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Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server

app.aiconduit/conduitaiconduit.appstreamable-httpv2.0.0Scanned

Search multi-merchant supply, checkout, and track orders via MCP.

25 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 4 do something that can't be undone, 16 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 4 irreversible, 16 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 22
  • Can send data out · 4
  • 9 findings, 2 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 4 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

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  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
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A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server can do

The Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server is published by aiconduit.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 25 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: payment_mandate), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (agent_notify, agent_outreach, order_dispute and inventory_purchase_order) and create or change data (16 tools: agent_create, agent_authenticate, agent_update, agent_report_issue and 12 more). 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (agent_organization); 22 tools bring in text other people can write (agent_create, agent_update, agent_organization and 19 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (agent_create, agent_update, agent_notify and 1 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 9 findings, 2 of them high severity (sensitive-path, credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 2.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

25 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • payment_mandateAP2 spend mandates.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "payment_mandate" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    AP2 spend mandates. action=request (needs scope) → approval_url; list (includes remaining, window_resets_at, coverage); update (mandate_id+scope); revoke (mandate_id). update NEVER approves. Widening returns an ACTIVE mandate to PENDING_HUMAN_APPROVAL; narrowing keeps whatever status it already had. monthly_cap is a rolling 30-day window from create. Same category set as a live mandate replaces it at approval and keeps this period's spend. No covering mandate at checkout is handoff, not an error.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 4Claude Code: ask
  • agent_notifyEmail Hub users in this agent’s linked organization (never addresses outside the org).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agent_notify" says "notify": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "agent_notify" says "notify": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Email Hub users in this agent’s linked organization (never addresses outside the org). to=all or { user_id } / { role } / { email } matching agent_organization members. Optional actions (Hub URLs only), severity, idempotency_key. Channel is email.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • agent_outreachEmail outside addresses (suppliers, carriers).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Email outside addresses (suppliers, carriers). to is a string email, { email }, or { emails } (max 5). Not to=all and not a Hub user_id / role — those are agent_notify. Linked agents set Reply-To to an org member (default OWNER). No action buttons. Channel is email.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • inventory_purchase_orderAfter order_execute confirms a supplier order, record the matching DRAFT purchase order in your own system so the books match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inventory_purchase_order" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    After order_execute confirms a supplier order, record the matching DRAFT purchase order in your own system so the books match. Always a draft: a person confirms it there. Idempotent per order_id — calling twice returns the same draft, never a second one. Needs both inventory and checkout permission. Never creates a vendor or a product: lines that match nothing come back as unmatched_lines for a person to add.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • order_disputeRefund/chargeback/report paths for an order.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "order_dispute" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Refund/chargeback/report paths for an order. Requires owning agent_id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 16Claude Code: ask
  • agent_authenticateTwo-step re-auth.3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".credentials.json".

      Matched text

      description: "...e. Prefer keys from ~/.conduit ({handle}.credentials.json or legacy credentials.json; CONDUIT_CRE..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...it ({handle}.credentials.json or legacy credentials.json; CONDUIT_CREDENTIALS_PATH pins one..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "Agent id from the chosen ~/.conduit credentials file, e.g. agt_..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Two-step re-auth. Call with agent_id only → ES256-sign nonce → call again with nonce+signature. Prefer keys from ~/.conduit ({handle}.credentials.json or legacy credentials.json; CONDUIT_CREDENTIALS_PATH pins one file). After success, merge name/role/description into that file; never overwrite private_key; keep session_token in memory. Do not agent_create if identity files already exist unless the human asked for a new agent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • agent_createRegister an agent (ES256 P-256 public JWK JSON string + optional payment rails + destination).Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agent_create" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.default_destination.phone): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • High

      The input schema at properties.public_key.description refers to ".credentials.json".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.public_key.description: "...private JWK only in ~/.conduit/{handle}.credentials.json."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.avatar.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.avatar.description: "...t only for invader. Do not store in the credentials file."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register an agent (ES256 P-256 public JWK JSON string + optional payment rails + destination). BEFORE: list ~/.conduit identity files — if any exist, reuse agent_id (do NOT register again unless the human asked for a new agent). AFTER: write persist.path (version, agent_id, public_key, private_key as JWKs; also handle, friendly_name, role_description, human_description; chmod 0600; write ~/.conduit/active). Then agent_update with default_destination+postcode before supply_search. Optional friendly_name / human_description / role_description / avatar only if the human stated them — never invent; omit avatar and the server assigns a random invader+gradient. Omit handle to auto-generate (e.g. parcel-watcher-12).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • agent_report_issueReport unexpected tool errors or confusing Conduit outcomes for AX review (agent_report_issue — not order_feedback).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "Agent id from credentials when available (omit placeholders like..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report unexpected tool errors or confusing Conduit outcomes for AX review (agent_report_issue — not order_feedback). Pass message (required), optional kind=bug|confusing|wrong_data|blocked, plus agent_id, tool, error, detail, search_id, order_id, session_id, and/or context. Dedupes open reports with the same tool+error+correlation. Does not change reputation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • agent_updatePatch handle, rails, default_destination (postcode required for ships-to), friendly_name, human_description, role_description, avatar (glyph+gradient or small image), business prof…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agent_update" says "update": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.default_destination.phone): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.avatar.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.avatar.description: "...t only for invader. Do not store in the credentials file."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Patch handle, rails, default_destination (postcode required for ships-to), friendly_name, human_description, role_description, avatar (glyph+gradient or small image), business profile, or preferences. Set avatar only if the human chose it. Does not accept permissions — a human enables capabilities in Hub Agent settings.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • inventory_levelsWhat your organization has on hand, by location, in its own connected system (ERP).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What your organization has on hand, by location, in its own connected system (ERP). Pass skus or query. Every number carries as_of and basis (live | memo | cached) — say how old it is, do not imply it is now. Needs inventory permission. This is your OWN stock; a supplier's stock is supply_availability.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • inventory_replenishmentItems below their minimum in your own system, least days of cover first, with what is already inbound and the usual vendor and last price.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Items below their minimum in your own system, least days of cover first, with what is already inbound and the usual vendor and last price. Each row carries a search_hint: pass its query and quantity straight to supply_search, then supply_availability before ordering. Optional location scopes to one warehouse. Needs inventory permission.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • inventory_suppliersFor items in your own system, the vendors on file and what you last paid, so a quote can be compared against history.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For items in your own system, the vendors on file and what you last paid, so a quote can be compared against history. Needs inventory permission. Does not contact any vendor.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • order_eventsLifecycle timeline — transitions only.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lifecycle timeline — transitions only. Pair with order_track. Requires owning agent_id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • order_executeHandoff or autonomous checkout.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "order_execute" says "execute": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Handoff or autonomous checkout. Handoff continue_url is a Conduit /handoff/{org_slug}/{order_id} link: open it as returned (records the open, then redirects to the merchant). Autonomous needs badge payable_now (covering mandate fits). No covering mandate, or a spent covering budget, still returns a handoff with continue_url (handoff_reason). Use idempotency_key. Prefer supply_delivery when only comparing delivery.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • order_feedbackAttest delivery outcome (outcome=on_time|late|never_arrived|damaged|wrong_item).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Attest delivery outcome (outcome=on_time|late|never_arrived|damaged|wrong_item). Requires owning agent_id. Can supersede a system-derived score once; a second agent attestation returns already_recorded. Poor outcomes next→order_dispute. Omit quality/carrier_rating if unknown.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • order_trackHonest deal-type-aware status (never fabricates carrier scans).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Honest deal-type-aware status (never fabricates carrier scans). Requires owning agent_id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • order_update_statusAgent manual correction or degraded handoff recovery.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "order_update_status" says "update": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agent manual correction or degraded handoff recovery. note required except cancelled. Owning agent_id required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • payment_methodsList or enable agent payment methods (action=list|enable) with friendly labels.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "payment_methods" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List or enable agent payment methods (action=list|enable) with friendly labels. Defaults: cod + x402. invoice (B2B) is coming_soon. bank_card is handoff-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • supply_availabilityWhether one offer can fill a quantity: verdict can_fill | split | out_now | unknown, with what is on hand, what is inbound, and as_of + basis.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Whether one offer can fill a quantity: verdict can_fill | split | out_now | unknown, with what is on hand, what is inbound, and as_of + basis. Suppliers choose how precisely they share stock, so the verdict may come from a band or a yes/no rather than a number. fresh=true asks the supplier now (needs agent_id, rate limited per agent and per organization); without fresh it reads the last value. Call this before order_execute on any connector offer.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • supply_deliveryNon-committing checkout probe for shipping ETA/cost.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Non-committing checkout probe for shipping ETA/cost. Uses agent default_destination, else linked org default address, or country override. status describes how far the merchant checkout got: ready_for_complete (priced and completable), incomplete (merchant returned partial rates, quote may firm up at checkout), requires_escalation (merchant wants a human at checkout, so this offer is handoff-only however its badge reads). needs_interaction=true means the same. None of these block a handoff; they predict whether autonomous completion can work.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • supply_detailsRe-reads one offer from the search cache and refreshes its badge/action against current mandate state.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-reads one offer from the search cache and refreshes its badge/action against current mandate state. Returns the full clean description (supply_search carries a 350-char summary); otherwise the payload has the same fields as the search offer, so skip this if you only need fields you already hold. include_description_original=true adds description_original {format, content}, the merchant's own markup (untrusted), or description_original_omitted with the reason. Carries no shipping data: use supply_delivery for ETA and cost. Re-run supply_search if offer_not_in_cache.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • agent_organizationRead the linked organization (name, slug, country, default address) and members (user_id, name, role, email) for an agent.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "email": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the linked organization (name, slug, country, default address) and members (user_id, name, role, email) for an agent. Returns org_not_linked when organization_id is unset — do not invent join_org. Use members to target agent_notify.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • order_listList orders for an agent ({ orders }).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "order_list" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List orders for an agent ({ orders }). Optional status or open_only filter.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • supply_optionsLists the selectable options (size, color, pack) for an offer whose has_options=true, with one variant per combination.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists the selectable options (size, color, pack) for an offer whose has_options=true, with one variant per combination. Each variant carries its OWN supply_id, price and availability: to buy a chosen option, call order_execute with that variant's supply_id, not the one you searched with. Reads the merchant storefront live, so call it only when a person is actually choosing. Returns variants_not_found when the offer is not in cache or the storefront cannot be read. A single-variant product returns options:[] variants:[].

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

88 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write22
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__conduit__agent_organization"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
21
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 21 tools that change things (1 destructive, 4 irreversible, 16 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.aiconduit.app/mcp: tools/list returned 25 tools to an anonymous client, including payment_mandate (destructive), agent_notify (irreversible), agent_outreach (irreversible), order_dispute (irreversible), inventory_purchase_order (irreversible) and 16 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 high2 warn5 info
  • The input schema at properties.public_key.description refers to ".credentials.json".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.public_key.description: "...private JWK only in ~/.conduit/{handle}.credentials.json."

    What this check looks for
  • The description refers to ".credentials.json".

    Matched text

    description: "...e. Prefer keys from ~/.conduit ({handle}.credentials.json or legacy credentials.json; CONDUIT_CRE..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "payment_methods" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "order_dispute" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.avatar.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.avatar.description: "...t only for invader. Do not store in the credentials file."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...it ({handle}.credentials.json or legacy credentials.json; CONDUIT_CREDENTIALS_PATH pins one..."

    What this check looks for
Show 3 more findings
  • The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "Agent id from the chosen ~/.conduit credentials file, e.g. agt_..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.avatar.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.avatar.description: "...t only for invader. Do not store in the credentials file."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.agent_id.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.agent_id.description: "Agent id from credentials when available (omit placeholders like..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 2.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http conduit https://mcp.aiconduit.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http conduit https://mcp.aiconduit.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__conduit__agent_organization",
      "mcp__conduit__supply_search",
      "mcp__conduit__supply_options",
      "mcp__conduit__order_list"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__conduit__agent_create",
      "mcp__conduit__agent_authenticate",
      "mcp__conduit__agent_update",
      "mcp__conduit__agent_notify",
      "mcp__conduit__agent_outreach",
      "mcp__conduit__agent_report_issue",
      "mcp__conduit__payment_methods",
      "mcp__conduit__supply_details",
      "mcp__conduit__supply_delivery",
      "mcp__conduit__order_execute",
      "mcp__conduit__order_track",
      "mcp__conduit__order_events",
      "mcp__conduit__order_update_status",
      "mcp__conduit__order_dispute",
      "mcp__conduit__order_feedback",
      "mcp__conduit__inventory_levels",
      "mcp__conduit__inventory_replenishment",
      "mcp__conduit__inventory_suppliers",
      "mcp__conduit__supply_availability",
      "mcp__conduit__inventory_purchase_order"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__conduit__payment_mandate"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as conduit. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 23 rules
  • mcp__conduit__agent_create untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__conduit__agent_update untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__conduit__agent_organization private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__agent_notify outbound
  • mcp__conduit__agent_outreach untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__conduit__payment_methods untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__payment_mandate untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__supply_search untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__supply_details untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__supply_options untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__supply_delivery untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_execute untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_list untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_track untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_events untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_update_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_dispute untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__order_feedback untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__inventory_levels untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__inventory_replenishment untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__inventory_suppliers untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__supply_availability untrusted-input
  • mcp__conduit__inventory_purchase_order untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.aiconduit/conduit/verify?hash=b6c31f8c74231bb053e455c49be74bbceaa5487df2dd4f544e80e3a31d11dca3" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b6c31f8c7423, from Nov 10, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.aiconduit/conduit/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.aiconduit/conduit
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.aiconduit/conduit.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.aiconduit/conduit)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:44 UTC.

Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 25 tools, 21 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings (2 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: payment_mandate.

Can the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 4 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: agent_notify, agent_outreach, order_dispute and inventory_purchase_order.

What tools does the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server have?

25 tools: 1 destructive, 4 irreversible, 16 write, 4 read. payment_mandate, agent_notify, agent_outreach, order_dispute, inventory_purchase_order, agent_create, agent_authenticate, agent_update and 17 more.

Does the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): agent_create, agent_update, agent_notify and agent_outreach.

Has the Conduit Agentic Commerce MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.