Stringer CleanExtract MCP server
app.getstringer/cleanextractgetstringer.appstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Convert public HTML or a public URL into token-dense Markdown through one remote MCP tool.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server can do
The Stringer CleanExtract MCP server is published by getstringer.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: clean_extract and clean_extract_outline), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (clean_extract and clean_extract_outline).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
clean_extractExtract a full page or selected sections from a public URL or raw HTML as clean Markdown, with navigation, scripts and page chrome removed.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract a full page or selected sections from a public URL or raw HTML as clean Markdown, with navigation, scripts and page chrome removed. Use it instead of a raw fetch when a task needs the text of documentation, an article, an RFC or another reference page: in a five-site benchmark the Markdown was 62% fewer estimated tokens than the HTML. Call the free clean_extract_outline first on a long page, then pass only the section ids you need. A call is charged only when it returns usable content; the first 3 usable extraction calls are free, total, then USD 0.05. Uncharged failures name upstream_timeout, upstream_http_error, bot_challenge, js_shell, empty_extraction, or sections_not_found. Recoverable structured data names fallback_used. Every success reports extraction_quality and extraction_content_ratio_band.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Read a web page as clean Markdown
- openWorldHint: true
clean_extract_outlineFree outline with section ids, headings, byte sizes, and a fingerprint, without page body text or payment.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free outline with section ids, headings, byte sizes, and a fingerprint, without page body text or payment. It never uses the free extraction allowance. Use it first to see what a long page contains and which sections are worth reading. A later clean_extract call can select sections and is charged only when it returns usable content. Uncharged failures name upstream_timeout, upstream_http_error, bot_challenge, js_shell, empty_extraction, or sections_not_found. Recoverable structured data names fallback_used.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Outline a web page's sections (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:29 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-11-25
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://extract.getstringer.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://extract.getstringer.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including clean_extract (write), clean_extract_outline (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http cleanextract https://extract.getstringer.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http cleanextract https://extract.getstringer.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__cleanextract__clean_extract",
"mcp__cleanextract__clean_extract_outline"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as cleanextract. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__cleanextract__clean_extract untrusted-input
- mcp__cleanextract__clean_extract_outline untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.getstringer/cleanextract/verify?hash=9604f245f5df1dd325b49412148c032d03d0db5d09d35b7ff872e304e3e00280" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9604f245f5df, from Nov 12, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.getstringer/cleanextract/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.getstringer/cleanextract)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:44 UTC.
Stringer CleanExtract MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. clean_extract and clean_extract_outline.
Does the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Stringer CleanExtract MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.