x-toolkit MCP server
app.x-toolkit/x-toolkitx-toolkit.appstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Read public X posts with no account or key: Articles as Markdown, video transcripts, posts.
4 tools: 1 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 4
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the x-toolkit MCP server can do
The x-toolkit MCP server is published by x-toolkit.app, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: transcribe_x_video), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (read_x_article, get_x_video_transcript, transcribe_x_video and 1 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (read_x_article, get_x_video_transcript, transcribe_x_video and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
transcribe_x_videoTranscribes the video in an X post that has no captions, one part (about 108 seconds of audio) per call.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Transcribes the video in an X post that has no captions, one part (about 108 seconds of audio) per call. Start with part 0. Each call says whether to call again with the next part; the last one returns the transcript. The transcript is saved, so get_x_video_transcript works for it afterwards. Videos up to 15 minutes. Only text is stored, never video or audio.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_x_video_transcriptReturns the transcript of the video in an X (Twitter) post: X's own captions when they exist, or a transcript x-toolkit made earlier.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_x_video_transcript" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the transcript of the video in an X (Twitter) post: X's own captions when they exist, or a transcript x-toolkit made earlier. If there is none yet, it says so; call transcribe_x_video to make one.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
read_x_articleReturns an X (Twitter) Article as Markdown with images in place.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_x_article" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns an X (Twitter) Article as Markdown with images in place. X only shows Articles to signed-in readers, so fetching the link directly gets a login page. Pass the link of the post the Article was published in. Optionally translate it with lang.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
read_x_postReturns a single X (Twitter) post as Markdown: author, date, text, the quoted post, image links and counts.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_x_post" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "read_x_post" says "read" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns a single X (Twitter) post as Markdown: author, date, text, the quoted post, image links and counts. For an Article use read_x_article; for a video's words use get_x_video_transcript.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out4
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://x-toolkit.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including transcribe_x_video (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http x-toolkit https://x-toolkit.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http x-toolkit https://x-toolkit.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__x-toolkit__read_x_article",
"mcp__x-toolkit__get_x_video_transcript",
"mcp__x-toolkit__transcribe_x_video",
"mcp__x-toolkit__read_x_post"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as x-toolkit. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__x-toolkit__read_x_article untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__x-toolkit__get_x_video_transcript untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__x-toolkit__transcribe_x_video untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__x-toolkit__read_x_post untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/app.x-toolkit/x-toolkit/verify?hash=e445503250bdf314945c0f3a95e466818ee424271b40b29142180ffbb8c9b540" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e445503250bd, from Nov 13, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.x-toolkit/x-toolkit/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/app.x-toolkit/x-toolkit)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
x-toolkit MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the x-toolkit MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the x-toolkit MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the x-toolkit MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the x-toolkit MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 write, 3 read. transcribe_x_video, read_x_article, get_x_video_transcript and read_x_post.
Does the x-toolkit MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the x-toolkit MCP server send data to outside services?
- 4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): read_x_article, get_x_video_transcript, transcribe_x_video and read_x_post.
Has the x-toolkit MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.