Verificate MCP server
ai.verificate/mcpverificate.aistreamable-httpv1.9.0Scanned
Merge gate for AI-written code: deterministic vetoes plus a Claude Haiku 5.5 review. No signup.
5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Verificate MCP server can do
The Verificate MCP server is published by verificate.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (validate_ai_output) and create or change data (2 tools: analyze_code and generate_code), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (validate_ai_output, validate_plan, analyze_code and 1 more).
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.9.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
validate_ai_outputThe merge gate for ANY AI-written output — code, documentation, reports, emails, configs: returns a binary approve/reject verdict with veto power — e.g.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_ai_output" says "validate": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "merge": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "validate_ai_output" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "validate_ai_output" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The merge gate for ANY AI-written output — code, documentation, reports, emails, configs: returns a binary approve/reject verdict with veto power — e.g. it rejects code calling the nonexistent stripe.Inventory API, an N+1 loop with the latency arithmetic to prove it, or a doc claiming success with no evidence. Deterministic checks (mock/placeholder veto, reward-gamed tests, standard-library calls that do not exist, secrets written to logs) run first and cannot be overridden; a Claude Haiku 5.5 review (ISO/IEC 25010, ISO/IEC 5055) then verifies third-party API calls and scores quality, accuracy, reliability and tech debt; its high/critical security and API findings block. In a benchmark, a frontier model reviewing alone caught reward-gaming and hallucinated APIs 0/6 times in a natural review workflow; this gate checks for both on every call. Read-only: nothing is executed. Call it on every AI-generated deliverable before accepting it; use validate_plan for plans, analyze_code for an advisory report without a verdict.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
analyze_codeAdvisory deep-dive on existing code — scores and findings, deliberately NO pass/fail verdict, so it never blocks an agent.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_code" says "analyze": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "analyze_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "analyze_code" says "analyze": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Advisory deep-dive on existing code — scores and findings, deliberately NO pass/fail verdict, so it never blocks an agent. Surfaces performance hot paths, scalability cliffs, reliability gaps and tech debt with concrete latency/throughput arithmetic (e.g. 'O(n²) dedup: ~4s at 10k items'). Read-only: the code is analyzed, never executed. Use it to understand a validate_ai_output rejection or review inherited code; use validate_ai_output when you need an accept/reject decision.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
generate_codeGenerate code and gate it in one step: an LLM writes the implementation, then the same protection engine as validate_ai_output vets it — retrying generation when the gate rejects.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_code" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_code" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate code and gate it in one step: an LLM writes the implementation, then the same protection engine as validate_ai_output vets it — retrying generation when the gate rejects. If every attempt is vetoed you still receive the last attempt, clearly marked validated:false with the gate findings — rejected code is never presented as clean. Generation runs on our infrastructure; nothing executes in your environment.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
validate_artifactDeterministic production-readiness gate for AI-built systems.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_artifact" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Deterministic production-readiness gate for AI-built systems. Verifies the invariants that stop a system silently shipping broken: every critical component is PRESENT and LOADS, the import closure resolves (nothing assumed 'already on the box'), all runtime dependencies are declared, and health is a REAL fail-closed check. Returns approve/reject with a fix plan and ISO 27001 / ISO 5055 control evidence. Facts are gathered by the Verificate collector in your CI; the gate is the authority. Non-bypassable, fails closed. This is the control-plane sibling of validate_ai_output — code quality is one invariant; this gates the whole deployable.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
validate_planThe gate for PLANS, designs and specs — run BEFORE any code is written, the cheapest place to catch a bad design.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_plan" says "validate": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it The gate for PLANS, designs and specs — run BEFORE any code is written, the cheapest place to catch a bad design. Returns the same binary verdict shape as validate_ai_output, with findings on completeness, feasibility, performance and scalability implications, security risks and missing considerations (e.g. it rejects a plan that polls an API every 100ms per client, with the request-volume math). Read-only: nothing is executed or stored beyond the verdict. Use validate_ai_output for the code that follows.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.verificate.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including validate_ai_output (irreversible), analyze_code (write), generate_code (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "validate_ai_output" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "validate_ai_output" says "validate": a word for reading.
- Warnanalyze_code
The server marks "analyze_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "analyze_code" says "analyze": a word for reading.
- Warngenerate_code
The server marks "generate_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_code" says "generate": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:validate_ai_outputCan't be undonedescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:validate_planOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.9.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http verificate https://mcp.verificate.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http verificate https://mcp.verificate.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__verificate__validate_artifact",
"mcp__verificate__validate_plan"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__verificate__validate_ai_output",
"mcp__verificate__analyze_code",
"mcp__verificate__generate_code"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as verificate. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__verificate__validate_ai_output untrusted-input
- mcp__verificate__validate_plan untrusted-input
- mcp__verificate__analyze_code untrusted-input
- mcp__verificate__generate_code untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.verificate/mcp/verify?hash=9bfa0a15e657cc35ee84921f03005aff11ac67d7870ee1cd29f2792f1d76b072" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9bfa0a15e657, from Nov 10, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.verificate/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.verificate/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Verificate MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Verificate MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Verificate MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Verificate MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: validate_ai_output.
What tools does the Verificate MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. validate_ai_output, analyze_code, generate_code, validate_artifact and validate_plan.
Does the Verificate MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Verificate MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Verificate MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.