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RELTO MCP server

app.relto/reltorelto.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

AI virtual staging that doesn't change the house.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the RELTO MCP server can do

The RELTO MCP server is published by relto.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: stage_room), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_staging_result).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • stage_roomStart a RELTO staging job for one empty room photo.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start a RELTO staging job for one empty room photo. RELTO furnishes the room and runs RELTOLock™ verification on its own output before delivering it. RELTOLock™ verifies RELTO's own staged outputs against the original photo, window by window and door by door; the verification mark is withheld if anything moved. It does not scan or verify photos staged by other tools. Returns immediately with a jobId and status "queued"; rendering takes about a minute. Then call get_staging_result with the jobId to collect the staged photo and its verification summary.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_staging_resultCheck a RELTO staging job by jobId and, when it is done, get the staged photo URL, the link to the original photo, and the RELTOLock™ verification summary (state, how many elements…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_staging_result" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a RELTO staging job by jobId and, when it is done, get the staged photo URL, the link to the original photo, and the RELTOLock™ verification summary (state, how many elements were measured, and any element lines that came back altered or inconclusive). RELTOLock™ verifies RELTO's own staged outputs against the original photo, window by window and door by door; the verification mark is withheld if anything moved. It does not scan or verify photos staged by other tools. If the job is still queued or processing, call again in a few seconds.
  • get_verificationFetch the full RELTOLock™ verification evidence recorded for a finished RELTO staging job: the structural checks run against the original photo and their outcomes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_verification" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the full RELTOLock™ verification evidence recorded for a finished RELTO staging job: the structural checks run against the original photo and their outcomes. Use this when the summary from get_staging_result is not enough, for example to show exactly which windows and doors were measured and what each check found. RELTOLock™ verifies RELTO's own staged outputs against the original photo, window by window and door by door; the verification mark is withheld if anything moved. It does not scan or verify photos staged by other tools.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 27, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://relto.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including stage_room (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http relto https://relto.app/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http relto https://relto.app/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__relto__get_staging_result",
      "mcp__relto__get_verification"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__relto__stage_room"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as relto. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__relto__get_staging_result untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.relto/relto/verify?hash=2e34b8420cf8dad9a54b42b7c75a63eddea5d54bf9eeb816008723ddc8b5ae22" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 2e34b8420cf8, from Nov 9, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.relto/relto/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.relto/relto
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.relto/relto.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.relto/relto)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

RELTO MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the RELTO MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the RELTO MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the RELTO MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the RELTO MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. stage_room, get_staging_result and get_verification.

Does the RELTO MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the RELTO MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the RELTO MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.