Tier 1 Protocol MCP server
app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocolmcp.tier1protocol.appstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Search files while they stay encrypted: the problem DARPA chased for a decade. Exact quotes back.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server can do
The Tier 1 Protocol MCP server is published by mcp.tier1protocol.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: search and authorize_sources), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
authorize_sourcesAdd selected private ChatGPT files to the paid account's Tier 1 context.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Add selected private ChatGPT files to the paid account's Tier 1 context. Show the filenames and fixed 30-day retention and require explicit confirmation before calling. This upload consent applies to private file intake only; it does not define or narrow the other policy-eligible catalogs Tier 1 may route. Authentication and an active paid plan are required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
searchRetrying the same public search with the same MCP request identity replays the same bounded operation.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "search" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrying the same public search with the same MCP request identity replays the same bounded operation. Paid context routing for useful work. Route a question across policy-eligible Tier 1 context available to the account, including private, shared, licensed, or public catalogs when present. Returns up to ten verified excerpts, exact source coordinates, signed result ids, and reference URLs. Broad questions may need focused follow-up searches; absence from one result set does not establish absence from the corpus. Authentication and an active paid plan are required. This is not an unrestricted web crawler and cannot change files.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
fetchPaid exact-span retrieval after Tier 1 search.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid exact-span retrieval after Tier 1 search. Accept only an unchanged id returned by search for the same account. Authentication and an active paid plan are required. Do not invent ids, browse nearby text, or change files.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
render_context_resultsInspect one to six exact coordinates returned by paid Tier 1 search.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect one to six exact coordinates returned by paid Tier 1 search. Pass only unchanged result ids. Tier 1 rehydrates and revalidates each id for the same account; caller-supplied titles, excerpts, URLs, and coordinates are rejected. Authentication and an active paid plan are required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://mcp.tier1protocol.app
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including search (write), authorize_sources (write), index (write), index_upload_token (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 17, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnsearch
The server marks "search" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tier-1-protocol https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tier-1-protocol https://mcp.tier1protocol.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tier-1-protocol__fetch",
"mcp__tier-1-protocol__render_context_results"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tier-1-protocol__search",
"mcp__tier-1-protocol__authorize_sources"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tier-1-protocol. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol/verify?hash=6ccbfbf327eb5268ffffeefb0b0b87e0227d3fd84351d23089968c000469bd44" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6ccbfbf327eb, from Nov 10, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.tier1protocol.mcp/tier-1-protocol)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
Tier 1 Protocol MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. search, authorize_sources, fetch and render_context_results.
Does the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Tier 1 Protocol MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.