Mailroom MCP server
app.usemailroom/mailroomusemailroom.appstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Your own IMAP mailbox in any MCP client: search, read, flag, move; send and delete need confirm.
7 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 3
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Mailroom MCP server can do
The Mailroom MCP server is published by usemailroom.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: send_email and empty_trash) and create or change data (2 tools: flag_message and move_message). 3 tools only read.
3 tools read private data (list_folders, search_messages and read_message); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (list_folders, search_messages, read_message and 1 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (move_message and send_email). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in.
Last scanned Oct 30, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
empty_trashPermanently delete every message in the Trash folder.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The description says "Permanently delete".
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Permanently delete every message in the Trash folder. Returns a preview (folder and message count) unless confirm=true.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Empty Trash (preview unless confirm=true)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
send_emailSend email via SMTP.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_email" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "send_email" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send email via SMTP. Pass confirm=true to actually send. Otherwise returns a preview.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Send email (preview unless confirm=true)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
flag_messageFlag a message.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Flag a message. action: seen, unseen, flagged, unflagged, deleted. deleted moves the message to the mailbox's Trash folder (recoverable). Use empty_trash to delete permanently.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Flag message or move it to Trash
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
move_messageMove a message to dest_folder.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "move_message" says "move": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "move_message" says "move" and "message": it writes something other people read.
Description, as the server wrote it Move a message to dest_folder.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Move message
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
list_foldersList all folders in the connected mailbox.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_folders" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "list_folders" says "list" and "folder": it reads files.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "folder": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "mailbox": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List all folders in the connected mailbox.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List folders
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
read_messageRead one message by IMAP UID.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_message" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "read_message" says "read" and "message": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "message": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe input names a folder (input.folder), and the tool reads: it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe name "read_message" says "read" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Read one message by IMAP UID.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Read message
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_messagesSearch a folder.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_messages" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_messages" says "search" and "message": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "folder": it reads files.
- private-dataThe input names a folder (input.folder), and the tool reads: it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe name "search_messages" says "search" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Search a folder. criteria examples: ALL, UNSEEN, FROM alice@example.com.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search messages
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
24 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 outbound tools breaks every one.
- Reads private data3
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__mailroom__move_message",
"mcp__mailroom__send_email"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:30 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 401
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint asks for credentials (HTTP 401) but publishes no RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: no resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate and no document at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://usemailroom.app/mcp: initialize answered HTTP 401, with a WWW-Authenticate header
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
- Oct 29, 2026
- Reachable: no to yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 401; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 0 (and 2 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 2 more).View diff
- Reachable: no to yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http mailroom https://usemailroom.app/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http mailroom https://usemailroom.app/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__mailroom__list_folders",
"mcp__mailroom__search_messages",
"mcp__mailroom__read_message"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__mailroom__flag_message",
"mcp__mailroom__move_message"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__mailroom__send_email",
"mcp__mailroom__empty_trash"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mailroom. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__mailroom__list_folders private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__mailroom__search_messages private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__mailroom__read_message private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__mailroom__move_message outbound
- mcp__mailroom__send_email untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.usemailroom/mailroom/verify?hash=48b9a1eb0712a12570c10c499b1bf9629fda1a6f5720df2bc4d7d4fa7ab686a0" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 48b9a1eb0712, from Oct 30, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.usemailroom/mailroom/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.usemailroom/mailroom)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.
Mailroom MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Mailroom MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Mailroom MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: send_email and empty_trash.
Can the Mailroom MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Mailroom MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 2 destructive, 2 write, 3 read. send_email, empty_trash, flag_message, move_message, list_folders, search_messages and read_message.
Does the Mailroom MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and no OAuth protected resource metadata was found.
Does the Mailroom MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): move_message and send_email.
Has the Mailroom MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 30, 2026.