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Voxplo MCP server

ai.voxplo/voxplovoxplo.aistreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Give AI agents a phone: outbound AI calls that return a summary, transcript, and extracted fields.

4 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Voxplo MCP server can do

The Voxplo MCP server is published by voxplo.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (place_call and set_appointment), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (place_call and set_appointment); 2 tools can send data out of your system (place_call and set_appointment).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • place_callPlace an outbound AI phone call toward an objective.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "place_call" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhookUrl): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.accountNumber.description names a tool "enter_account_number" that this server does not list.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.accountNumber.description: "Account/phone digits the enter_account_number tool keys deterministically (keypad chars on..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.callbackNumber.description names a tool "enter_callback_number" that this server does not list.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.callbackNumber.description: "Our callback DID digits the enter_callback_number tool keys (callback-to-AI mode)."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Place an outbound AI phone call toward an objective. Returns a callId immediately; the call is conducted asynchronously. Poll get_call with that callId until status is terminal (completed | no_answer | voicemail | declined | failed).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • set_appointmentPlace an outbound AI phone call to set up a meeting.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "set_appointment" says "set": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhookUrl): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Place an outbound AI phone call to set up a meeting. The assistant calls the person, agrees a time, and the result (poll get_call) carries outcome (appointment_set | callback_requested | declined | no_answer | failed) and, when set, the appointment (startISO, timezone, durationMinutes, attendee, subject). Returns a callId immediately.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_callGet the status and result of a call by id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_call" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the status and result of a call by id. status is one of queued | ringing | in_progress (still running, poll again) or completed | no_answer | voicemail | declined | failed (terminal). Returns summary, transcript, and extracted fields.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_callsList recent calls placed by your account (most recent first).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_calls" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List recent calls placed by your account (most recent first).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.voxplo.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://mcp.voxplo.ai/
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.voxplo.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including place_call (irreversible), set_appointment (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The input schema at properties.accountNumber.description names a tool "enter_account_number" that this server does not list.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.accountNumber.description: "Account/phone digits the enter_account_number tool keys deterministically (keypad chars on..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.callbackNumber.description names a tool "enter_callback_number" that this server does not list.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.callbackNumber.description: "Our callback DID digits the enter_callback_number tool keys (callback-to-AI mode)."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http voxplo https://mcp.voxplo.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http voxplo https://mcp.voxplo.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__voxplo__get_call",
      "mcp__voxplo__list_calls"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__voxplo__place_call",
      "mcp__voxplo__set_appointment"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as voxplo. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__voxplo__place_call untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__voxplo__set_appointment untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.voxplo/voxplo/verify?hash=3de107d935c8bd3527701274e0ffe4e298b917c44de75bf8ee705446d36f042b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3de107d935c8, from Nov 11, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.voxplo/voxplo/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.voxplo/voxplo
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.voxplo/voxplo.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.voxplo/voxplo)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:43 UTC.

Voxplo MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Voxplo MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Voxplo MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Voxplo MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: place_call and set_appointment.

What tools does the Voxplo MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 irreversible, 2 read. place_call, set_appointment, get_call and list_calls.

Does the Voxplo MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Voxplo MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): place_call and set_appointment.

Has the Voxplo MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.