HealthPass MCP server
app.travelhealthpass/healthpasstravelhealthpass.appstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned
Find verified travel-health doctors and request an appointment on HealthPass.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the HealthPass MCP server can do
The HealthPass MCP server is published by travelhealthpass.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (prepare_appointment), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (prepare_appointment); 1 tool can send data out of your system (prepare_appointment).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
prepare_appointmentHand over a doctor you found so the traveller can request an appointment on HealthPass.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.preferredDays.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.doctor.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Hand over a doctor you found so the traveller can request an appointment on HealthPass. This books nothing and sends nothing: it returns a link the traveller opens to sign in, check the doctor and send the request. Takes the doctor's details with their sources; it has no field for the traveller's name, diagnosis, condition or medication. HealthPass emails the practice only if the address appears on the practice's own website.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Hand a doctor over to HealthPass
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
find_travel_health_providerSearch verified travel-health doctors and clinics by country, city or position, service and language, nearest first when a position is given.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_travel_health_provider" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search verified travel-health doctors and clinics by country, city or position, service and language, nearest first when a position is given. Each result has a page and a HealthPass link where the traveller requests an appointment. Returns only providers a person has checked.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find a travel-health doctor
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_destination_requirementsWhere the official entry and vaccination requirements for a country are published (CDC, WHO), and the HealthPass trip plan that matches them to the traveller's own record.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_destination_requirements" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Where the official entry and vaccination requirements for a country are published (CDC, WHO), and the HealthPass trip plan that matches them to the traveller's own record.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Health requirements for a destination
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_providerThe checked details of one verified provider: services, languages, foreign-patient policy, opening hours, date verified, and the HealthPass request link.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_provider" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The checked details of one verified provider: services, languages, foreign-patient policy, opening hours, date verified, and the HealthPass request link.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a travel-health doctor
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://travelhealthpass.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including prepare_appointment (irreversible)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
- Changed:find_travel_health_providerOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_destination_requirementsOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_providerOnly readsannotations
- Changed:prepare_appointmentCan't be undonedescriptionannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http healthpass https://travelhealthpass.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http healthpass https://travelhealthpass.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__healthpass__find_travel_health_provider",
"mcp__healthpass__get_provider",
"mcp__healthpass__get_destination_requirements"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__healthpass__prepare_appointment"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as healthpass. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__healthpass__prepare_appointment untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.travelhealthpass/healthpass/verify?hash=ea2557b677552b9d8ed1e7221b3a84fe2fd86a46424f1d2d45e2ac57d6fed363" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ea2557b67755, from Nov 12, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.travelhealthpass/healthpass/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.travelhealthpass/healthpass)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
HealthPass MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the HealthPass MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the HealthPass MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the HealthPass MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: prepare_appointment.
What tools does the HealthPass MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 read. prepare_appointment, find_travel_health_provider, get_provider and get_destination_requirements.
Does the HealthPass MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the HealthPass MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): prepare_appointment.
Has the HealthPass MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.