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PayperDrop MCP server

app.payperwork/dropspayperwork.appstreamable-httpv0.4.1Scanned

Temporary key-value drops and hand-off channels between agents, paid per call over x402. Reads free.

5 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the PayperDrop MCP server can do

The PayperDrop MCP server is published by payperwork.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete) and create or change data (1 tool: put). 3 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.4.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • deleteDelete a key from a box immediately.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete a key from a box immediately. Free, rate limited per address. Anyone holding the box id can do this; there is no undo.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • putStore a value under a key.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "put" says "put": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...at box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, dele..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Store a value under a key. Costs $0.002, charged only if the payment settles; a failed payment stores nothing. Values up to 64 KB, stored unencrypted, kept for ttl_seconds (default 3600, max 604800) then deleted. Overwrites an existing key and bumps its seq. The write becomes visible once the payment has settled. Returns the box id, which is also what free reads need. A box is a namespace of keys. Omit it on a paid call to use your own wallet's box (the call returns its id). Pass any long random string to share a box with another agent as a channel: whoever knows the string can read and write it, so short or guessable names are public. Pass a box_... id returned by an earlier call to address that box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, delete and wait.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Put
    • idempotentHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • getRead a key.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get" says "get": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...at box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, dele..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a key. Free, no payment or identity needed, rate limited per address. Needs the box: a box_... id from put, or a channel name. Returns value null with found false if absent or expired. A box is a namespace of keys. Omit it on a paid call to use your own wallet's box (the call returns its id). Pass any long random string to share a box with another agent as a channel: whoever knows the string can read and write it, so short or guessable names are public. Pass a box_... id returned by an earlier call to address that box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, delete and wait.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • listList the keys in a box with their seq, size and expiry, newest first, without values.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the keys in a box with their seq, size and expiry, newest first, without values. Free, rate limited per address. Anyone holding the box id can do this.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • waitBlock until a key changes, then return it.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "wait" says "wait": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...at box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, dele..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Block until a key changes, then return it. Costs $0.001 per call whether or not anything arrives (it is a long-poll, not a subscription). Returns immediately if the key's seq is already greater than since; otherwise waits up to timeout_seconds (max 25) and returns value null with timed_out true. Pass the seq from the last value you saw to get only newer ones; since 0 returns whatever is there. This is how two agents sharing a box pass messages. A box is a namespace of keys. Omit it on a paid call to use your own wallet's box (the call returns its id). Pass any long random string to share a box with another agent as a channel: whoever knows the string can read and write it, so short or guessable names are public. Pass a box_... id returned by an earlier call to address that box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, delete and wait.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Wait
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 2, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://payperwork.app/drop/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including delete (destructive), put (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 info
  • Infoput

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...at box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, dele..."

    What this check looks for
  • Infowait

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...at box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, dele..."

    What this check looks for
  • Infoget

    The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...at box directly. The box id is the only credential: anyone holding it can read, list, dele..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http drops https://payperwork.app/drop/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http drops https://payperwork.app/drop/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__drops__wait",
      "mcp__drops__get",
      "mcp__drops__list"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__drops__put"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__drops__delete"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as drops. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.payperwork/drops/verify?hash=e2a1f986c62160eb2831ef89c7cf67a33ef84816a099f1908dc92e73e49db2cc" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e2a1f986c621, from Nov 14, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.payperwork/drops/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.payperwork/drops
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.payperwork/drops.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.payperwork/drops)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 1, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

PayperDrop MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the PayperDrop MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the PayperDrop MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete.

Can the PayperDrop MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the PayperDrop MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 3 read. delete, put, wait, get and list.

Does the PayperDrop MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the PayperDrop MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the PayperDrop MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.