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Tier 1 Protocol MCP server

app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocolmcp.tier1protocol.appstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Search files while they stay encrypted: the problem DARPA chased for a decade. Exact quotes back.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server can do

The Tier 1 Protocol MCP server is published by mcp.tier1protocol.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: search and authorize_sources), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • authorize_sourcesAdd selected private ChatGPT files to the paid account's Tier 1 context.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Add selected private ChatGPT files to the paid account's Tier 1 context. Show the filenames and fixed 30-day retention and require explicit confirmation before calling. This upload consent applies to private file intake only; it does not define or narrow the other policy-eligible catalogs Tier 1 may route. Authentication and an active paid plan are required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • fetchPaid exact-span retrieval after Tier 1 search.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid exact-span retrieval after Tier 1 search. Accept only an unchanged id returned by search for the same account. Authentication and an active paid plan are required. Do not invent ids, browse nearby text, or change files.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • render_context_resultsInspect one to six exact coordinates returned by paid Tier 1 search.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect one to six exact coordinates returned by paid Tier 1 search. Pass only unchanged result ids. Tier 1 rehydrates and revalidates each id for the same account; caller-supplied titles, excerpts, URLs, and coordinates are rejected. Authentication and an active paid plan are required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://mcp.tier1protocol.app
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including search (write), authorize_sources (write), index (write), index_upload_token (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 17, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • Warnsearch

    The server marks "search" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 4.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http tier-1-protocol https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http tier-1-protocol https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__tier-1-protocol__fetch",
      "mcp__tier-1-protocol__render_context_results"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__tier-1-protocol__search",
      "mcp__tier-1-protocol__authorize_sources"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tier-1-protocol. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol/verify?hash=6ccbfbf327eb5268ffffeefb0b0b87e0227d3fd84351d23089968c000469bd44" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 6ccbfbf327eb, from Nov 10, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

Tier 1 Protocol MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. search, authorize_sources, fetch and render_context_results.

Does the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.