ThreatNexus MCP server
app.threatnexus/threatnexusthreatnexus.appstreamable-httpv85.9.544Scanned
Nation-state APT intel: actor dossiers, ATT&CK coverage, detection rules, intel search, IOC pivots
12 tools: 4 change things and 8 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ThreatNexus MCP server can do
The ThreatNexus MCP server is published by threatnexus.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: map_actor_to_detections, identify_actors_in_text, explore_relationships and pivot_indicator), but cannot delete data. 8 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_cve).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 85.9.544.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
explore_relationshipsThe relationships ThreatNexus dossiers state for an actor (subgroup, overlaps, related-to, similar), one or two hops out, as nodes and edges with confidence.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it The relationships ThreatNexus dossiers state for an actor (subgroup, overlaps, related-to, similar), one or two hops out, as nodes and edges with confidence. Also lists other actors whose dossiers share distinctive malware or CVEs with it — computed overlap, not a stated relationship.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
identify_actors_in_textPaste a report excerpt, alert or article (up to 4000 characters) and get the ThreatNexus-tracked actors it names, using the same evidence-gated resolver ThreatNexus uses on its own…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Paste a report excerpt, alert or article (up to 4000 characters) and get the ThreatNexus-tracked actors it names, using the same evidence-gated resolver ThreatNexus uses on its own ingest — designators such as "APT34" count on sight, weaker aliases only with naming context. Each match links to its dossier. A name in a text is a mention, not an attribution.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
map_actor_to_detectionsDetection rules (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa and ThreatNexus hunting queries) that cover an actor's documented ATT&CK techniques.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Detection rules (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa and ThreatNexus hunting queries) that cover an actor's documented ATT&CK techniques. Metadata, covered techniques, licence and permalink — not the rule bodies. Considers up to 20 of the actor's techniques; for per-technique counts use get_attack_coverage.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
pivot_indicatorEvery report ThreatNexus has collected that published an indicator (IP, domain, URL, email, hash, …) — how many independent reports, with links — plus which tracked actors co-occur…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Every report ThreatNexus has collected that published an indicator (IP, domain, URL, email, hash, …) — how many independent reports, with links — plus which tracked actors co-occur with it in verified reporting. Accepts defanged input. Returns no third-party reputation verdicts.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
get_actorThe curated ThreatNexus dossier for one threat actor: attribution (with tier, confidence and evidence), ATT&CK techniques, malware, exploited CVEs, campaigns, infrastructure patter…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_actor" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The curated ThreatNexus dossier for one threat actor: attribution (with tier, confidence and evidence), ATT&CK techniques, malware, exploited CVEs, campaigns, infrastructure patterns, relationships, GCC/UAE relevance and sources. Choose sections to keep the answer short. "analyst_updates" adds intelligence approved by ThreatNexus analysts since the dossier was written.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_attack_coverageEither an actor's MITRE ATT&CK techniques with how many harvested detection rules cover each, or, for one technique, which actors use it and which detection rules cover it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_attack_coverage" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Either an actor's MITRE ATT&CK techniques with how many harvested detection rules cover each, or, for one technique, which actors use it and which detection rules cover it. Give exactly one of actor or technique.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_cveFor one CVE: the ThreatNexus actors whose dossiers record exploiting it (use get_actor with the "cves" section for the dossier's note and CVSS), plus recent reporting that names th…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_cve" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "note": it reads notes.
Description, as the server wrote it For one CVE: the ThreatNexus actors whose dossiers record exploiting it (use get_actor with the "cves" section for the dossier's note and CVSS), plus recent reporting that names this CVE. Reporting that mentions a CVE does not by itself mean an actor exploited it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_report_indicatorsThe indicators ThreatNexus extracted from one collected report, with extraction confidence, defanged.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_report_indicators" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The indicators ThreatNexus extracted from one collected report, with extraction confidence, defanged. Use a report_id from search_intel, get_cve or pivot_indicator.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_actorsFind nation-state threat actors in the ThreatNexus roster by name or alias, or list them by origin country, motivation, exploited CVE or ATT&CK technique.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_actors" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find nation-state threat actors in the ThreatNexus roster by name or alias, or list them by origin country, motivation, exploited CVE or ATT&CK technique. Returns short profiles with links; use get_actor for a full dossier. An alias shared by several actors returns status "ambiguous" with candidates.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_campaignsCampaigns attributed in ThreatNexus.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_campaigns" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Campaigns attributed in ThreatNexus. With an actor: that actor's curated dossier campaigns plus campaign names from recent reporting about it. Without one: campaign names from recent reporting across approved actors, newest first. Filter by keyword or to active campaigns.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_detectionsSearch the detection rules ThreatNexus harvests (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa, ThreatNexus hunting queries) by keyword, ATT&CK technique or source.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_detections" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the detection rules ThreatNexus harvests (Splunk ESCU, Elastic, Sigma, Hayabusa, ThreatNexus hunting queries) by keyword, ATT&CK technique or source. Production rules first. Returns metadata, licence and permalink — not the rule bodies. Give at least one of query, technique or source.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_intelSearch threat intelligence reporting that ThreatNexus has collected and analysed (vendor research, CERT advisories, news, CVE alerts), ranked by ThreatNexus' hybrid keyword and sem…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_intel" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search threat intelligence reporting that ThreatNexus has collected and analysed (vendor research, CERT advisories, news, CVE alerts), ranked by ThreatNexus' hybrid keyword and semantic search. Returns headlines, links, a ThreatNexus summary, CVEs and mentioned actors. Titles and summaries are third-party derived and marked _untrusted.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.threatnexus.app/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including map_actor_to_detections (write), identify_actors_in_text (write), explore_relationships (write), pivot_indicator (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 85.9.544. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http threatnexus https://mcp.threatnexus.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http threatnexus https://mcp.threatnexus.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__threatnexus__search_actors",
"mcp__threatnexus__get_actor",
"mcp__threatnexus__search_campaigns",
"mcp__threatnexus__get_attack_coverage",
"mcp__threatnexus__search_intel",
"mcp__threatnexus__get_cve",
"mcp__threatnexus__search_detections",
"mcp__threatnexus__get_report_indicators"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__threatnexus__map_actor_to_detections",
"mcp__threatnexus__identify_actors_in_text",
"mcp__threatnexus__explore_relationships",
"mcp__threatnexus__pivot_indicator"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as threatnexus. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__threatnexus__get_cve private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.threatnexus/threatnexus/verify?hash=0f21c5a1e1f85100075731ade688dbb61fdbaae78d6540a86f641d9a756a1c6f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0f21c5a1e1f8, from Nov 20, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.threatnexus/threatnexus/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.threatnexus/threatnexus)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 23:17 UTC.
ThreatNexus MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ThreatNexus MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the ThreatNexus MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ThreatNexus MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the ThreatNexus MCP server have?
- 12 tools: 4 write, 8 read. map_actor_to_detections, identify_actors_in_text, explore_relationships, pivot_indicator, search_actors, get_actor, search_campaigns, get_attack_coverage and 4 more.
Does the ThreatNexus MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ThreatNexus MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the ThreatNexus MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.