Electronic Invoice API MCP server
app.electronic-invoice/mcpelectronic-invoice.appstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Validate, generate, convert and extract EN 16931 e-invoices for businesses.
7 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Electronic Invoice API MCP server can do
The Electronic Invoice API MCP server is published by electronic-invoice.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (convert_invoice) and create or change data (2 tools: generate_invoice and open_invoice_check), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (extract_invoice); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_usage_limits); 1 tool can send data out of your system (convert_invoice). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
convert_invoiceConvert an existing e-invoice from UBL to CII, CII to UBL, or XML to a ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "convert_invoice" says "convert": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Convert an existing e-invoice from UBL to CII, CII to UBL, or XML to a ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF. Also accepts a ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF and converts its embedded XML. Validates every output and returns it only if valid. Changes format or container only; it does not create invoices from data or extract data. Supported profiles are EN 16931 and XRechnung 3.0; other profiles return 422 unsupported_profile. Other formats are not converted. B2B only. Requires the caller's own Electronic Invoice API key, sent either directly as Authorization: Bearer eia_live_... or through an OAuth 2.1 access token issued by this server. A call that reaches the API and returns 200, 400, 422 or 504 counts against the plan quota.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Convert e-invoice
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
generate_invoiceCreate a new e-invoice file from structured JSON.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_invoice" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a new e-invoice file from structured JSON. Builds XRechnung UBL/CII or a ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF, validates the result with the same rule sets, and returns the file only if it is valid. Creates new files only; it does not read or change existing files. Supports invoice, credit note, corrected, partial and final invoices, prepayments, and an optional EPC payment QR page for PDF output. B2B only. Requires the caller's own Electronic Invoice API key, sent either directly as Authorization: Bearer eia_live_... or through an OAuth 2.1 access token issued by this server. A call that reaches the API and returns 200, 400, 422 or 504 counts against the plan quota.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate e-invoice
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
open_invoice_checkOpen an upload field in the chat where the user chooses an invoice PDF or XML file.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "open_invoice_check" says "open": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "open_invoice_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "open_invoice_check" says "open": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Open an upload field in the chat where the user chooses an invoice PDF or XML file. The file goes straight from the field to this server's validation without passing through the model, so a PDF is checked as a whole, including its PDF/A-3 container, and the validation runs on the KoSIT validator. For clients that cannot pass a file as a tool argument. Opening the field is free, and a check counts against the user's quota only once they press the button. This tool needs no input and checks nothing by itself. B2B only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Open invoice file check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
extract_invoiceRead data from an existing UBL/CII XML or ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Read data from an existing UBL/CII XML or ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF. Returns JSON business terms keyed by BT/BG numbers, CSV with one row per line, or a DATEV Buchungsstapel (EXTF). Does not validate the invoice. Suited to accounting import or data analysis. Supports UBL, CII and ZUGFeRD/Factur-X only. DATEV export has hard limits: EUR only, one invoice per file, issue date inside the fiscal year, and no booking of prepayments, rounding or Skonto. DATEV output is written to the documented layout and was not tested against a DATEV installation. B2B only. Requires the caller's own Electronic Invoice API key, sent either directly as Authorization: Bearer eia_live_... or through an OAuth 2.1 access token issued by this server. A call that reaches the API and returns 200, 400, 422 or 504 counts against the plan quota.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Extract e-invoice data
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_service_statusCheck whether the Electronic Invoice API is up and which rule set versions it currently runs.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_service_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether the Electronic Invoice API is up and which rule set versions it currently runs. Calls GET /v1/health without an API key. Free, not billable, works without an account. B2B only. It reports service health only, not whether a specific API key or quota is valid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get service status
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_usage_limitsReturn the technical limits of the Electronic Invoice API: rate limits, concurrency limits, request body size limits, and which HTTP status codes count against the quota.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_usage_limits" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the technical limits of the Electronic Invoice API: rate limits, concurrency limits, request body size limits, and which HTTP status codes count against the quota. Works without an API key and does not call the API. B2B only. Information about plans is at https://electronic-invoice.app/en/api/.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get usage limits
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
validate_invoiceValidate an existing e-invoice file without changing it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_invoice" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Validate an existing e-invoice file without changing it. Accepts UBL Invoice/CreditNote XML, UN/CEFACT CII XML, FatturaPA or KSeF FA(3) XML, or a ZUGFeRD/Factur-X/XRechnung PDF. Returns verdict, findings and rule set versions. Checks: XRechnung 3.0 (UBL, CII), EN 16931 (UBL, CII), Peppol BIS Billing 3.0 (UBL), Netherlands NLCIUS (SI-UBL 2.0, CII), Romania CIUS-RO, French CIUS rules when country is FR, and ZUGFeRD/Factur-X PDF or CII in all profiles (MINIMUM, BASIC WL, BASIC, EN16931, EXTENDED). Other EN 16931 CIUS are checked against the EN 16931 core rules only, and the result notes that national rules were not checked. Italy FatturaPA and Poland KSeF FA(3) are checked against the official schema only. A PDF is also checked as a PDF/A-3 container, but only if the PDF itself is sent. Checks an existing file; it does not create, convert or change invoices. B2B only. Requires the caller's own Electronic Invoice API key, sent either directly as Authorization: Bearer eia_live_... or through an OAuth 2.1 access token issued by this server. A call that reaches the API and returns 200, 400, 422 or 504 counts against the plan quota.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Validate e-invoice
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__electronic-invoice__convert_invoice"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.electronic-invoice.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://mcp.electronic-invoice.app
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.electronic-invoice.app/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including convert_invoice (irreversible), generate_invoice (write), open_invoice_check (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "open_invoice_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "open_invoice_check" says "open": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools7 changed.~7 changedView diff
- Changed:convert_invoiceCan't be undonedescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:extract_invoiceOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:generate_invoiceChanges thingsdescriptionannotations
- Changed:get_service_statusOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_usage_limitsOnly readsannotations
- Changed:open_invoice_checkChanges thingsdescriptionannotations
- Changed:validate_invoiceOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
Tools1 added, 1 removed, 5 changed.+1 added−1 removed~5 changedView diff
- Added:get_usage_limitsOnly reads
- Removed:get_pricing_and_limits
- Changed:convert_invoiceCan't be undonedescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:extract_invoiceOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_service_statusOnly readsdescription
- Changed:open_invoice_checkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:validate_invoiceOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http electronic-invoice https://mcp.electronic-invoice.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http electronic-invoice https://mcp.electronic-invoice.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__electronic-invoice__validate_invoice",
"mcp__electronic-invoice__extract_invoice",
"mcp__electronic-invoice__get_service_status",
"mcp__electronic-invoice__get_usage_limits"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__electronic-invoice__generate_invoice",
"mcp__electronic-invoice__convert_invoice",
"mcp__electronic-invoice__open_invoice_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as electronic-invoice. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__electronic-invoice__convert_invoice outbound
- mcp__electronic-invoice__extract_invoice private-data
- mcp__electronic-invoice__get_usage_limits untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.electronic-invoice/mcp/verify?hash=a305132a7a52a5cf97ec4012bc1bec59043a5d969182efe8c8478b7e5be4b63a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a305132a7a52, from Nov 20, 2026, 10:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.electronic-invoice/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.electronic-invoice/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 6, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
Electronic Invoice API MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Electronic Invoice API MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Electronic Invoice API MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Electronic Invoice API MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: convert_invoice.
What tools does the Electronic Invoice API MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 4 read. convert_invoice, generate_invoice, open_invoice_check, validate_invoice, extract_invoice, get_service_status and get_usage_limits.
Does the Electronic Invoice API MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Electronic Invoice API MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): convert_invoice.
Has the Electronic Invoice API MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.