Premrest MCP server
au.com.premrest/premrestpremrest.com.austreamable-httpv1.2.4Scanned
Commercial floor care, non-slip and urgent flood enquiries for facilities across Australia.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Premrest MCP server can do
The Premrest MCP server is published by premrest.com.au, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: submit_service_request), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (list_services); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (submit_service_request); 1 tool can send data out of your system (submit_service_request). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.2.4.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
submit_service_requestCreates a Premrest quote, preferred-date booking or flood restoration enquiry in the private staff queue and sends it to the website Formspree inbox with the configured AI integrat…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_service_request" says "submit": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Creates a Premrest quote, preferred-date booking or flood restoration enquiry in the private staff queue and sends it to the website Formspree inbox with the configured AI integration source. Submitting an enquiry requests contact from Premrest about that enquiry. urgent_flood requests use flood-restoration and do not require a preferred date. Returns a request reference, delivery status and call/text contact options. Repeated identical requests with the same idempotency_key return the original reference without duplicate delivery. Does not confirm dispatch, arrival time, price or booking and does not process payments. Photo inputs are optional customer-provided HTTPS links.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Submit Premrest service request
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_servicesList Premrest commercial flooring services, including non-slip coatings, anti-slip tile treatments, slippery-floor assessments, flood restoration, and phone and SMS contact details…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "contact": it reads contacts.
Description, as the server wrote it List Premrest commercial flooring services, including non-slip coatings, anti-slip tile treatments, slippery-floor assessments, flood restoration, and phone and SMS contact details. Prices and availability require assessment by the Premrest team.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List Premrest services
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__premrest__submit_service_request"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:31 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://premrest.com.au/mcp?provider=agent: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_service_request (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:list_servicesOnly readsdescription
- Changed:submit_service_requestChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http premrest https://premrest.com.au/mcp?provider=agentclaude mcp add --transport http premrest https://premrest.com.au/mcp?provider=agentRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__premrest__list_services"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__premrest__submit_service_request"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as premrest. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__premrest__list_services private-data
- mcp__premrest__submit_service_request untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/au.com.premrest/premrest/verify?hash=1aad2c91b135a208b56c2300786310fd021b1be9785f821a7bd66702f72e9b4f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1aad2c91b135, from Nov 12, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/au.com.premrest/premrest/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/au.com.premrest/premrest)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:45 UTC.
Premrest MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Premrest MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Premrest MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Premrest MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Premrest MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. submit_service_request and list_services.
Does the Premrest MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Premrest MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): submit_service_request.
Has the Premrest MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 30, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.