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Samplecut MCP server

app.samplecut/samplecutsamplecut.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Cut audio from YouTube, TikTok or Instagram links to MP3/WAV, and fetch video transcripts.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 2 findings, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Samplecut MCP server can do

The Samplecut MCP server is published by samplecut.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_feedback) and create or change data (2 tools: cut_audio and retrim_clip), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (cut_audio, get_transcript and send_feedback); 3 tools can send data out of your system (cut_audio, get_transcript and send_feedback).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings, 1 of them high severity (model-directed-text and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • send_feedbackTell Samplecut's developers how the user's task went.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_feedback" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_feedback" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "send_feedback" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "send_feedback" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Tell Samplecut's developers how the user's task went. Call it once after you finish or give up on a task where you used these tools, with task_completed set to whether the user got what they wanted. Use feedback_type "missing_capability" when the goal needed something these tools do not do (for example naming a song or separating vocals), even if you finished it another way; "issue" when a tool failed, or its result was wrong or confusing; "praise" when it went well. This only records feedback. No links, names or personal details.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Send feedback
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • cut_audioCut audio from a YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, SoundCloud, or X URL and return a short-lived download link.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "do not show them to the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

      Matched text

      description: "...eractive clip card some chat apps show; do not show them to the user. If the user adjusted the clip in the c..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cut audio from a YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, SoundCloud, or X URL and return a short-lived download link. Lead with download_url for cut/download requests; offer editor_url when the user wants to tweak the selection. Links expire after about an hour — ask again in chat for a fresh cut if expired. Omit start_sec and end_sec for the full track. format defaults to mp3 (wav allowed). clip_id and peaks drive the interactive clip card some chat apps show; do not show them to the user. If the user adjusted the clip in the card, read the widget context for the current range and download link before answering follow-ups.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • retrim_clipRe-cut a clip from Samplecut's clip card to a new start/end, reusing the audio already extracted for it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-cut a clip from Samplecut's clip card to a new start/end, reusing the audio already extracted for it. Called by the interactive card; to cut something new, use cut_audio.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_transcriptFetch timestamped captions for a YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, SoundCloud, or X URL when the platform provides them.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_transcript" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch timestamped captions for a YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, SoundCloud, or X URL when the platform provides them. Use segment start_sec/end_sec (or the flat text) to choose a cut range, then call cut_audio with the same URL and those times. When available is false there are no captions — do not invent lyrics or timestamps; tell the user to pick times another way. Optional lang is a BCP-47 code (default en). No job_id is returned.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:30 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.samplecut.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including send_feedback (irreversible), cut_audio (write), retrim_clip (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high1 warn
  • The description contains "do not show them to the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

    Matched text

    description: "...eractive clip card some chat apps show; do not show them to the user. If the user adjusted the clip in the c..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "send_feedback" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "send_feedback" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http samplecut https://api.samplecut.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http samplecut https://api.samplecut.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__samplecut__cut_audio",
      "mcp__samplecut__get_transcript",
      "mcp__samplecut__retrim_clip",
      "mcp__samplecut__send_feedback"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as samplecut. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__samplecut__cut_audio untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__samplecut__get_transcript untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__samplecut__send_feedback untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.samplecut/samplecut/verify?hash=000ec8c5e0b27461c552ef76fa39452c01d2743e43ef8077dffe1e14849f1703" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 000ec8c5e0b2, from Nov 12, 2026, 03:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.samplecut/samplecut/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.samplecut/samplecut
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.samplecut/samplecut.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.samplecut/samplecut)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.

Samplecut MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Samplecut MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Samplecut MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Samplecut MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_feedback.

What tools does the Samplecut MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read. send_feedback, cut_audio, retrim_clip and get_transcript.

Does the Samplecut MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Samplecut MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): cut_audio, get_transcript and send_feedback.

Has the Samplecut MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 30, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.