response says exactly which figures don't add up. Returns vendor, customer, invoice number, dates, PO, line items, subtotal, discount, taxes, shipping, total, amount paid and balance due, plus checks (passed true/false, or null when the figures aren't printed). $0.04 per page (up to 25 pages) in USDC per successful read via x402, quoted before you pay; failed reads are free. First 3 reads a day are free (documents up to 10 pages, no payment needed); after that, the usual price.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://subpay.ai/invoice/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including about (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http invoice-reader https://subpay.ai/invoice/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http invoice-reader https://subpay.ai/invoice/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__invoice-reader__extract_invoice"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__invoice-reader__about"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as invoice-reader. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__invoice-reader__extract_invoice private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.subpay/invoice-reader/verify?hash=3b480a55d53b6d2f331d968480d07f81f4285c3545e483db59eafe36baa8db58" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3b480a55d53b, from Nov 11, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.subpay/invoice-reader/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.subpay/invoice-reader
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.subpay/invoice-reader.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.subpay/invoice-reader)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:43 UTC.

Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. about and extract_invoice.

Does the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Subpay Invoice Reader MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.