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registry MCP server

au.com.bidit/registrybidit.com.austreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Does this retailer take offers, and does it price match? Verified answers, checked by a person.

5 tools: 5 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the registry MCP server can do

The registry MCP server is published by bidit.com.au, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • can_make_offerReturns whether a shopper can make this retailer an offer instead of paying the listed price.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns whether a shopper can make this retailer an offer instead of paying the listed price. answer is yes (the retailer accepts offers through Bidit now; offers_url is where) or not_yet (the retailer does not; register_interest_url and consent_text describe how a shopper can register the price they would pay). There is no third state.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Can a shopper make this retailer an offer?
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • find_productsSearches the products the Registry has pulled from its retailers' own catalogues (Shopify stores, up to 500 products each) and returns each hit with its price, its page at the stor…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_products" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Searches the products the Registry has pulled from its retailers' own catalogues (Shopify stores, up to 500 products each) and returns each hit with its price, its page at the store, when it was last seen, and the store's verified facts: whether it accepts offers (true only when the store is in the engine's live list) and whether it price matches (yes or no only after a person verified the policy; unknown otherwise). Filter by country, a ceiling on price, only stores that take offers, or only stores with a verified price-match policy. Prices and availability are as of last_seen_at; confirm on the product page before quoting. Not every retailer's products are listed, so an empty result is not a no.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find products at retailers that take offers or price match
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • price_policyReturns everything the Registry has verified about how a retailer handles price: whether it takes offers through Bidit, whether it price matches and on what terms, how it runs prom…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns everything the Registry has verified about how a retailer handles price: whether it takes offers through Bidit, whether it price matches and on what terms, how it runs promotions, and its clearance page. Fields are null where nothing has been verified.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: A retailer's verified price policy
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • retailers_that_price_matchReturns the retailers whose price-match policy a person has verified, optionally filtered by category and country, each with its terms and policy page.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the retailers whose price-match policy a person has verified, optionally filtered by category and country, each with its terms and policy page. A retailer absent from the list is unverified, not a no.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Retailers with a verified price-match policy
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • will_price_matchReturns whether a retailer publishes a policy of matching a competitor's lower price, with the verified terms, exclusions, how to claim, a sentence quoted from the policy and the p…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns whether a retailer publishes a policy of matching a competitor's lower price, with the verified terms, exclusions, how to claim, a sentence quoted from the policy and the policy page. answer is yes (a person has verified the published policy), no (a person looked and found none) or unknown (not verified). Whether a particular competitor price qualifies depends on the terms returned.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Will this retailer price match?
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:30 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http registry https://registry.bidit.com.au/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http registry https://registry.bidit.com.au/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__registry__will_price_match",
      "mcp__registry__price_policy",
      "mcp__registry__retailers_that_price_match",
      "mcp__registry__can_make_offer",
      "mcp__registry__find_products"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as registry. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/au.com.bidit/registry/verify?hash=608055c47909aef17b4674ea38aacc94bad6d8a96baa52accf03835556a71db3" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 608055c47909, from Nov 10, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/au.com.bidit/registry/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for au.com.bidit/registry
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/au.com.bidit/registry.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/au.com.bidit/registry)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.

registry MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the registry MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the registry MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the registry MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the registry MCP server have?

5 tools: 5 read. will_price_match, price_policy, retailers_that_price_match, can_make_offer and find_products.

Does the registry MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the registry MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the registry MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 29, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.