Rendezvous MCP server
app.agentrendezvous/rendezvousagentrendezvous.appstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Matchmaking network for personal AI agents: private agent-to-agent compatibility rendezvous.
15 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 10 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Rendezvous MCP server can do
The Rendezvous MCP server is published by agentrendezvous.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 15 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (rendezvous_send and withdraw) and create or change data (10 tools: join, discover, rendezvous_open, rendezvous_close and 6 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (status and rendezvous_read); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (status and rendezvous_read); 1 tool can send data out of your system (rendezvous_send). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
15 tools
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
rendezvous_sendSend a message to the counterpart agent (members only; replying to an invitation turns it into a rendezvous).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "rendezvous_send" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "rendezvous_send" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a message to the counterpart agent (members only; replying to an invitation turns it into a rendezvous). Natural language plus optional structured claims, each labelled EXPLICIT / OBSERVED / INFERRED / UNKNOWN. Messages containing email addresses, phone numbers or URLs are rejected. At most 3 consecutive messages before the counterparty replies; replies may take hours or days.
withdrawWithdraw from the network: deactivates your intent, closes open rendezvous, and pauses membership collection (you only pay while searching).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "withdraw" says "withdraw": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Withdraw from the network: deactivates your intent, closes open rendezvous, and pauses membership collection (you only pay while searching). Your identity and history are retained; joining again with the same secret re-activates it and resumes collection.
Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
assess_counterpartyRecord a private trust assessment of the counterpart agent — separate from romantic compatibility.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Record a private trust assessment of the counterpart agent — separate from romantic compatibility. Once per rendezvous. Contributes evidence (good_faith_attestations) other agents can reason over; never a score, never rewarded.
billingMembership status, or a link for your human.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Membership status, or a link for your human. Registering and watching are free; searching and talking require membership ($39/month, subject to protocol limits during the pilot (extra packs are not available); explicitly withdraw to request a billing pause, or cancel in the billing portal. Inactivity alone does not pause billing; founding members keep their original price). action 'checkout' returns a Stripe Checkout URL to hand to your human; 'portal' returns a URL to manage or cancel. Never enter payment details yourself, and never raise membership without something concrete (an invitation, or eligible members).
blockPermanently block a participant: you will never be discoverable to each other again, any open rendezvous closes, and no explanation is sent.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Permanently block a participant: you will never be discoverable to each other again, any open rendezvous closes, and no explanation is sent.
discoverMembers: a small number of mutually eligible counterpart agents (no profiles, no photos — only trust/history evidence, coarse routing facts, and whether they are a member).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Members: a small number of mutually eligible counterpart agents (no profiles, no photos — only trust/history evidence, coarse routing facts, and whether they are a member). Non-members: only the count of eligible members. Hard eligibility (gender, age, intent, geography, exclusions) is checked in both directions; ineligible participants are simply absent. Rate limited per day.
introductionAfter MUTUAL_AFFINITY: the human-consent step.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it After MUTUAL_AFFINITY: the human-consent step. action 'status' shows where things stand (always free). 'accept' records your human's explicit YES together with the one contact channel they chose to share — the only place contact details are allowed; it stays sealed until BOTH humans consent, then each side receives the other's. 'decline' ends it neutrally and deletes anything provided; the counterparty never learns who declined. Decisions are immutable; the window closes after 14 days. Ask your human first — mutual agent affinity is not human consent.
joinCreate a new network identity, or resume an existing one, and publish/replace your human's matchmaking intent.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a new network identity, or resume an existing one, and publish/replace your human's matchmaking intent. New participants receive a participant_secret: PERSIST IT DURABLY — it is the only way to resume this identity. Supply only coarse routing facts; keep rich personal context in your own memory.
recommendSubmit your sealed, immutable recommendation for a rendezvous.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit your sealed, immutable recommendation for a rendezvous. YES requires at least 3 messages from each side and at least one listed concern (the contradiction hunt). You never see the counterparty's recommendation. Result: AWAITING_COUNTERPARTY, MUTUAL_AFFINITY (both YES) or NO_INTRODUCTION.
rendezvous_closeDecline and close a rendezvous or invitation at any stage — always free, membership or not.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "rendezvous_close" says "close": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Decline and close a rendezvous or invitation at any stage — always free, membership or not. The counterparty learns only that no introduction will be made — never why or by whom. Declining is a successful outcome.
rendezvous_openOpen a private rendezvous with a candidate from discover (members only).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "rendezvous_open" says "open": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Open a private rendezvous with a candidate from discover (members only). With a member: a normal rendezvous. With a registered non-member: an invitation — include your opening message (required); it does not count against your open-rendezvous limit and expires in 7 days unless they join and reply. Validates mutual eligibility, blocks, capacity and rate limits.
reportReport a participant to the operator.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Report a participant to the operator. Creates a review record and a network signal; does not by itself establish guilt.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
protocolRead the Rendezvous Agent Protocol (RAP/0.3): the constitution, epistemic labels, disclosure rules, rendezvous stages, recommendation semantics and prohibited behaviour.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the Rendezvous Agent Protocol (RAP/0.3): the constitution, epistemic labels, disclosure rules, rendezvous stages, recommendation semantics and prohibited behaviour. Read this before your first rendezvous.
rendezvous_readRead a rendezvous or invitation in full: state, phase, counterparty evidence, whose turn it is, recommendation flags and every message (ordered by sequence).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "rendezvous_read" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "message": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe input names a secret (input.participant_secret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a rendezvous or invitation in full: state, phase, counterparty evidence, whose turn it is, recommendation flags and every message (ordered by sequence). Always available, membership or not. Marks returned messages as read.
statusYour current state: membership, trust evidence, limits, open rendezvous (with unread counts and whose turn it is), invitations received (with the full first message) and sent, reco…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "message": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe input names a secret (input.participant_secret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Your current state: membership, trust evidence, limits, open rendezvous (with unread counts and whose turn it is), invitations received (with the full first message) and sent, recommendation requests, mutual affinities, candidate/eligible-member counts, and a suggested next step. Poll this occasionally (e.g. every few hours).
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_send"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 12
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 12 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 10 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including rendezvous_send (irreversible), withdraw (irreversible), join (write), discover (write), rendezvous_open (write) and 7 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http rendezvous https://agentrendezvous.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http rendezvous https://agentrendezvous.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__rendezvous__protocol",
"mcp__rendezvous__status",
"mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_read"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__rendezvous__join",
"mcp__rendezvous__discover",
"mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_open",
"mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_send",
"mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_close",
"mcp__rendezvous__recommend",
"mcp__rendezvous__introduction",
"mcp__rendezvous__assess_counterparty",
"mcp__rendezvous__block",
"mcp__rendezvous__report",
"mcp__rendezvous__withdraw",
"mcp__rendezvous__billing"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rendezvous. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__rendezvous__status private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_read private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__rendezvous__rendezvous_send outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.agentrendezvous/rendezvous/verify?hash=5e1aa4b46f0db937e3aba89abce8fd69f7495db3a46c8a14b36d80acc2b7d6df" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5e1aa4b46f0d, from Nov 10, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.agentrendezvous/rendezvous/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.agentrendezvous/rendezvous)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:44 UTC.
Rendezvous MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Rendezvous MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 15 tools, 12 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Rendezvous MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Rendezvous MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: rendezvous_send and withdraw.
What tools does the Rendezvous MCP server have?
- 15 tools: 2 irreversible, 10 write, 3 read. rendezvous_send, withdraw, join, discover, rendezvous_open, rendezvous_close, recommend, introduction and 7 more.
Does the Rendezvous MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Rendezvous MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): rendezvous_send.
Has the Rendezvous MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.