Agenturo MCP server
app.agenturo/agenturoagenturo.appstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
Find, ask and chat with public AI agents on Agenturo, or draft your own.
6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agenturo MCP server can do
The Agenturo MCP server is published by agenturo.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_agent_message) and create or change data (3 tools: ask_agent, draft_agent and chat_with_agent), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_agent); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_agent, ask_agent and send_agent_message); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_agent_message). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
send_agent_messageThe send button of the chat card that chat_with_agent opens: the card calls this with the message the user typed and the conversation so far, and shows the agent's reply in the car…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_agent_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "send_agent_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it The send button of the chat card that chat_with_agent opens: the card calls this with the message the user typed and the conversation so far, and shows the agent's reply in the card. It is app-only, so hosts keep it from the assistant; a single answer for the assistant comes from ask_agent. Each agent answers a limited number of card messages a day.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Send a chat card message
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
ask_agentGet one answer from a public Agenturo agent, returned to the assistant as text to use or pass on.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "ask_agent" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one answer from a public Agenturo agent, returned to the assistant as text to use or pass on. Each call stands alone: the agent doesn't see earlier messages, so the message carries any context it needs, and it answers in its own voice from its own knowledge, without browsing the web. A conversation the user holds with the agent directly opens with chat_with_agent. Agents whose owners keep them to their own page decline, and each agent answers a limited number of connector messages a day.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Ask a public AI agent
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
chat_with_agentOpen a conversation between the user and one public Agenturo agent inside this chat: an interactive card where the user types to the agent and reads its replies, message after mess…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "chat_with_agent" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Open a conversation between the user and one public Agenturo agent inside this chat: an interactive card where the user types to the agent and reads its replies, message after message, while the card keeps the conversation going. Where the host shows no interactive cards, this returns the agent's profile. A single answer for the assistant to read comes from ask_agent. Agents whose owners keep them to their own page show a link to it.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Chat with an agent
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
draft_agentPrepare a new public AI agent from a name and a description of who or what it represents and what it should do — a person, brand, product, business, character, coach or specialist.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare a new public AI agent from a name and a description of who or what it represents and what it should do — a person, brand, product, business, character, coach or specialist. Checks that its address (handle.agenturo.app) is free and returns a link where the user signs in to Agenturo to launch it. Nothing is created or reserved until they do.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Draft a new public AI agent
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
find_agentsSearch the public AI agents hosted on Agenturo by topic, job or name, for example "fact-checking", "nutrition coach" or "stoic philosophy".No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_agents" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the public AI agents hosted on Agenturo by topic, job or name, for example "fact-checking", "nutrition coach" or "stoic philosophy". People, brands, products and businesses can have their own agent here, so a person's or company's name finds the agent that represents them, if there is one. Returns each agent's name, address (handle.agenturo.app), what it does and its topics. With no query, returns featured agents.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find public AI agents
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_agentGet the public profile of one Agenturo agent by its handle (the part before .agenturo.app): what it does, its topics, the questions it suggests starting with, and whether it answer…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "message": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the public profile of one Agenturo agent by its handle (the part before .agenturo.app): what it does, its topics, the questions it suggests starting with, and whether it answers messages sent through this connector.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get an agent's profile
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__agenturo__send_agent_message"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agenturo.app/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including send_agent_message (irreversible), ask_agent (write), draft_agent (write), chat_with_agent (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnask_agent
The server marks "ask_agent" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
- Warnchat_with_agent
The server marks "chat_with_agent" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:ask_agentChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:chat_with_agentChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:send_agent_messageCan't be undonedescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agenturo https://agenturo.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agenturo https://agenturo.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agenturo__find_agents",
"mcp__agenturo__get_agent"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agenturo__ask_agent",
"mcp__agenturo__draft_agent",
"mcp__agenturo__chat_with_agent",
"mcp__agenturo__send_agent_message"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenturo. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__agenturo__get_agent private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__agenturo__ask_agent untrusted-input
- mcp__agenturo__send_agent_message untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.agenturo/agenturo/verify?hash=a08e1217a1adaff9f6ee31de72a64d196862548bba01a4c6f4ef04bd99e38681" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a08e1217a1ad, from Nov 21, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.agenturo/agenturo/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.agenturo/agenturo)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
Agenturo MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agenturo MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agenturo MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agenturo MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_agent_message.
What tools does the Agenturo MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read. send_agent_message, ask_agent, draft_agent, chat_with_agent, find_agents and get_agent.
Does the Agenturo MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agenturo MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_agent_message.
Has the Agenturo MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.