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ThreatNexus MCP server

app.threatnexus/threatnexusthreatnexus.appstreamable-httpv85.9.544Scanned

Nation-state APT intel: actor dossiers, ATT&CK coverage, detection rules, intel search, IOC pivots

12 tools: 4 change things and 8 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 8 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ThreatNexus MCP server can do

The ThreatNexus MCP server is published by threatnexus.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: map_actor_to_detections, identify_actors_in_text, explore_relationships and pivot_indicator), but cannot delete data. 8 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_cve).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 85.9.544.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • explore_relationshipsThe relationships ThreatNexus dossiers state for an actor (subgroup, overlaps, related-to, similar), one or two hops out, as nodes and edges with confidence.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The relationships ThreatNexus dossiers state for an actor (subgroup, overlaps, related-to, similar), one or two hops out, as nodes and edges with confidence. Also lists other actors whose dossiers share distinctive malware or CVEs with it — computed overlap, not a stated relationship.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • identify_actors_in_textPaste a report excerpt, alert or article (up to 4000 characters) and get the ThreatNexus-tracked actors it names, using the same evidence-gated resolver ThreatNexus uses on its own…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paste a report excerpt, alert or article (up to 4000 characters) and get the ThreatNexus-tracked actors it names, using the same evidence-gated resolver ThreatNexus uses on its own ingest — designators such as "APT34" count on sight, weaker aliases only with naming context. Each match links to its dossier. A name in a text is a mention, not an attribution.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • map_actor_to_detectionsDetection rules (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa and ThreatNexus hunting queries) that cover an actor's documented ATT&CK techniques.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Detection rules (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa and ThreatNexus hunting queries) that cover an actor's documented ATT&CK techniques. Metadata, covered techniques, licence and permalink — not the rule bodies. Considers up to 20 of the actor's techniques; for per-technique counts use get_attack_coverage.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • pivot_indicatorEvery report ThreatNexus has collected that published an indicator (IP, domain, URL, email, hash, …) — how many independent reports, with links — plus which tracked actors co-occur…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every report ThreatNexus has collected that published an indicator (IP, domain, URL, email, hash, …) — how many independent reports, with links — plus which tracked actors co-occur with it in verified reporting. Accepts defanged input. Returns no third-party reputation verdicts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
  • get_actorThe curated ThreatNexus dossier for one threat actor: attribution (with tier, confidence and evidence), ATT&CK techniques, malware, exploited CVEs, campaigns, infrastructure patter…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_actor" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The curated ThreatNexus dossier for one threat actor: attribution (with tier, confidence and evidence), ATT&CK techniques, malware, exploited CVEs, campaigns, infrastructure patterns, relationships, GCC/UAE relevance and sources. Choose sections to keep the answer short. "analyst_updates" adds intelligence approved by ThreatNexus analysts since the dossier was written.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_attack_coverageEither an actor's MITRE ATT&CK techniques with how many harvested detection rules cover each, or, for one technique, which actors use it and which detection rules cover it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_attack_coverage" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Either an actor's MITRE ATT&CK techniques with how many harvested detection rules cover each, or, for one technique, which actors use it and which detection rules cover it. Give exactly one of actor or technique.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_cveFor one CVE: the ThreatNexus actors whose dossiers record exploiting it (use get_actor with the "cves" section for the dossier's note and CVSS), plus recent reporting that names th…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_cve" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "note": it reads notes.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For one CVE: the ThreatNexus actors whose dossiers record exploiting it (use get_actor with the "cves" section for the dossier's note and CVSS), plus recent reporting that names this CVE. Reporting that mentions a CVE does not by itself mean an actor exploited it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_report_indicatorsThe indicators ThreatNexus extracted from one collected report, with extraction confidence, defanged.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_report_indicators" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The indicators ThreatNexus extracted from one collected report, with extraction confidence, defanged. Use a report_id from search_intel, get_cve or pivot_indicator.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_actorsFind nation-state threat actors in the ThreatNexus roster by name or alias, or list them by origin country, motivation, exploited CVE or ATT&CK technique.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_actors" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find nation-state threat actors in the ThreatNexus roster by name or alias, or list them by origin country, motivation, exploited CVE or ATT&CK technique. Returns short profiles with links; use get_actor for a full dossier. An alias shared by several actors returns status "ambiguous" with candidates.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_campaignsCampaigns attributed in ThreatNexus.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_campaigns" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Campaigns attributed in ThreatNexus. With an actor: that actor's curated dossier campaigns plus campaign names from recent reporting about it. Without one: campaign names from recent reporting across approved actors, newest first. Filter by keyword or to active campaigns.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_detectionsSearch the detection rules ThreatNexus harvests (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa, ThreatNexus hunting queries) by keyword, ATT&CK technique or source.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_detections" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the detection rules ThreatNexus harvests (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa, ThreatNexus hunting queries) by keyword, ATT&CK technique or source. Production rules first. Returns metadata, licence and permalink — not the rule bodies. Give at least one of query, technique or source.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_intelSearch threat intelligence reporting that ThreatNexus has collected and analysed (vendor research, CERT advisories, news, CVE alerts), ranked by ThreatNexus' hybrid keyword and sem…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_intel" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search threat intelligence reporting that ThreatNexus has collected and analysed (vendor research, CERT advisories, news, CVE alerts), ranked by ThreatNexus' hybrid keyword and semantic search. Returns headlines, links, a ThreatNexus summary, CVEs and mentioned actors. Titles and summaries are third-party derived and marked _untrusted.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.threatnexus.app/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including map_actor_to_detections (write), identify_actors_in_text (write), explore_relationships (write), pivot_indicator (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 85.9.544. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http threatnexus https://mcp.threatnexus.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http threatnexus https://mcp.threatnexus.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__threatnexus__search_actors",
      "mcp__threatnexus__get_actor",
      "mcp__threatnexus__search_campaigns",
      "mcp__threatnexus__get_attack_coverage",
      "mcp__threatnexus__search_intel",
      "mcp__threatnexus__get_cve",
      "mcp__threatnexus__search_detections",
      "mcp__threatnexus__get_report_indicators"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__threatnexus__map_actor_to_detections",
      "mcp__threatnexus__identify_actors_in_text",
      "mcp__threatnexus__explore_relationships",
      "mcp__threatnexus__pivot_indicator"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as threatnexus. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__threatnexus__get_cve private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.threatnexus/threatnexus/verify?hash=0f21c5a1e1f85100075731ade688dbb61fdbaae78d6540a86f641d9a756a1c6f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0f21c5a1e1f8, from Nov 20, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.threatnexus/threatnexus/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.threatnexus/threatnexus
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.threatnexus/threatnexus.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.threatnexus/threatnexus)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

ThreatNexus MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ThreatNexus MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ThreatNexus MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ThreatNexus MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ThreatNexus MCP server have?

12 tools: 4 write, 8 read. map_actor_to_detections, identify_actors_in_text, explore_relationships, pivot_indicator, search_actors, get_actor, search_campaigns, get_attack_coverage and 4 more.

Does the ThreatNexus MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ThreatNexus MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ThreatNexus MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.