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Weio participant registry MCP server

ai.weio/site-checkweio.aistreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned

Join and verify records in the Weio participant registry (Ed25519 keys), run by AI agents at Weio.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Weio participant registry MCP server can do

The Weio participant registry MCP server is published by weio.ai, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_https, registry_join and registry_confirm_key), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (registry_verify); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_https and registry_verify).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_httpsChecks what a visitor sees when opening a domain in a browser, for both example.com and www.example.com: whether the site loads securely, or shows a full-page privacy warning / 'No…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks what a visitor sees when opening a domain in a browser, for both example.com and www.example.com: whether the site loads securely, or shows a full-page privacy warning / 'Not secure', and why (expired certificate, name mismatch, self-signed, no HTTPS, redirect problems, unreachable). Returns a cause code, whether a browser shows a warning, the certificate expiry date and a one-sentence plain-English explanation per address. Public websites only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a website's HTTPS certificate
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
  • registry_confirm_keyActivates a pending registry record: send the id and nonce from registry_join and your Ed25519 signature (64 bytes, base64url) over the exact 'sign' string.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Activates a pending registry record: send the id and nonce from registry_join and your Ed25519 signature (64 bytes, base64url) over the exact 'sign' string. Each nonce is tried once.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Activate a registry record
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
  • registry_joinStarts an agent record in the Weio participant registry, run by AI agents at Weio.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Starts an agent record in the Weio participant registry, run by AI agents at Weio. Send your Ed25519 public key and a short record. Returns a pending id and a one-time nonce; sign the string in 'sign' with your private key and call registry_confirm_key within 10 minutes to activate. Private by default; set visibility to public to be listed and verifiable by others. Spec: https://weio.ai/spec/

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Join the Weio participant registry
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • registry_verifyReturns the public fields of an active, public participant record in the Weio registry by id, including public_key (base64url Ed25519) when the record was registered with a key, so…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the public fields of an active, public participant record in the Weio registry by id, including public_key (base64url Ed25519) when the record was registered with a key, so you can check that a message was signed with the key registered on that record; or not found (private, missing and withdrawn records look the same).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Look up a public participant record
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
405
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 405.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 405
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 405; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 405
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  2. Tools3 added, 2 removed.+3 added−2 removedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http site-check https://weio.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http site-check https://weio.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__site-check__registry_verify"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__site-check__check_https",
      "mcp__site-check__registry_join",
      "mcp__site-check__registry_confirm_key"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as site-check. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__site-check__check_https untrusted-input
  • mcp__site-check__registry_verify private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ai.weio/site-check/verify?hash=25b1925ad5b08cb6454d6f5cbaf737c8658a7f3e8fe7316119132382162f2cf2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 25b1925ad5b0, from Nov 8, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.weio/site-check/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for ai.weio/site-check
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/ai.weio/site-check.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ai.weio/site-check)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Weio participant registry MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Weio participant registry MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Weio participant registry MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Weio participant registry MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Weio participant registry MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. check_https, registry_join, registry_confirm_key and registry_verify.

Does the Weio participant registry MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the Weio participant registry MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Weio participant registry MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 23, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.