LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit
app.netlify.gleaming-cassata-d41682/lion-mcpgleaming-cassata-d41682.netlify.appstreamable-httpv1.1.1Scanned
x402-paid MCP data: trend feed + visibility audit. USDC/Base. No API key. No PII.
5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit can do
The LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit is published by gleaming-cassata-d41682.netlify.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit) and create or change data (3 tools: lion_trend_intent_signal_json, lion_trend_intent_signal_csv and lion_base_dex_signals_json), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.1.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
lion_payment_attempt_readiness_auditPre-spend payment-term trust check for x402 endpoints.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-spend payment-term trust check for x402 endpoints. Before your agent signs a Payment-Signature, call this with a target x402/MCP service URL: LION extracts the target live 402 payment terms (payTo, amount, asset, network, scheme), cross-checks them for drift across public discovery surfaces, and returns payment_attempt_blockers, buyer_policy_fit, canonical_purchase_recipe, funnel_stage, a transparent readiness score, and risk_flags so the agent can decide whether to sign. 0.05 USDC on Base eip155:8453. Unpaid tools/call returns JSON-RPC error -32402 with the x402 paymentRequirement; wallet-capable MCP clients (e.g. Coinbase Payments MCP, AWS AgentCore Payments) auto-construct the EIP-3009 signature. LION does NOT perform payment inside MCP. Checks payment-term consistency only - not a smart-contract security audit, no settlement guarantee, no fund movement.
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
lion_base_dex_signals_jsonLive Base (eip155:8453) DEX market-data feed for trading and research agents.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Live Base (eip155:8453) DEX market-data feed for trading and research agents. Returns a fresh ranked snapshot of active Base tokens with raw on-chain metrics: price_usd, liquidity_usd, volume_h24, volume_m5, price_change_h1/h24, pair_age_hours, dex, and a transparent mechanical activity_score (volume + liquidity + recency). Source: public DexScreener data, no API key. Raw public market data only - not financial or investment advice, no buy/sell recommendation. Pay 0.005 USDC on Base via x402 at the paid route. tools/call returns payment-required metadata only; settle the x402 invoice at the paid route to fetch the live JSON.
lion_trend_intent_signal_csvHardware-wallet buyer-intent + self-custody onboarding-friction intelligence as flat CSV.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Hardware-wallet buyer-intent + self-custody onboarding-friction intelligence as flat CSV. Same column set as the JSON variant: Ledger vs Trezor comparison demand, Bitcoin-only wallet research, under-$100 wallet shopper queries, DeFi hardware-wallet intent, decision-stage crypto purchase research. Optimised for spreadsheet / pipeline ingestion and affiliate-routing or comparison-research workflows. Pay $0.01 USDC on Base mainnet via x402 at the paid route. tools/call returns payment-required metadata only; settle the invoice at the paid route to fetch the CSV.
lion_trend_intent_signal_jsonHardware-wallet buyer-intent + self-custody onboarding-friction intelligence as JSON.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Hardware-wallet buyer-intent + self-custody onboarding-friction intelligence as JSON. Non-PII public-signal feed covering: Ledger vs Trezor comparison demand, Bitcoin-only wallet research, under-$100 wallet shopper queries, DeFi hardware-wallet intent, and adjacent decision-stage crypto purchase research. Designed for agent routing, affiliate / comparison-content workflows, and research context. Pay $0.01 USDC on Base mainnet via x402 (HTTP 402 + EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization) at the paid route. This MCP tool does NOT return the dataset; tools/call returns payment-required metadata so an x402-capable client can settle and fetch the JSON directly.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
lion_adaptive_data_queryLION Adaptive Data Fabric: ONE typed x402 query endpoint that adapts to any agent request over live Base on-chain data, covering multiple verticals from one call.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lion_adaptive_data_query" says "query": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it LION Adaptive Data Fabric: ONE typed x402 query endpoint that adapts to any agent request over live Base on-chain data, covering multiple verticals from one call. Query params: source (base_dex | token_risk | defi_yields), token (0x address; for token_risk / single-token base_dex), sort (activity|volume|liquidity|age), limit, min_liquidity, max_age_hours, fields (output projection), q (free-text intent). base_dex = ranked active Base tokens (liquidity, volume, price-change, pair-age, activity_score) via DexScreener; token_risk = token security card (honeypot, buy/sell tax, mintable, owner, holders + mechanical risk_flags) via GoPlus; defi_yields = Base DeFi pools ranked by TVL with APY via DefiLlama. Free self-describing capability manifest at the same URL with ?describe=1 (no payment). Returns typed JSON rows + freshness fields (as_of, data_age_seconds, confidence, source_provider). Public keyless data, no API key. Raw public market data only - not financial or investment advice. Pay 0.005 USDC on Base via x402; tools/call returns payment-required metadata only, settle at the paid route to fetch the live JSON.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:29 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-03-26
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://gleaming-cassata-d41682.netlify.app/api/mcp?src=mcpregistry_domain_v1_1: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit (irreversible), lion_trend_intent_signal_json (write), lion_trend_intent_signal_csv (write), lion_base_dex_signals_json (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http lion https://gleaming-cassata-d41682.netlify.app/api/mcp?src=mcpregistry_domain_v1_1claude mcp add --transport http lion https://gleaming-cassata-d41682.netlify.app/api/mcp?src=mcpregistry_domain_v1_1Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__lion__lion_adaptive_data_query"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__lion__lion_trend_intent_signal_json",
"mcp__lion__lion_trend_intent_signal_csv",
"mcp__lion__lion_base_dex_signals_json",
"mcp__lion__lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as lion. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__lion__lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.netlify.gleaming-cassata-d41682/lion-mcp/verify?hash=7cf2d58db55c0f0101d20182a4c646bde917e3fccc076a43020bdc049379cdc0" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7cf2d58db55c, from Nov 12, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.netlify.gleaming-cassata-d41682/lion-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.netlify.gleaming-cassata-d41682/lion-mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:44 UTC.
LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit.
What tools does the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit have?
- 5 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read. lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit, lion_trend_intent_signal_json, lion_trend_intent_signal_csv, lion_base_dex_signals_json and lion_adaptive_data_query.
Does the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): lion_payment_attempt_readiness_audit.
Has the LION - Trend Intent MCP + Marketplace Visibility Audit changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.