TerraVue MCP server
app.terravue/terravueterravue.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Analyze any US home: buy vs rent Monte Carlo, affordability, and ZIP-level appreciation data.
6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the TerraVue MCP server can do
The TerraVue MCP server is published by terravue.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: request_capability, buy_vs_rent, affordability and affordable_price), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (analyze_address, buy_vs_rent, affordability and 2 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
affordabilityCan this buyer afford this home?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Can this buyer afford this home? Returns the monthly PITI payment, front-end and back-end debt-to-income ratios (what a lender qualifies on), the income needed at a 28% front-end ratio, estimated after-tax money left over each month, the cash cushion left after closing, and a plain Comfortable / Qualifiable-tight / Stretch verdict. monthly_debts = recurring debt obligations a lender counts (car, student loan, minimum credit-card) — NOT living costs; this feeds DTI. monthly_expenses = living costs (food, utilities, childcare) used ONLY for the 'left over each month' life check, never DTI. Pass `address` to ground property tax + insurance in the ZIP's real rates. Pass `liquid_savings` to get the post-closing cash cushion (months of payment covered).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
affordable_priceWhat's the most this buyer can afford?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it What's the most this buyer can afford? The reverse of `affordability` — 'what price can I afford?' instead of 'can I afford this specific home?'. Solves for the maximum home price under standard lender limits: a front-end DTI cap (default 28% = housing / gross income) and a back-end cap (default 36% = housing + other debts / gross income). If `liquid_savings` is given, also caps by the cash available for down payment + closing and reports which limit binds. Returns the affordable price, the PITI and DTIs at that price, and the cash to close. Pass `address` to ground property tax + insurance in the ZIP's real rates. This is a lender-limit ceiling, not a comfort recommendation — feed the result into `affordability` (or buy_vs_rent) to check monthly slack and whether buying pencils.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
buy_vs_rentShould someone buy this home or keep renting?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Should someone buy this home or keep renting? Runs the TerraVue engine: a deterministic 30-year simulation plus a 500-scenario Monte Carlo over correlated market paths. Returns the probability buying wins, the breakeven hold period, and net-worth outcomes. monthly_rent = what the person would pay to rent THE SAME HOME to live in — an owner-occupant buy-vs-rent decision, NOT rental income they'd collect as a landlord (this tool does not model rental cash flow; that lens lives on terravue.app). A rent far out of line with home_price is almost certainly a misunderstanding — confirm it before trusting the verdict. If `address` is given, the ZIP's real appreciation forecast and regional tax/insurance defaults are used (explicit parameters still win).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
request_capabilityRecord a question TerraVue could not answer, so it can be built.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_capability" says "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Record a question TerraVue could not answer, so it can be built. Call this whenever a user asks for something outside the current tools' coverage (rental metrics, Airbnb modeling, valuations, move-vs-stay, non-US, anything else), then tell the user their request was captured. Keep `description` to the capability needed — no names, emails, or other personal details. category: rental_metrics | str_airbnb | valuation | move_vs_stay | data_coverage | other
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
analyze_addressLook up a US address (or bare 5-digit ZIP): ZIP-level home-price appreciation forecast (FHFA data back to 1975), estimated market rent, and neighborhood signals (schools, walkabili…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_address" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up a US address (or bare 5-digit ZIP): ZIP-level home-price appreciation forecast (FHFA data back to 1975), estimated market rent, and neighborhood signals (schools, walkability, water quality, grocery/dining/outdoors proximity). For a full street address this also returns sub-ZIP `nbhd*` fields describing the specific census tract - how its prices, incomes and build era compare to the rest of the ZIP. That is POSITION, not a neighborhood forecast; see _units. property_type: sfr | condo | townhome | multi
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
compare_areasAnalyze and RANK 2-12 ZIPs or addresses side by side on the signals TerraVue has: home-price appreciation forecast (and how each compares to the national average), school rating, w…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "compare_areas" says "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze and RANK 2-12 ZIPs or addresses side by side on the signals TerraVue has: home-price appreciation forecast (and how each compares to the national average), school rating, walkability, education level, and water quality. Returns the correct city name per ZIP, so locations are never guessed or mislabeled. Use for "which areas have the best appreciation / schools / upside." TerraVue has no listing inventory and cannot discover ZIPs on its own — to scan a metro, pass that metro's ZIP codes (the ranking then covers exactly what you passed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:30 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.terravue.app/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including request_capability (write), buy_vs_rent (write), affordability (write), affordable_price (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http terravue https://api.terravue.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http terravue https://api.terravue.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__terravue__analyze_address",
"mcp__terravue__compare_areas"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__terravue__request_capability",
"mcp__terravue__buy_vs_rent",
"mcp__terravue__affordability",
"mcp__terravue__affordable_price"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as terravue. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__terravue__analyze_address untrusted-input
- mcp__terravue__buy_vs_rent untrusted-input
- mcp__terravue__affordability untrusted-input
- mcp__terravue__compare_areas untrusted-input
- mcp__terravue__affordable_price untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.terravue/terravue/verify?hash=b1ecc835e82096a5a39b320eba1de8160cb1269546e7b0966fe216ec84a4ea48" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b1ecc835e820, from Nov 12, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.terravue/terravue/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.terravue/terravue)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.
TerraVue MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the TerraVue MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the TerraVue MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the TerraVue MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the TerraVue MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 4 write, 2 read. request_capability, buy_vs_rent, affordability, affordable_price, analyze_address and compare_areas.
Does the TerraVue MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the TerraVue MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the TerraVue MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.