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ToolSnap MCP server

app.toolsnap/toolsnap-mcptoolsnap.appstreamable-httpv1.1.2Scanned

Deterministic AI agent microtools, no accounts/API keys. fetch_extract: 98% token cut. 47 tools.

17 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 11 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 11 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 10
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ToolSnap MCP server can do

The ToolSnap MCP server is published by toolsnap.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 17 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: remove_background) and create or change data (11 tools: tool_catalog, use_tool, task_recipes, memory_snippet and 7 more). 5 tools only read.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (fetch_extract, fetch_html, fetch_metadata and 3 more); 10 tools can send data out of your system (fetch_extract, fetch_html, html_to_markdown and 7 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

17 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • remove_backgroundRemove an image's background, return a transparent PNG URL.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "remove_background" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Remove an image's background, return a transparent PNG URL. $0.03 USDC/call. Paid: calling without a payment payload returns a structured 402 with payment options — that response is the documented behavior, not a failure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Remove image background
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
Changes things 11Claude Code: ask
  • html_to_markdownFree, read-only.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Convert a fetched URL or an HTML string you pass (one of the two) to Markdown: headings, links, lists, emphasis, code, quotes. Drops nav, header, footer, aside, script and style. Returns text, cut at maxChars with a marker. Runs no JavaScript: SPAs return an empty shell. Tables become plain text.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Convert HTML to Markdown
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • keyword_researchGoogle Ads volume/CPC/competition for 1-20 keywords.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Google Ads volume/CPC/competition for 1-20 keywords. $0.04 USDC/call. Paid: calling without a payment payload returns a structured 402 with payment options — that response is the documented behavior, not a failure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Keyword research
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • memory_snippetFree, read-only.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Returns static text: a short note on when ToolSnap tools suit a task, plus how to store a note in your runtime's memory. This tool saves nothing. Use only if your user asks about persistent memory or ToolSnap setup; show them the text and save it only with their approval.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Memory snippet for agents
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • pdf_text_extractFree, read-only.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Extract plain text from a PDF given as a URL (max 20 MB) or inline base64 (max 5 MB), one of the two. Returns text, cut at maxChars with a marker. Text-layer PDFs only: scans return little or nothing (no OCR). Layout and tables are not preserved. Fails if the URL serves HTML, not a PDF.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Extract PDF text
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • pricingFree, read-only, no network, no arguments; calling it charges nothing.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only, no network, no arguments; calling it charges nothing. Call it before a paid tool to see its exact cost and whether first_call_free applies, or to choose pay-per-call vs prepaid. Returns a JSON menu: endpoint and docs URLs; payment with x402 USDC on Base, minimum deposit, prepaid discount and SpendAuthorization fields; tools[] with name and tier free|paid, plus price_usdc, prepaid_price_usdc, first_call_free and a value note for paid ones. Flat prices are exact; fal.ai media tools show a default-args quote. For what a tool does and its schema use tool_catalog; this one is only about cost.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Pricing and payment options
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • rss_parseFree, read-only.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Fetch an RSS 2.0 or Atom feed and return JSON: feed title, link, description, lastBuildDate, itemCount, truncated, and items[] with title, link, pubDate, guid, description (HTML stripped), author, categories, enclosure. Items past maxItems are dropped and truncated=true. A URL that is not a feed returns type 'unknown' and no items. Not JSON Feed. Errors on non-2xx, 10 s timeout or private hosts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Parse RSS or Atom feed
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • screenshot_urlScreenshot a page → public image URL.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "screenshot" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "screenshot_url" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false}; The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screenshot a page → public image URL. $0.04/call. Paid: calling without a payment payload returns a structured 402 with payment options — that response is the documented behavior, not a failure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screenshot a URL
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
  • sitemap_parseFree, read-only.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Fetch one XML sitemap and return JSON. A urlset gives urls[] (loc, lastmod, changefreq, priority, plus image/news extensions), urlCount and truncated. A sitemap index gives type 'sitemapindex' and sitemaps[] with the child URLs; children are not fetched, call again per child. Uncompressed XML only, no .gz. Errors on non-2xx, 10 s timeout or private hosts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Parse sitemap
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • task_recipesFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. Multi-tool workflow prompts (clone a site, SEO audit). No args → menu; recipe='<id>' → prompt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Task recipes
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tool_catalogFree, read-only, no network.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only, no network. Browse all 47 tools in 10 families (web, seo, data, documents, images, media, utils, payments, recipes, meta). No args: families with id, label, one-liner, tool count. family='<id>': each tool with name, price, description, notes, inputSchema. tool='<name>': that entry alone; wins over family. Unknown ids error naming the valid families. Run what you find via use_tool.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Browse tool catalog
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • use_toolFree wrapper.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free wrapper. Runs any catalog tool missing from your tools/list exactly as a direct call: args pass through unchanged and the inner tool's price, payment, result and errors apply verbatim. Its hints are the worst case over the whole catalog: not read-only because some inner tools create a render, a stored file or a ledger entry; never destructive because no catalog tool deletes or overwrites anything. Get the inner tool's name, schema and its own annotations from tool_catalog(tool='<name>') first. A missing or unknown name errors pointing to tool_catalog; it cannot call itself.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Run any catalog tool
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • csv_queryFree, read-only.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "csv_query" says "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Query a comma-separated CSV with a header row, from a URL (max 5 MB, streamed) or inline text, one of the two: select columns, filter rows, sort, limit. Returns {meta:{returned_rows,columns,total_rows,truncated},rows:[{column:value}]}, all values strings, or CSV text with format='csv'. One filter condition, no joins or aggregates. Unknown select columns and bad filters error with the valid names or operators. Over 5 MB: csv_query_xl (paid, 100 MB).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Query CSV
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • fetch_extractFree, read-only.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_extract" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Fetch a public http(s) URL and return its body as plain text: script, style, nav, header, footer and aside removed, tags stripped, entities decoded, whitespace collapsed. Median 98% fewer tokens than raw HTML. Follows up to 5 redirects, 10 s timeout; private and local hosts are rejected and non-2xx responses error with the HTTP status. Text past maxChars is cut and ends with '[Truncated at N chars]': raise maxChars (max 32000) or use fetch_html for everything. Runs no JavaScript: a client-side-rendered SPA or a bot/login wall yields almost no text, so the call errors instead of returning an empty shell and names the fix (fetch_rendered, paid, runs a browser; screenshot_url; or headers for auth). For title/OG/JSON-LD only use fetch_metadata; for Markdown with links use html_to_markdown.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch page as clean text
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • fetch_htmlFree, read-only.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_html" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "fetch_html" says "fetch" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Fetch a page and return its HTML minus scripts, styles, svg, iframes, comments and inline handlers; tags and attributes stay, so structure is readable. For inspecting or rebuilding markup, not plain text (fetch_extract gives that). Runs no JavaScript: SPAs return an empty shell. Cut at maxChars with a marker.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch raw HTML
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • fetch_metadataFree, read-only.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_metadata" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Fetch a public http(s) URL and return its <head> metadata as JSON: url (after redirects), title, description, canonical, robots, author, keywords, lang, charset, og{} and twitter{} (prefix stripped), httpEquiv{}, jsonLd[] (parsed blocks, malformed ones skipped). Absent fields are null or {}. Reads only the first 512 KB, follows up to 5 redirects, 10 s timeout; private and local hosts are rejected and non-2xx responses error with the HTTP status. Runs no JavaScript, so tags injected client-side are not seen. Not for body text: use fetch_extract (plain text) or fetch_html (raw HTML).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch page metadata
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • json_queryFree, read-only.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "json_query" says "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. JSONPath-lite query on JSON from a URL or an inline string (one of the two). Returns matches as JSON: one match bare, several as an array. Supports $, .key, ['key'], [0], [-1], [*], ..key and [?(@.k op v)]; no slices or jq. Errors on invalid JSON or over 5 MB (json_query_xl: paid, 25 MB).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Query JSON
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out10
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:30 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
12
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.toolsnap.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://portal.toolsnap.app
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 12 tools that change things (1 destructive, 11 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.toolsnap.app/mcp: tools/list returned 17 tools to an anonymous client, including remove_background (destructive), tool_catalog (write), use_tool (write), task_recipes (write), memory_snippet (write) and 7 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 12

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "screenshot_url" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false}; The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "remove_background" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools17 changed.~17 changedView diff
    • Changed:csv_queryOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:fetch_extractOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:fetch_htmlOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:fetch_metadataOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:html_to_markdownChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:json_queryOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:keyword_researchChanges thingstitleannotations
    • Changed:memory_snippetChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:pdf_text_extractChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:pricingChanges thingstitledescriptionannotations
    • Changed:remove_backgroundDeletes or cancelstitleannotations
    • Changed:rss_parseChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:screenshot_urlChanges thingstitleannotations
    • Changed:sitemap_parseChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:task_recipesChanges thingstitleannotations
    • Changed:tool_catalogChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:use_toolChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 -> 12.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 10 to 12

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http toolsnap https://mcp.toolsnap.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http toolsnap https://mcp.toolsnap.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__toolsnap__tool_catalog",
      "mcp__toolsnap__use_tool",
      "mcp__toolsnap__task_recipes",
      "mcp__toolsnap__memory_snippet",
      "mcp__toolsnap__pricing",
      "mcp__toolsnap__fetch_extract",
      "mcp__toolsnap__fetch_html",
      "mcp__toolsnap__html_to_markdown",
      "mcp__toolsnap__fetch_metadata",
      "mcp__toolsnap__pdf_text_extract",
      "mcp__toolsnap__csv_query",
      "mcp__toolsnap__json_query",
      "mcp__toolsnap__sitemap_parse",
      "mcp__toolsnap__rss_parse",
      "mcp__toolsnap__screenshot_url",
      "mcp__toolsnap__keyword_research"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__toolsnap__remove_background"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as toolsnap. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 10 rules
  • mcp__toolsnap__fetch_extract untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__fetch_html untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__html_to_markdown outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__fetch_metadata untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__pdf_text_extract outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__csv_query untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__json_query untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__sitemap_parse outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__rss_parse outbound
  • mcp__toolsnap__screenshot_url untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.toolsnap/toolsnap-mcp/verify?hash=cfcedcc0e9f17b16589d8b86f71c08d261a7fd1b3fb02c7927b7131594254130" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash cfcedcc0e9f1, from Nov 8, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.toolsnap/toolsnap-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.toolsnap/toolsnap-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.toolsnap/toolsnap-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.toolsnap/toolsnap-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 22:17 UTC.

ToolSnap MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ToolSnap MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 17 tools, 12 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ToolSnap MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: remove_background.

Can the ToolSnap MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ToolSnap MCP server have?

17 tools: 1 destructive, 11 write, 5 read. remove_background, tool_catalog, use_tool, task_recipes, memory_snippet, pricing, html_to_markdown, pdf_text_extract and 9 more.

Does the ToolSnap MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ToolSnap MCP server send data to outside services?

10 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): fetch_extract, fetch_html, html_to_markdown, fetch_metadata, pdf_text_extract, csv_query and 4 more.

Has the ToolSnap MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.