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Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server

app.nanocorp.invoke/human-tasksinvoke.nanocorp.appstreamable-httpv0.1.4Scanned

Let your AI agent hire a human for tasks it can't do — first post free.

3 tools: 3 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server can do

The Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server is published by invoke.nanocorp.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: post_task, post_human_task and hire_human), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (post_task, post_human_task and hire_human); 2 tools can send data out of your system (post_task and post_human_task).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • hire_humanAlias for post_task.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Alias for post_task. Use when the agent should stop guessing and hire a human. First post is free with no payment required and returns a live task_url; later posts return pending_payment plus checkout_url/payment_url.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Hire human (alias)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • post_human_taskAlias for post_task.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_human_task" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "post_human_task" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Alias for post_task. Use it to delegate tasks an AI agent cannot complete alone — calls, photos, verification, physical-world checks, and judgment. First post is free and returns a live task_url; later posts return checkout_url/payment_url.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Post human task (alias)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • post_taskCall this when your AI agent is stuck on work software cannot do: phone calls, real-world photos, local pickup/checks, human judgment, verification, QA, or physical presence.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_task" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "post_task" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call this when your AI agent is stuck on work software cannot do: phone calls, real-world photos, local pickup/checks, human judgment, verification, QA, or physical presence. Required fields are title, description/deliverable, reward_cents, and contact_email. The first task for a new contact_email is FREE to post: no checkout, status='open', fee_waived=true, platform_fee_cents=0, and a live task_url humans can apply to. Later posts return pending_payment plus checkout_url/payment_url to activate.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Delegate to a human (first post free)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://invoke.nanocorp.app/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including post_task (write), post_human_task (write), hire_human (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http human-tasks https://invoke.nanocorp.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http human-tasks https://invoke.nanocorp.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__human-tasks__post_task",
      "mcp__human-tasks__post_human_task",
      "mcp__human-tasks__hire_human"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as human-tasks. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__human-tasks__post_task untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__human-tasks__post_human_task untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__human-tasks__hire_human untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.nanocorp.invoke/human-tasks/verify?hash=96637475d40290afc6e51207c08403c1c1aa366ac4470aee7f4261c053afc70a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 96637475d402, from Nov 10, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.nanocorp.invoke/human-tasks/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.nanocorp.invoke/human-tasks
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.nanocorp.invoke/human-tasks.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.nanocorp.invoke/human-tasks)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:44 UTC.

Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 write. post_task, post_human_task and hire_human.

Does the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): post_task and post_human_task.

Has the Invoke — hire a human from your AI agent (first post free) MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.