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Sugra MCP server

ai.sugra/api-mcpsugra.aistreamable-httpv0.14.1Scanned

Connect AI agents to primary sources - markets, macro, news, earth, network, entities and research.

11 tools: 2 change things and 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 11
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Sugra MCP server can do

The Sugra MCP server is published by sugra.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: sugra_entity_screen and call_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.

11 tools bring in text other people can write (sugra_entity_screen, sugra_entity_lookup, search_endpoints and 8 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.14.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • call_endpointCall a Sugra API endpoint by operation_id from the bundled catalog.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call a Sugra API endpoint by operation_id from the bundled catalog. Plan calls with describe_endpoint's agent_hints: duration_class "fast" usually responds in under ~2s, "slow" usually 1-5s and occasionally 15s+ on a cold upstream, "heavy" can exceed the gateway timeout - keep parallel calls within max_concurrency and prefer small batches. Bulk endpoints bill 1 request credit per body item. Failures return structured errors {error, reason, status_code, elapsed_ms, retry_hint}; after "upstream_timeout" a single retry often succeeds because the aborted attempt warms upstream caches.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Call endpoint
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sugra_entity_screenScreen a person or organization name against the Sugra sanctions corpus.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a person or organization name against the Sugra sanctions corpus. Returns a SCREENING SIGNAL, not a compliance determination. Sugra is a technology provider, not a sanctions authority or consumer reporting agency. PEP and adverse-media coverage is supplementary and non-comprehensive - a `clear` result is not proof of absence, and a `hit` is a candidate match to review, not a finding. Output is COMPACT to protect the agent context budget: `{status, matches:[{name, score, list, type}], disclaimer}`. The verdict `status` is one of `clear`, `review`, or `hit`. The heavy raw fields (match rationale, source ids, publish dates) are dropped; use the Sugra API directly when the full screening envelope is needed. Args: name: The person or organization name to screen (required). country: Optional ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country to narrow the match. dob: Optional date of birth (YYYY-MM-DD) for a person. nationality: Optional nationality to narrow the match.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sugra Entity screen
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • describe_endpointDescribe one Sugra API endpoint by operation_id.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_endpoint" says "describe": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Describe one Sugra API endpoint by operation_id. Includes agent_hints (duration_class fast/slow/heavy, max_concurrency, bulk billing) so you can budget timeouts and parallelism before calling. POST endpoints with a JSON body also carry request_body_schema (the resolved JSON schema) - construct the `body` argument from it instead of guessing key names. Call this after search_endpoints and before call_endpoint when you need the exact parameter names and examples.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Describe endpoint
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • fetch_dataOne-step fetch: find the best Sugra endpoint for the query and call it.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_data" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One-step fetch: find the best Sugra endpoint for the query and call it. Combines search_endpoints + call_endpoint into a single round trip. Use this when you want data without manually picking an operation_id. The full search_endpoints + describe_endpoint + call_endpoint dance is still available when you need explicit control, but for most natural-language queries this tool is enough. Behavior: 1. Search the bundled catalog for the query. Top match wins. 2. If the matched endpoint has required parameters and they are all provided in `params`, call it and return the response. 3. If required parameters are missing, return the candidate endpoints and the missing-params list so the LLM can retry with the correct `params` dict on the next call. 4. If the query names a country and the match takes a `country` or `countries` param that `params` leaves unset, return needs_params for it with query_countries (ISO2) instead of running the match without that filter. Examples: - `fetch_data("US CPI inflation", params={"series_id": "CPIAUCSL"})` runs fred_series_series_id (/api/v1/fred/series/CPIAUCSL) and returns observations. - `fetch_data("Bitcoin price")` runs onchain_bitcoin_price, which takes no params. - `fetch_data("Latest financial news")` runs news_latest, which has no required params. Only the top match runs, and a param it does not declare returns error unknown_parameters. For one coin's price, name the operation: `call_endpoint("crypto_coin_id_price", params={"coin_id": "bitcoin"})`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch data
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_snapshotComposed current view of an entity via a named recipe.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_snapshot" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Composed current view of an entity via a named recipe. Executes a fixed server-side recipe (company_snapshot, etf_snapshot, quote_snapshot, macro_indicator_snapshot, macro_calendar, earnings_snapshot, debt_snapshot) and returns one envelope with freshness, provenance, per-component coverage, and billing. Composed calls charge the recipe's fixed cost (1-2 units) from the daily quota. status "partial" means an optional component was unavailable - the present components are still trustworthy; honor the freshness block (stale=true means the data aged past its budget); for macro_calendar, entity is accepted but does not filter the calendar. Args: recipe: Recipe name from the fixed manifest. entity: Entity dict from resolve_entity ({"namespace": ..., "ids": ...}).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get snapshot
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_timeseriesBounded timeseries for an entity: price, macro_series, etf_flows or etf_monthly_flows.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_timeseries" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,002 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...arity (default "1d"). max_points: Hard cap on returned points (default 500)."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Bounded timeseries for an entity: price, macro_series, etf_flows or etf_monthly_flows. Returns points oldest-first with an explicit downsampling flag when the raw series exceeded max_points. Times are UTC. Costs 1 unit per call. Read the step from ``served_granularity``, not ``granularity``. The latter echoes the request; the former is the step the source built the points at, and the two can differ (a long price range can come back as monthly bars under a "1d" request). It reads ``mixed`` when the points do not share one step, ``unknown`` when the source does not say, and null when no point came back. It describes how each point was built, not how far apart the returned points are: a thinned daily series still reads ``1d``, and ``downsampled`` is what says points were dropped. The two ETF flow metrics answer different questions and are not interchangeable. ``etf_flows`` is an ESTIMATE at filing cadence: one point per SEC filing refresh, so ``t`` is a filing date and even a wide window yields a handful of points. ``etf_monthly_flows`` is the fund's own creations and redemptions from its NPORT-P filing, so ``t`` is a calendar month (``YYYY-MM``) and each point carries the three filed components - sales, reinvestment, redemption - beside the net. Two things to read before quoting etf_monthly_flows. NPORT-P is filed per SERIES, so for a fund with more than one share class the figures cover every class and the payload says so in ``multi_class_series``; where the class count is unknown it says ``class_scope`` instead of staying silent. And a fund that files no NPORT-P at all, such as a commodity trust, is not an error: the call returns status ``partial`` with an empty point list and a ``reason``. Args: metric: One of price / macro_series / etf_flows / etf_monthly_flows. entity: Entity dict from resolve_entity ({"namespace": ..., "ids": ...}). granularity: Requested point granularity (default "1d"). max_points: Hard cap on returned points (default 500).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get timeseries
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_sourcesList source families in the bundled catalog with endpoint counts.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_sources" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List source families in the bundled catalog with endpoint counts. Use the family names as the source filter on search_endpoints. This does not call the Sugra API.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List sources
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_toolsetsList catalog groups with endpoint counts and short descriptions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_toolsets" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List catalog groups with endpoint counts and short descriptions. Use the group names as the toolset filter on search_endpoints. This does not call the Sugra API; it reads the bundled catalog.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List toolsets
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • resolve_entityResolve free text to a canonical market or macro entity.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_entity" says "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve free text to a canonical market or macro entity. Turns a ticker, company name, macro indicator, coin, or currency pair into the agent plane's ``{namespace, ids}`` entity for use with get_snapshot and get_timeseries. A cross-namespace collision (e.g. a ticker that is both an equity and a coin) returns status "ambiguous" with ranked candidates and NEVER silently picks one; pass type_hint (e.g. "equity", "etf", "coin") to narrow the universe. Crypto aliases resolve too (e.g. "bitcoin" -> the BTC coin entity). Status "low_confidence" means the best match cleared resolution but scored weakly - verify the returned entity before building on it, or re-query with a more specific name or type_hint. For compliance KYB lookups by LEI/VAT or sanctions screening use sugra_entity_lookup / sugra_entity_screen instead - this tool is for market-data entities. Args: query: Free-form text - ticker, company, indicator, coin, or pair. type_hint: Optional namespace hint narrowing resolution.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Resolve entity
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • search_endpointsSearch the bundled Sugra endpoint catalog by natural-language query.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_endpoints" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the bundled Sugra endpoint catalog by natural-language query. Use this to pick an operation_id. It does not fetch data. Typical loop: 1. search_endpoints(query) -> ranked hits with required_parameters 2. describe_endpoint(operation_id) -> params, request_body_schema, agent_hints 3. call_endpoint(operation_id, params=..., body=...) or fetch_data(query, params=...) Filter with toolset or source only after list_toolsets / list_sources; a misspelled filter is an error, not a silent empty result. Examples: - search_endpoints("US CPI inflation") - search_endpoints("AAPL price", toolset="markets") - search_endpoints("container ship AIS", toolset="network")

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search endpoints
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sugra_entity_lookupResolve an entity by identifier and return its composed KYB envelope.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sugra_entity_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an entity by identifier and return its composed KYB envelope. `anchor` is `lei` (Legal Entity Identifier, resolved via the GLEIF registry) or `vat` (EU VAT number, validated via the EU VIES service). The result weaves identity, a sanctions screening signal, and - on request - ownership and adverse-media slices. The screening verdict is a SCREENING SIGNAL, not a compliance determination, and any PEP / adverse-media content is supplementary and non-comprehensive. The `disclaimer` field carries this and is always present. Output is COMPACT by default to protect the agent context budget: `{entity:{name, anchor, value, status, country}, screening:{status, top_matches:[...3], hit_count}, ids:{...}, disclaimer}`. Pass `include` to opt INTO fuller per-slice detail, e.g. `include=["ownership","adverse_media"]` adds those slices in full form. On a bad anchor or an API error this returns a clean `{error, detail}` dict rather than raising, so the agent can branch on `result.get("error")`. Args: anchor: Identifier type, one of `lei` or `vat`. value: The identifier value (the 20-char LEI code or the VAT number). include: Optional list of fuller slices to add, e.g. `["ownership", "adverse_media"]`. Omit for the compact default.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sugra Entity lookup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write11
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://app.sugra.ai
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.sugra.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including sugra_entity_screen (write), call_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://app.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to https://mcp.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 2,002 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...arity (default "1d"). max_points: Hard cap on returned points (default 500)."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://app.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp -> https://mcp.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp.View diff
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://app.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to https://mcp.sugra.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp

Install

Pinned to version 0.14.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http api https://mcp.sugra.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http api https://mcp.sugra.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__api__sugra_entity_lookup",
      "mcp__api__search_endpoints",
      "mcp__api__describe_endpoint",
      "mcp__api__list_toolsets",
      "mcp__api__fetch_data",
      "mcp__api__list_sources",
      "mcp__api__resolve_entity",
      "mcp__api__get_snapshot",
      "mcp__api__get_timeseries"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__api__sugra_entity_screen",
      "mcp__api__call_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as api. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 11 rules
  • mcp__api__sugra_entity_screen untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__sugra_entity_lookup untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__search_endpoints untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__describe_endpoint untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__call_endpoint untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__list_toolsets untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__fetch_data untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__list_sources untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__resolve_entity untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__get_snapshot untrusted-input
  • mcp__api__get_timeseries untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.sugra/api-mcp/verify?hash=f37dd01de1df9f9c3b634dac57c384f511e819608b8f5efc975e812963427b2d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f37dd01de1df, from Nov 19, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.sugra/api-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.sugra/api-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.sugra/api-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.sugra/api-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Sugra MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Sugra MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Sugra MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Sugra MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Sugra MCP server have?

11 tools: 2 write, 9 read. sugra_entity_screen, call_endpoint, sugra_entity_lookup, search_endpoints, describe_endpoint, list_toolsets, fetch_data, list_sources and 3 more.

Does the Sugra MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Sugra MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Sugra MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.