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Invoice Table MCP server

app.invoicetable/invoice-tableinvoicetable.appstreamable-httpv0.4.3Scanned

Review invoice records, flag duplicates, validate totals, and prepare spreadsheet-safe CSV.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Invoice Table MCP server can do

The Invoice Table MCP server is published by invoicetable.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: export_invoice_records), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (analyze_invoice_text).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 0.4.3.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • export_invoice_recordsProcesses the reviewed invoice fields you supply and returns spreadsheet-safe CSV text, a filename, media type, and summary.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Processes the reviewed invoice fields you supply and returns spreadsheet-safe CSV text, a filename, media type, and summary. Invalid and duplicate rows remain visible. Invoice Table does not store the tool input or output after the response.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Prepare invoice CSV
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • analyze_invoice_textProcesses the filenames and invoice text you supply to extract common fields, check dates and subtotal-plus-tax arithmetic, flag likely duplicates, and return the derived records a…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "analyze_invoice_text" says "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Processes the filenames and invoice text you supply to extract common fields, check dates and subtotal-plus-tax arithmetic, flag likely duplicates, and return the derived records and review summary. Invoice Table does not store the tool input or output after the response. Human source review is required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Analyze invoice text
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • validate_invoice_recordsProcesses the structured invoice fields you supply to check missing values, dates, arithmetic, and likely duplicates, then returns the records with derived validation and review fi…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_invoice_records" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Processes the structured invoice fields you supply to check missing values, dates, arithmetic, and likely duplicates, then returns the records with derived validation and review fields. Invoice Table does not store the tool input or output after the response.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Validate invoice records
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:29 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://invoicetable.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including export_invoice_records (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http invoice-table https://invoicetable.app/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http invoice-table https://invoicetable.app/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__invoice-table__analyze_invoice_text",
      "mcp__invoice-table__validate_invoice_records"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__invoice-table__export_invoice_records"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as invoice-table. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__invoice-table__analyze_invoice_text untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.invoicetable/invoice-table/verify?hash=da94f9827016bbd2a3a2c20e185b5391761d95df99565aa5084cdb28a7de3109" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash da94f9827016, from Nov 12, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.invoicetable/invoice-table/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.invoicetable/invoice-table
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.invoicetable/invoice-table.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.invoicetable/invoice-table)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:44 UTC.

Invoice Table MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Invoice Table MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Invoice Table MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Invoice Table MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Invoice Table MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. export_invoice_records, analyze_invoice_text and validate_invoice_records.

Does the Invoice Table MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Invoice Table MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Invoice Table MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 30, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.