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BaseLens MCP server

app.vercel.baselens-api/baselensbaselens-api.vercel.appstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Base on-chain data for agents: balances, prices, transfers, Basenames, contracts. x402 pay-per-call.

11 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 8 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 10
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the BaseLens MCP server can do

The BaseLens MCP server is published by baselens-api.vercel.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (base_transfers) and create or change data (8 tools: base_address, base_erc20_balance, base_token, base_tx and 4 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

10 tools bring in text other people can write (base_address, base_erc20_balance, base_token and 7 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • base_transfersRecent ERC-20 transfers in and out of an address on Base for up to 5 tokens (default USDC), newest first, over the last ~10k blocks (max 30k).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "base_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "base_transfers" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "base_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recent ERC-20 transfers in and out of an address on Base for up to 5 tokens (default USDC), newest first, over the last ~10k blocks (max 30k). Check incoming payments or wallet activity. Costs $0.004 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • base_addressBase (chain 8453) address snapshot: EOA vs contract vs EIP-7702, ETH balance, nonce, code size and native USDC balance, at the latest block.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Base (chain 8453) address snapshot: EOA vs contract vs EIP-7702, ETH balance, nonce, code size and native USDC balance, at the latest block. Costs $0.002 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • base_contractContract check on Base: is it a contract, code size, owner(), proxy implementation, and whether the source (and implementation) is verified on Sourcify, plus plain-language notes.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Contract check on Base: is it a contract, code size, owner(), proxy implementation, and whether the source (and implementation) is verified on Sourcify, plus plain-language notes. Not an audit. Costs $0.003 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • base_erc20_balanceERC-20 balance of any address for any token on Base, with symbol and decimals already applied (raw and human-readable).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    ERC-20 balance of any address for any token on Base, with symbol and decimals already applied (raw and human-readable). Costs $0.002 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • base_free_gas_sampleFree sample: latest Base block number and base fee (gwei).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free sample: latest Base block number and base fee (gwei). Use it to test the connection.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • base_gasCurrent Base gas: base fee, gas price, suggested EIP-1559 max fee and priority fee (gwei), block fullness, and cost of a plain ETH transfer.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Current Base gas: base fee, gas price, suggested EIP-1559 max fee and priority fee (gwei), block fullness, and cost of a plain ETH transfer. Costs $0.001 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • base_priceOn-chain USDC price of any Base ERC-20: executable Uniswap v3 quote for 1 whole token (direct USDC pool or via WETH, best fee tier).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    On-chain USDC price of any Base ERC-20: executable Uniswap v3 quote for 1 whole token (direct USDC pool or via WETH, best fee tier). No third-party price API. Costs $0.003 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • base_tokenToken facts on Base: name, symbol, decimals, total supply, contract code size, owner() and EIP-1967 proxy implementation, plus plain-language notes (upgradeable?Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Token facts on Base: name, symbol, decimals, total supply, contract code size, owner() and EIP-1967 proxy implementation, plus plain-language notes (upgradeable? owner renounced?). Read-only facts, not advice. Costs $0.003 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • base_txHuman-readable summary of a Base transaction: status, block time, from/to, value, total fee (incl.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Human-readable summary of a Base transaction: status, block time, from/to, value, total fee (incl. L1 fee), and decoded ERC-20 Transfer events with token symbols and amounts. Handy to verify a payment landed. Costs $0.003 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • base_catalogLists every BaseLens tool with price, inputs and the equivalent x402 HTTP URL.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists every BaseLens tool with price, inputs and the equivalent x402 HTTP URL.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • base_nameResolve a Basename (name.base.eth) or ENS name to its Base/Ethereum address, or reverse-resolve an address to its primary ENS/Basename.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve a Basename (name.base.eth) or ENS name to its Base/Ethereum address, or reverse-resolve an address to its primary ENS/Basename. Includes avatar record. Costs $0.001 USDC on Base via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write10
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 14, 2026, 12:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://baselens-api.vercel.app/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including base_transfers (irreversible), base_address (write), base_erc20_balance (write), base_token (write), base_tx (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "base_transfers" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "base_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http baselens https://baselens-api.vercel.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http baselens https://baselens-api.vercel.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__baselens__base_name",
      "mcp__baselens__base_catalog"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__baselens__base_address",
      "mcp__baselens__base_erc20_balance",
      "mcp__baselens__base_token",
      "mcp__baselens__base_tx",
      "mcp__baselens__base_gas",
      "mcp__baselens__base_price",
      "mcp__baselens__base_transfers",
      "mcp__baselens__base_contract",
      "mcp__baselens__base_free_gas_sample"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as baselens. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 10 rules
  • mcp__baselens__base_address untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_erc20_balance untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_token untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_tx untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_gas untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_name untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_price untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_transfers untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_contract untrusted-input
  • mcp__baselens__base_catalog untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.vercel.baselens-api/baselens/verify?hash=f320603b3a29ce84e69a63183809332375d6fcad0c709a7f82b72a45a606e2cb" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f320603b3a29, from Nov 12, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.vercel.baselens-api/baselens/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for app.vercel.baselens-api/baselens
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/app.vercel.baselens-api/baselens.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.vercel.baselens-api/baselens)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

BaseLens MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the BaseLens MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the BaseLens MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the BaseLens MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: base_transfers.

What tools does the BaseLens MCP server have?

11 tools: 1 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read. base_transfers, base_address, base_erc20_balance, base_token, base_tx, base_gas, base_price, base_contract and 3 more.

Does the BaseLens MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the BaseLens MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the BaseLens MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.