triggerfetch MCP server
ai.triggerfetch/triggerfetchtriggerfetch.aistreamable-httpv0.1.6Scanned
When a shopper asks ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini or Grok for a product, is yours in the answer?
5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the triggerfetch MCP server can do
The triggerfetch MCP server is published by triggerfetch.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_product, sign_in, sign_in_verify and correct_product), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (check_product, sign_in, sign_in_verify and 2 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.1.6.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_productIs your product in the answer when a shopper asks?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Is your product in the answer when a shopper asks? For one barcode in one country: found (whether ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok name it, and where in the four it sits), likely why (the most probable reason from what the record shows: wrong name, missing barcode, not in the catalogue the AI reads, not verified, not orderable) and corrected (the brand's own words bound to its barcode, with a new receipt). One free check a day; then the brand's agent signs in.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
correct_productCorrected: the signed-in brand gives the words it wants its product found by (name, brand, size) for one barcode and one country.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Corrected: the signed-in brand gives the words it wants its product found by (name, brand, size) for one barcode and one country. Writes a new match record on matchfetch and issues a new receipt on rco.wefetch.ai that supersedes the last one for that barcode. The next index edition shows whether the answer changed.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
sign_inSign in the brand's agent with its claim_seat identity: give the card address the brand claimed its seat with and one of its barcodes.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Sign in the brand's agent with its claim_seat identity: give the card address the brand claimed its seat with and one of its barcodes. Returns a token to place at https://<card domain>/.well-known/triggerfetch.txt or in DNS TXT _triggerfetch.<domain>; then call sign_in_verify.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
sign_in_verifyFinish sign-in: the token is read at the brand's domain and the barcode's seat on the hub must be the seat of that card.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Finish sign-in: the token is read at the brand's domain and the barcode's seat on the hub must be the seat of that card. Returns the session key for check_product and correct_product.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_indexThe current edition of The AI Grocery Shopping Index: what the AIs answer when shoppers ask, by category and country, with each product by barcode, its answer share and shelf posit…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_index" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it The current edition of The AI Grocery Shopping Index: what the AIs answer when shoppers ask, by category and country, with each product by barcode, its answer share and shelf position, and orderable coverage per country.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 7, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://triggerfetch.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_product (write), sign_in (write), sign_in_verify (write), correct_product (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:check_productChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http triggerfetch https://triggerfetch.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http triggerfetch https://triggerfetch.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__triggerfetch__get_index"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__triggerfetch__check_product",
"mcp__triggerfetch__sign_in",
"mcp__triggerfetch__sign_in_verify",
"mcp__triggerfetch__correct_product"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as triggerfetch. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__triggerfetch__check_product untrusted-input
- mcp__triggerfetch__sign_in untrusted-input
- mcp__triggerfetch__sign_in_verify untrusted-input
- mcp__triggerfetch__correct_product untrusted-input
- mcp__triggerfetch__get_index untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.triggerfetch/triggerfetch/verify?hash=2bac8a9abc23aaf7dc259f49918b155c782c8dfbbf03e745efd9a8384ec24888" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2bac8a9abc23, from Nov 14, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.triggerfetch/triggerfetch/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.triggerfetch/triggerfetch)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 00:17 UTC.
triggerfetch MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the triggerfetch MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the triggerfetch MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the triggerfetch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the triggerfetch MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. check_product, sign_in, sign_in_verify, correct_product and get_index.
Does the triggerfetch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the triggerfetch MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the triggerfetch MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.