ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield
app.railway.up.chainguard-studio-production/chainguard-shieldchainguard-studio-production.up.railway.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Web3 & AI Firewall: EIP-7702 hijacks, Solana Token-2022 drainers, EVM tx & MCP injection check.
5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield can do
The ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield is published by chainguard-studio-production.up.railway.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (check_tx_firewall) and create or change data (3 tools: check_eip7702_delegation, check_mcp_poisoning and audit_solidity_or_mcp), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (check_tx_firewall).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
check_tx_firewallPre-flight EVM transaction drainer & unlimited approval firewall (Base/Arbitrum/Polygon).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-flight EVM transaction drainer & unlimited approval firewall (Base/Arbitrum/Polygon).
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
audit_solidity_or_mcpInstant triage audit of Solidity contracts or MCP/AI agent configs for vulnerabilities & token burn.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Instant triage audit of Solidity contracts or MCP/AI agent configs for vulnerabilities & token burn.
check_eip7702_delegationDetect active EIP-7702 EOA delegation hijacks (0xef0100...) on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, or Polygon.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Detect active EIP-7702 EOA delegation hijacks (0xef0100...) on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, or Polygon.
check_mcp_poisoningDetect hidden zero-width Unicode smuggling & prompt injection inside MCP tools or web text.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Detect hidden zero-width Unicode smuggling & prompt injection inside MCP tools or web text.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
check_solana_token2022Inspect Solana SPL / Token-2022 mint for PermanentDelegate drainers, TransferHooks, Mint/Freeze authority & RugCheck score.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect Solana SPL / Token-2022 mint for PermanentDelegate drainers, TransferHooks, Mint/Freeze authority & RugCheck score.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://chainguard-studio-production.up.railway.app/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_tx_firewall (irreversible), check_eip7702_delegation (write), check_mcp_poisoning (write), audit_solidity_or_mcp (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http chainguard-shield https://chainguard-studio-production.up.railway.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http chainguard-shield https://chainguard-studio-production.up.railway.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__chainguard-shield__check_solana_token2022"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__chainguard-shield__check_eip7702_delegation",
"mcp__chainguard-shield__check_tx_firewall",
"mcp__chainguard-shield__check_mcp_poisoning",
"mcp__chainguard-shield__audit_solidity_or_mcp"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as chainguard-shield. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__chainguard-shield__check_tx_firewall outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.railway.up.chainguard-studio-production/chainguard-shield/verify?hash=b321eda5c14a8901b04f0b2fd87277e1fd57af36b85722f04c3cd6e924723d90" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b321eda5c14a, from Nov 20, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.railway.up.chainguard-studio-production/chainguard-shield/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.railway.up.chainguard-studio-production/chainguard-shield)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: check_tx_firewall.
What tools does the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield have?
- 5 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read. check_tx_firewall, check_eip7702_delegation, check_mcp_poisoning, audit_solidity_or_mcp and check_solana_token2022.
Does the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_tx_firewall.
Has the ChainGuard Web3 & MCP Shield changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.