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Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server

app.samedoc/samedocsamedoc.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Translate PDFs and scans into another language in the same layout, every number kept. PDF to Word.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server can do

The Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server is published by samedoc.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (translate_document) and create or change data (1 tool: convert_to_word), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (get_translation and get_upload_link); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (translate_document, convert_to_word and get_upload_link); 1 tool can send data out of your system (translate_document). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • translate_documentTranslates a PDF or a scanned document / photo of one into another language and returns the same document as a PDF: layout, tables, logos and every number kept and checked.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Translates a PDF or a scanned document / photo of one into another language and returns the same document as a PDF: layout, tables, logos and every number kept and checked. For payslips, bank statements, official and government letters, birth and marriage certificates, diplomas, school reports, contracts, leases and forms, e.g. for a visa, immigration, a bank or a school. Strong on right-to-left sources (Hebrew, Arabic), which it can also mirror into a left-to-right layout. Use when the user says 'translate this PDF / document / scan', 'keep the formatting / layout', 'give me back the PDF', or when a translation in chat lost the tables or layout. Give the document as `file` (a file the user attached) or `file_url` (an https link). Up to 3 pages per document. Takes 30-90 seconds; if it takes longer, returns an id for get_translation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Translate a document
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • convert_to_wordTurns a PDF or a scanned document / photo of one into an editable Word file (.docx) that looks like the original page: every line of text is editable in place, over the original de…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "convert_to_word" says "convert": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Turns a PDF or a scanned document / photo of one into an editable Word file (.docx) that looks like the original page: every line of text is editable in place, over the original design (tables, lines, logos, stamps and signatures kept exactly). Same language, no translation. Reads scans and broken PDF text, and keeps Hebrew and Arabic right-to-left. Use when the user says 'convert this PDF to Word / docx', 'make this PDF editable', 'I need to edit this form / scan', or when a Word file made in chat lost the logo, tables or layout. Give the document as `file` (a file the user attached) or `file_url` (an https link). Up to 3 pages per document. Takes 20-90 seconds; if it takes longer, returns an id for get_translation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Convert to Word
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_translationReturns the status and download link of a job started with translate_document or convert_to_word (use its id).Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_translation" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the status and download link of a job started with translate_document or convert_to_word (use its id).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get a translation
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__samedoc__translate_document"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://samedoc.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including translate_document (irreversible), convert_to_word (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http samedoc https://samedoc.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http samedoc https://samedoc.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__samedoc__get_translation",
      "mcp__samedoc__get_upload_link"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__samedoc__translate_document",
      "mcp__samedoc__convert_to_word"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as samedoc. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__samedoc__translate_document untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__samedoc__convert_to_word untrusted-input
  • mcp__samedoc__get_translation private-data
  • mcp__samedoc__get_upload_link private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.samedoc/samedoc/verify?hash=85de07e926e7aaae1f95fe738cf4b17b3b1e0cd728129ed97b8a7f29b5b6499f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 85de07e926e7, from Nov 19, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.samedoc/samedoc/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.samedoc/samedoc
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.samedoc/samedoc.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.samedoc/samedoc)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: translate_document.

What tools does the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. translate_document, convert_to_word, get_translation and get_upload_link.

Does the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): translate_document.

Has the Samedoc: Translate PDF & PDF to Word MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.