RecallDB MCP server
app.recalldb/recalldbrecalldb.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Official recalls from NHTSA, CPSC, FDA, USDA, Canada, UK, EU and Australia; VIN and barcode lookup.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the RecallDB MCP server can do
The RecallDB MCP server is published by recalldb.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: barcode_lookup and vehicle_recalls), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
barcode_lookupRecalls whose official notice lists a barcode (UPC-A, EAN-13, GTIN-14, UPC-E or EAN-8; the check digit must be right).1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "barcode_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "barcode_lookup" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "barcode_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Recalls whose official notice lists a barcode (UPC-A, EAN-13, GTIN-14, UPC-E or EAN-8; the check digit must be right). Each match includes the notice's own text and the lot codes, best-by dates and serial numbers written near the barcode. A match means the code appears in a notice; the user must verify lot codes and dates against the official notice. No match does not mean there is no recall: not every recall lists barcodes.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Look up a barcode
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
vehicle_recallsNHTSA recalls for a car make, model and model year, as listed by the recall notices.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it NHTSA recalls for a car make, model and model year, as listed by the recall notices. Recalls are by model, not by individual vehicle: this does not say whether one specific car has an open recall (the owner checks the VIN with NHTSA or the carmaker).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Vehicle recalls by model and year
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_recallThe full record for one recall: the official problem, consequence and remedy text, the issuing company, units, official codes as listed, and the agency, its own number and a link t…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_recall" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The full record for one recall: the official problem, consequence and remedy text, the issuing company, units, official codes as listed, and the agency, its own number and a link to the official notice.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a recall
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_recallsFull-text search of recall notices by product name, brand, model number, recall number or UPC across vehicles, motorcycles, RVs, car seats, tires, equipment, consumer products, foo…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_recalls" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Full-text search of recall notices by product name, brand, model number, recall number or UPC across vehicles, motorcycles, RVs, car seats, tires, equipment, consumer products, food, supplements, pet food, cosmetics, drugs and medical devices. Returns up to 50 results a page, each with an id for get_recall and a link to the official notice.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search recalls
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://recalldb.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including barcode_lookup (write), vehicle_recalls (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnbarcode_lookup
The server marks "barcode_lookup" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "barcode_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http recalldb https://recalldb.app/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http recalldb https://recalldb.app/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__recalldb__search_recalls",
"mcp__recalldb__get_recall"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__recalldb__barcode_lookup",
"mcp__recalldb__vehicle_recalls"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as recalldb. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.recalldb/recalldb/verify?hash=f35ef2de09f529ea5a7a9b0a99e5aaf7d879563f7ede9c8f3e8285b59500c61c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash f35ef2de09f5, from Nov 15, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.recalldb/recalldb/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.recalldb/recalldb)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 15, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
RecallDB MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the RecallDB MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the RecallDB MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the RecallDB MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the RecallDB MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. barcode_lookup, vehicle_recalls, search_recalls and get_recall.
Does the RecallDB MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the RecallDB MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the RecallDB MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.